The paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government agencies among 33 countries. In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, ...(ii) to be more biased in booms, and (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons. This over-optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits, especially the failure to run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely, retrenchment is treated as unnecessary. Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or, better yet, the structural deficit. But we also find: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form of euroland's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain frequent violations of the SGP. The question becomes how to overcome governments' tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. Chile in 2000 created structural budget institutions that may have solved the problem. Independent expert panels, insulated from political pressures, are responsible for estimating the long-run trends that determine whether a given deficit is deemed structural or cyclical. The result is that Chile's official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002—7 expansion to run budget surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008—9 recession.
In a market economy, everyone, as far as possible, tries to use the available funds efficiently. This is a separate derived individual, family, enterprise, etc. will be affected. However, despite ...this, life observations and scientific research have shown that this problem becomes more and more complex as it goes from bottom to top. In particular, one of such difficult problems is the issue of effective use of funds within the framework of local budgets. However, in our opinion, there is a certain paradox here. This is due to the fact that countries operating in market relations and in civilized countries of the world (USA, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria, Holland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, etc.)).g.) this problem is already successfully resolved. Nobody doubts that the funds allocated from local budgets in these countries are spent efficiently. This is evidenced by the fact that the real situation exists there. But if we talk about the efficiency of spending funds in the accounts of local budgets in Uzbekistan, then, unfortunately, this cannot be said.
O orçamento participativo é uma ferramenta de cooperação popular na destinação do capital junto a administração pública, onde a população participa efetivamente na investigação do dinheiro público e ...definem como prioridade as áreas com maiores necessidades, essas participações podem melhorar a destinação do capital alheio e proporcionar benefícios para a sociedade como um todo, além de promover uma gestão transparente e eficaz. Portanto, este artigo tem como objetivo demonstrar se nos municípios da região metropolitana de Londrina é aplicado o orçamento participativo.Os achados desta pesquisa apontam que os municípios base deste estudo não possuem o orçamento participativo implementados em sua gestão.
Corporate Finance budget as an important part of the work of that enterprise normal operations guarantee. In every enterprise, the budget should be attached great importance to the work. This article ...is an in-depth understanding of corporate control of the budget process, the meta-analysis presented in the information economy, it should make full use of the information network technology advantages, and actively use our enterprise budget control, real-time control of the budget increase, effectiveness, timeliness improve the operations of enterprises, improve the operating efficiency of funds, and promote sustained and healthy development of enterprises.
In this paper, the authors use the Bush administration's management grades from the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to evaluate performance budgeting in the federal government-in particular, ...the role of merit and political considerations in formulating recommendations for 234 programs in the president's fiscal year 2004 budget. PART scores and political support were found to influence budget choices in expected ways, and the impact of management scores on budget decisions diminished as the political component was taken into account. The Bush administration's management scores were positively correlated with proposed budgets for programs housed in traditionally Democratic departments but not in other departments. The federal government's most ambitious effort to use performance budgeting to date shows both the promise and the problems of this endeavor.
Esta investigación tiene como objetivo examinar el efecto de la rendición de cuentas, la transparencia y la supervisión en el rendimiento presupuestario del concepto Value for Money. Investigación ...realizada en 43 unidades de trabajo locales en la Región de Capital Especial (DKI) Provincia de Yakarta. La muestra de la investigación consta de 86 funcionarios gubernamentales y se utiliza el análisis de modelado de ecuaciones estructurales (SEM) para probar la hipótesis. El resultado de esta investigación demostró que la rendición de cuentas y la supervisión tienen un efecto significativo en el rendimiento presupuestario del concepto Value for Money, mientras que la transparencia no mostró ningún efecto sobre la eficacia en el rendimiento presupuestario del mismo.
This paper attempts, for the first time, to assess the relationships between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout using a comparative international approach. With this aim, ...the authors build a comprehensive index of budget transparency encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries. They find a positive relationship between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency: The more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficits to achieve opportunistic goals. The univariate analysis shows a positive relationship between political turnout and transparency. This result gives some evidence of a positive answer to the question raised by James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen: Does transparency affect political outcomes such as turnout? To some extent, that the more transparent the budget reports are, the more incentives people have to vote. With respect to three variables—transparency, government fiscal balance, and electoral turnout—three clusters of countries arise: low transparency–fiscal imbalance, low transparency–small fiscal imbalance and high transparency–fiscal surplus.
Man spricht daher synonym vom Pflegesatzverfahren bzw. der Pflegesatzvereinbarung oder aber auch vom Entgeltverfahren oder Entgeltvereinbarung bzw. Konkret ergibt sich die Höhe der Vergütung eines ...Behandlungsfalls im Diagnosis-Related-Groups(DRG)-System durch die Multiplikation des fallbezogenen Relativgewichtes mit dem Basisfallwert. Die entscheidenden Vorschriften finden sich im Krankenhausentgeltgesetz (KHEntgG) bzw. für psychiatrische Krankenhäuser und psychiatrische Abteilungen sowie für die Einrichtungen für psychotherapeutische Medizin und Psychosomatik in der Bundespflegesatzverordnung (BPflV).
Governments often use multiple policy instruments for pursuing policy goals with mutually reinforcing effects. These effects include supplementation and substitution. This article examines both ...effects by studying two instruments of state budget stabilization policy: general fund balances and budget stabilization funds. States normally maintain budget surpluses in the general fund. In recent decades, many also created separate budget stabilization funds to guard against economic downturns. Empirical results show that substitution occurs between these instruments. In other words, the influence of the first instrument is partially offset by the second. The second instrument also produces some independent impacts—called supplementation—that increase the overall influence of both instruments. Such selfreinforcement decreases over time, suggesting that multiple policy instruments are most effective in the initial stage of application.
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