This paper traces the history of comparative philosophy and points to a transition toward post-comparative philosophy. It is argued that, theoretically speaking, comparative philosophy was created by ...making a distinction between Western and non-Western philosophy and then re-entering this distinction into one of its sides, namely non-Western philosophy. Historically speaking, comparative philosophy was preceded by Orientalist academic disciplines such as Indology and Sinology founded in the 19th century, as well as by the establishment of disciplines like “Chinese Philosophy” in non-Western countries. With the emergence of the field of comparative philosophy in the 20th century, two camps developed: one focusing on difference and the other on sameness. Post-comparative philosophy, it is argued, moves beyond difference and sameness and engages in diverse philosophical endeavours by employing sources from various traditions without constituting a specific field based on culturalist distinctions.
This paper compares the naturalistic interpretations of religion offered by the Chinese Confucian philosopher Xunzi (c. 310-219 BCE) and the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952), ...and shows how each philosopher reconceived the nature of religious life in fundamentally non-supernatural, ethical, and therapeutic terms. While acknowledging that there are important differences between their respective views―especially on such matters as the nature and scope of ethical knowledge, the nature of ethics, and what form an ideal society will take―and that their views were furthermore shaped by very different historical and cultural contexts, the paper argues that both philosophers nevertheless took this naturalized, ethical and therapeutic conception of religion to be the correct and more profound way to understand religious life, and the best way to develop an appropriate sense of oneness with and reverence for the social and natural worlds that we inhabit. For both Xunzi and Dewey, in short, religious attitudes, experiences, and practices are valuable not because they put us into proper relations with something supernatural, but rather because of their capacity to orient and enrich our lives at both the individual and social levels and put us into proper relations with other human beings and the natural world. Overall, the paper argues that a comparative study of Xunzi’s and Dewey’s interpretations of religion not only reveals features of their thought that we might otherwise miss, but also helps us to better understand the range of possible forms that a naturalistic interpretation of religion can take.
This paper compares the naturalistic interpretations of religion offered by the Chinese Confucian philosopher Xunzi (c. 310-219 BCE) and the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952), ...and shows how each philosopher reconceived the nature of religious life in fundamentally non-supernatural, ethical, and therapeutic terms. While acknowledging that there are important differences between their respective views—especially on such matters as the nature and scope of ethical knowledge, the nature of ethics, and what form an ideal society will take—and that their views were furthermore shaped by very different historical and cultural contexts, the paper argues that both philosophers nevertheless took this naturalized, ethical and therapeutic conception of religion to be the correct and more profound way to understand religious life, and the best way to develop an appropriate sense of oneness with and reverence for the social and natural worlds that we inhabit. For both Xunzi and Dewey, in short, religious attitudes, experiences, and practices are valuable not because they put us into proper relations with something supernatural, but rather because of their capacity to orient and enrich our lives at both the individual and social levels and put us into proper relations with other human beings and the natural world. Overall, the paper argues that a comparative study of Xunzi’s and Dewey’s interpretations of religion not only reveals features of their thought that we might otherwise miss, but also helps us to better understand the range of possible forms that a naturalistic interpretation of religion can take. KCI Citation Count: 0
In this article, I will introduce and describe my current research work, which centres on re-interpreting Chinese philosophy by implementing an innovative approach suitable for transcultural ...philosophical comparisons. To commence this undertaking, I was compelled to address certain issues, leading me to seek a novel methodology for transcultural research.
This article will begin by briefly addressing the still existing general problems of transcultural philosophical comparisons. I will then examine the recent and current landscape of research in the field of Chinese comparative philosophy, with a specific focus on emerging paradigms referred to as “post-comparative” approaches.
In the latter part of this paper, building upon a concise overview of my previous research findings, I will elucidate the current stage of development of the method of sublation. Furthermore, I will provide a theoretical framework outlining the subsequent phases of investigation.
V tem članku bom najprej predstavila in opisala svoje trenutno raziskovalno delo, ki se osredotoča na reinterpretacijo kitajske filozofije z uporabo inovativnega pristopa, primernega za transkulturne filozofske primerjave. Kot sinologinja sem se pri svojem raziskovalnem delu namreč nenehno srečevala z mnogimi problemi, povezanimi z metodološko problematiko medkulturnih raziskav. Le-ta me je privedla k iskanju novih metodoloških rešitev za primerjalne transkulturne študije.
Članek se prične s kratkim opisom še vedno obstoječih splošnih problemov na področju medkulturnih filozofskih primerjav, nadaljuje pa se s predstavitvijo nedavnega in trenutnega stanja raziskav na področju kitajske in primerjalne filozofije, s posebnim poudarkom na trenutno nastajajočih paradigmah, ki so znane kot »postprimerjalni« pristopi.
V zadnjem delu tega članka bom na osnovi kratkega pregleda svojih dosedanjih raziskovalnih izsledkov predstavila trenutno stopnjo razvoja metode sublacije. Poleg tega bom v njem vzpostavila nov teoretski okvir za nadaljnje faze raziskovanja.
