This paper investigates the influence of ideology on trust in scientists. We assume that during a pandemic, ideology is linked to levels of trust in scientists such that those espousing left- (vs. ...right-) wing beliefs trust the scientific profession more. We posit that the negative perception of scientists, a feature of right-wing narratives in the country of study, underlies this effect. Additionally, we argue that ideology has an indirect impact, via levels of trust in scientists, on beliefs and attitudes towards vaccines and vaccine policy. To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies (N = 1,155): one prepandemic study and two studies during a pandemic. The results confirmed the hypotheses; however, we observed varied effects at the outset of the pandemic versus later stages. The findings contribute to the ongoing discussion around the ideological underpinnings of trust in scientists and carry implications for public health measures.
Research shows that people prefer self-consistent over self-discrepant feedback—the self-verification effect. It is not clear, however, whether the effect stems from striving for self-verification or ...from the preference for subjectively accurate information. We argue that people prefer self-verifying feedback because they find it to be more accurate than self-discrepant feedback. We thus experimentally manipulated feedback credibility by providing information on its source: a student (control condition) or an experienced psychologist (experimental condition). In line with our expectations, the results of two preregistered studies with 342 adults showed that people preferred self-verifying feedback only in the control condition. In the experimental condition, the effect disappeared (or reversed, in Study 1). Study 2 showed that individual differences in credibility (epistemic authority) ascribed to the self and to psychologists matter as well. These findings suggest that feedback credibility, rather than the desire for self-verification, often drives the self-verification effect.
The paper investigates the psychological factors associated with the unprecedented assistance that Poles have offered refugees from Ukraine since the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Building ...on social identity theory, and examining the current social context in Poland, we focus on three social identity dimensions, i.e., a feeling of closeness towards refugees from Ukraine, anticipatory fears (of a Russian invasion), and a community norm of helping. These three dimensions predict collective helping resulting from a sense of a common fate and a feeling of togetherness with Ukrainians. We tested this hypothesis in a study (N = 1066) conducted between 11 and 17 March 2022. Participants were asked about their helping activities during the previous week; they also responded to questions on different measures of social identity processes. The results support our expectations, revealing that closeness, anticipatory fears, and social norms are associated with two forms of help: benevolent and activist. The results of the study contribute to the discussion on social identity processes underlying offers of help to people fleeing from war-zones. Thus, they enhance our understanding of the role of citizens in terms of their contribution to helping refugees, and can be used to improve responses to other humanitarian crises.
According to the principle of energy-conservation principle, effort investment is usually reduced in situations that are perceived as uncontrollable. This is because when success is recognized as ...impossible, any effortful actions are no longer justified. However, we predicted that individual differences in uncertainty tolerance, i.e., the need for closure (NFC), may moderate effort investment in uncontrollable situations. We tested this prediction in two experimental studies in which we exposed participants with differing levels of NFC to uncontrollable events, and indexed effort through the assessment of systolic blood pressure (SBP) responses. As predicted, in the uncontrollability (vs. controllability) condition, effort investment decreased significantly among low- but not high-NFC participants. Since gaining certainty and achieving closure is not a critical epistemic goal for low-NFC individuals, exerting extra effort to gain certainty is therefore no longer justified. On the other hand, high-NFC participants do not withhold their efforts, as they are highly motivated to obtain certainty. These results may help to account for contradictory findings in effort-investment behaviour and add substantively to the literature concerning motivation toward closure.
One might assume that the desire to help (here described as
Want
) is the essential driver of helping declarations and/or behaviors. However, even if desire to help (
Want
) is low, intention to help ...may still occur if the expectancy regarding the perceived effectiveness of helping is high. We tested these predictions in a set of three experimental studies. In all three, we measured the desire to help (
Want
) and the
Expectancy
that the aid would be impactful for the victim; in addition, we manipulated
Expectancy
in Study 3. In Studies 1 and 3, we measured the participants’ declaration to help while in Study 2, their helping behavior was examined. In all three studies, we used variations of the same story about a victim. The results supported our hypothesis. Thus, the studies help to tease apart the determinants of helping under conditions of lowered desire to do so, an issue of great importance in public policymaking.