On Philosophy as Living Timo Ennen
Azijske študije (Spletna izd.),
05/2024, Volume:
12, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Open access
This paper considers what it would mean to conceive of philosophy as living. In the first part, by way of a discussion on intercultural encounter recently taken up by Cora Diamond, I first illustrate ...why philosophical conflict cannot be resolved within already given modes of thought or self-contained finite philosophical traditions, but instead transcends those. In the second part, I show why this dynamic plays out not only between cultures but also between the individual and that individual’s own tradition. I do this by drawing from insights of the two major proponents of xinxue 心學 (Learning of the Heart-Mind), Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 and Wang Yangming 王陽明. The way xinxue deals with both orthodox and heterodox traditions illuminates how we can understand philosophy as something living. It is neither self-contained and indifferent to its own heritage or to the culturally alien, nor does it consist of the mere accumulation of diverse philosophical contents. The deepening of individuality that xinxue introduces into Chinese philosophy consists in the relation of the individual to what has already been conceived. Ultimately, by grasping this dynamic that happens through the individual, we may better grasp why philosophy is not reducible to given modes of thought nor to self-contained finite philosophical traditions, but instead is infinite.
In this article, I will introduce and describe my current research work, which centres on re-interpreting Chinese philosophy by implementing an innovative approach suitable for transcultural ...philosophical comparisons. To commence this undertaking, I was compelled to address certain issues, leading me to seek a novel methodology for transcultural research. This article will begin by briefly addressing the still existing general problems of transcultural philosophical comparisons. I will then examine the recent and current landscape of research in the field of Chinese comparative philosophy, with a specific focus on emerging paradigms referred to as “post-comparative” approaches. In the latter part of this paper, building upon a concise overview of my previous research findings, I will elucidate the current stage of development of the method of sublation. Furthermore, I will provide a theoretical framework outlining the subsequent phases of investigation.
The article analyzes the perspectives of overcoming nihilism (Verwindung) by discussing Heidegger’s relationship with East Asian traditions of thought (first of all, chan/zen and daoism). We can ...consider the emergence of Enframing (Gestell or Ge-stell) of the essence of modern technology defined by the philosopher as a diagnosis of the fulfillment of nihilism and the end of the Western tradition of thought. By revealing the problem of the end of the Western metaphysical tradition and its overcoming, the aim is to understand the possibilities of the emergence of a different way of thinking by looking at the horizon of post-metaphysical thinking. Heidegger’s dialogue with the sources of Eastern thought is a search for perspectives on overcoming nihilism (Verwindung), which is inseparable from the deepening of self, other and mutual understanding.
Straipsnyje analizuojamos nihilizmo įveikos (Verwindung) perspektyvos aptariant Heideggerio santykį su Rytų Azijos mąstymo tradicijomis (pirmiausia čan / zen ir daoizmu). Filosofo apibrėžtos moderniosios technikos esmės po-statos (Gestell, arba Ge-stell) įsivyravimą galime laikyti ir nihilizmo išsipildymo bei Vakarų mąstymo tradicijos pabaigos diagnoze. Atskleidžiant Vakarų metafizinės tradicijos pabaigos ir jos įveikos problematiką siekiama suprasti kitokio mąstymo atsiradimo galimybes žvelgiant į pometafizinio mąstymo horizontą. Heideggerio dialogas su Rytų mąstymo šaltiniais yra nihilizmo įveikos (Verwindung) perspektyvų ieškojimas, kas yra neatsiejama nuo savęs, kito ir abipusio supratimo gilinimo.
There has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics as a rival to deontology and consequentialism in contemporary Western normative ethics. Correspondingly, many comparative philosophers have shown ...a great interest in finding virtue ethics potentials in other philosophical traditions in the world, the most impressive of which is Confucianism. While the result of such comparative studies is equally impressive, in almost all these studies, scholars tend to use a historical example of virtue ethics in the Western philosophical tradition, particularly the Aristotelian one, as the ideal type of virtue ethics, to measure historical examples of virtue ethics in other philosophical traditions. The result is thus conceivably skewed: however great these non-Western examples of virtue ethics are, they are perceived to be deficient in one way or another in comparison with the Aristotelian one. In this paper, I first construct an ideal type of virtue ethics in its contrast with ideal types of consequentialism and deontology: a normative ethics in which virtue is primary. I then use this ideal type of virtue ethics to measure Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Zhu Xi’s virtue ethics, both regarded as historical types of virtue ethics, concluding that Zhu Xi’s is closer to the ideal type of virtue ethics than Aristotle’s.
Deconstruction of a Dialogue Burik, Steven
Azijske študije (Spletna izd.),
10/2023, Volume:
11, Issue:
1
Journal Article
It is common knowledge that Martin Heidegger’s attempts at engaging non-Western philosophy are very much a construct of his own making. This article in no way seeks to disagree with those ...observations, but argues two things: first, that Heidegger’s “dialogue” with his two main other sources of inspiration, the ancient Greek thinkers and the German poets, is not different in kind or in principle from his engagement with East Asia. One can of course quite easily argue that Heidegger’s main interest was the ancient Greek thinkers, and then the poets, and only lastly Asia. But this hierarchy in preference does not make Heidegger’s approach different in kind or in principle. Second, I argue that there is an important place in comparative philosophy for the type of thinking displayed by Heidegger in this kind of Auseinandersetzung (confrontation) with—and “appropriation” of—Asian (or Greek, or Poetic) thought.