Critical reflection on one's own group is beneficial for the group in the long run, yet critics addressing its wrongdoings are usually not welcomed and have to cope with hostility and ostracism from ...the ingroup. The present research tested whether the personal sense of control and perceived self-efficacy help one to speak out against one's own group and to endure its pressure to conform. The results across two studies (total N = 212) show that perceived self-efficacy (Study 1, correlational), or its experimental equivalent, perceived self-competence (Study 2, experimental), mediated the relationship between the sense of control and critical group reflection. The findings suggest that confidence in one's own abilities, which is the core of perceived self-efficacy and self-competence, is more important than the feelings of being in control and of having influence over reality. Confidence in one's own efficacy drives the individual to defend one's own ideas even when they are at odds with ingroup norms, and it allows one to cope with the adversity that may arise as a consequence of doing so.
•Sense of control is positively linked with critical reflection on the ingroup via self-efficacy.•Perceived self-competence facilitates critical reflection on the ingroup.•Sense of control without self-efficacy can lead to lower critical reflection on the ingroup.
Examining the relationship between brain activity and religious fundamentalism, this study explores whether fundamentalist religious beliefs increase responses to error-related words among ...participants intolerant to uncertainty (i.e., high in the need for closure) in comparison to those who have a high degree of toleration for uncertainty (i.e., those who are low in the need for closure). We examine a negative-going event-related brain potentials occurring 400 ms after stimulus onset (the N400) due to its well-understood association with the reactions to emotional conflict. Religious fundamentalism and tolerance of uncertainty were measured on self-report measures, and electroencephalographic neural reactivity was recorded as participants were performing an emotional Stroop task. In this task, participants read neutral words and words related to uncertainty, errors, and pondering, while being asked to name the color of the ink with which the word is written. The results confirm that among people who are intolerant of uncertainty (i.e., those high in the need for closure), religious fundamentalism is associated with an increased N400 on error-related words compared with people who tolerate uncertainty well (i.e., those low in the need for closure).
We claim that religious orthodoxy is related to prejudice toward groups that violate important values, i.e., atheists. Moreover, we suggest that expressing prejudice may efficiently reduce the threat ...posed by this particular group among people who hold high levels, but not low levels, of orthodox belief. We tested these assumptions in an experimental study in which, after being exposed to atheistic worldviews (value-threat manipulation), high and low orthodox participants were allowed (experimental condition) or not (control condition) to express prejudice toward atheists. Threat was operationalized by cardiovascular reactivity, i.e., heart rate (HR); the higher the HR index, the higher the threat. The results found that people who hold high (vs. low) levels of orthodox belief responded with increased HR after the threat manipulation. However, we observed decreased HR after the expression of prejudice toward atheists among highly orthodox participants compared to the control condition. We did not find this effect among people holding low levels of orthodox belief. Thus, we conclude that expressing prejudice toward this particular group may be an efficient strategy to cope with the threat posed by this group for highly orthodox people. The results are discussed in light of previous findings on religious beliefs and the self-regulatory function of prejudice.
•Feeling of closeness towards refugees played vital roles in sustaining helping behavior, regardless of the time that had passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.•Community norms of helping ...consistently predict collective helping behavior regardless of the time that had passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.•Although the initial fear of hostilities from Russia lost its predictive power over time, it significantly impacted helping behaviors when closeness was low, but not when high.•Overall, these results highlight the crucial role of social identity processes in guiding assistance to war refugees.
In the context of the refugee crisis in Poland following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we conducted a four-wave panel study (N = 598) with time-lags of two and four weeks between waves in March and April 2022. Our study aimed to explore collective helping behavior and its predictors during this challenging period. Participants were asked about their helping activities during the previous week and responded to questions about prospective fear, closeness towards refugees from Ukraine, and norms of helping. We hypothesized that feeling close to those in need from war-torn Ukraine, coupled with a community norm of helping, would consistently predict collective helping behavior across all waves. Additionally, we expected that the initial fear of hostilities from Russia would lose its predictive power over time. However, we anticipated an interaction between fear and closeness, where fear would predict helping at low levels of closeness but not at high levels. Our findings confirmed that the feeling of closeness towards refugees and adherence to social norms of helping played vital roles in sustaining helping behavior, regardless of the time that had passed since the invasion. Moreover, as expected, while prospective fear did not consistently predict helping across all waves, the interaction between fear and closeness was significant. Specifically, we found that prospective fear significantly impacted helping behaviors when closeness was low, but not when high. These results highlight the crucial role of social identity processes in guiding assistance to war refugees and can provide valuable insights for developing responses to other humanitarian crises.
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