This paper deals with an important and insufficiently studied problem relating to the ways in which Russia's authorities use electoral process rules in order to enhance their political advantage at ...the local level. The well-established Duvergerian framework of electoral system analysis applies to a new context: municipal elections in Putin-era St. Petersburg. One of the effects of the "block vote" electoral system, which is currently the most common method used in the St. Petersburg municipal elections, is the sweep effect, wherein a party with a weak majority of support nevertheless is able to win a large number of seats. From the data on election results in St. Petersburg it can be interpreted that the electoral system used gave a significant bonus to the leading party. It is noteworthy that the leading position in some cases was occupied by the opposition parties, which used the bonus provided by the electoral system.
There is a vast literature in political science concerning the strengths and weaknesses of single member plurality (SMP) electoral systems. Some argue that PR systems are superior because they ensure ...better representativeness by reducing the distortion between votes received by a party and its seat share. Others say that the benefits of SMP in terms of accountability make the price of electoral distortion bearable. But what if there would be incremental institutional changes that could maintain the benefits derived from SMP elections and still reduce the distortion it causes? In this paper, we make use of an innovative research design to measure the impact of assembly size on seat disproportionality as measured by the Gallagher Index. We make use of Canada as an ideal case. In this country, federal and provincial elections occur at regular intervals, and the numbers of seats at play vary substantially between levels of government within a province. We find that increasing assembly size is associated with reduced disproportionality in a negative logarithmic fashion, making it an especially useful institutional tool to reduce distortion in smaller assemblies. We argue this research brings a new light on an ongoing debate about SMP systems.
Research on mixed electoral systems provides inconclusive findings on the question whether members of parliament (MPs) elected in single-member districts are more likely to vote against the party ...line than MPs elected via closed party lists. This article rejects both the hypothesis of a general “mandate divide” and the competing claim that contamination effects completely wash out behavioral differences. Instead, we argue that electoral incentives to defect are stronger for a specific type of MP—those who run only in a district and are electorally insecure. Statistical analyses of roll call votes in the German Bundestag covering more than 60 years support this “conditional mandate divide” against alternative hypotheses. These findings suggest a more nuanced view on electoral system effects in mixed electoral systems and highlight the importance of electoral competition for incentivizing MPs to side with district demands if those conflict with the party line.
There are mounting claims that increasing ideological polarization is reshaping democratic party systems with important effects on the functioning of electoral politics, the correlates of voting ...choice, turnout, and even the representativeness of government. Yet, our knowledge of what causes party system polarization is still developing. The primary research goal is to systematically combine and test existing theories predicting levels of party system polarization across 21 established democracies. Polarization levels have generally risen since the mid-1990s. A pooled model finds that characteristics of the electoral system and the party system largely determine the continuity of party system polarization. Polarization levels also appear linked to short-term factors such as citizens’ declining confidence in the economy and increasing concerns about immigration. The conclusion discusses the implications for party systems and politics in affluent democracies.
Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen der Arbeit der vom Deutschen Bundestag eingesetzten Wahlrechtskommission wurde von den Parteien CDU und CSU die Einführung eines Grabenwahlsystems vorgeschlagen, bei dem der ...Wahlkreisgewinner mit absoluter Mehrheit ermittelt werden soll, in der Regel durch eine Stichwahl in einem zweiten Wahlgang. Als Argumente für ein solches System wurde vorgebracht, dass damit die üblichen Effekte des Grabenwahlsystems wie starke Verzerrungen der Proportionalität und mögliche Umkehrungen der Mehrheitsverhältnisse abgemildert werden könnten. Der Artikel untersucht die zu erwartenden Effekten der Einführung eines Grabenwahlsystems mit absoluter Mehrheitsregel mit Stichwahl für den Deutschen Bundestag anhand von Simulationen für die letzten beiden Bundestagswahlen. Entgegen den Vermutungen kommt es bei einer solchen Ausgestaltung des Grabenwahlsystems zu stärkeren Verzerrungen des Proporzes als bei einem Grabenwahlsystem, das mit der relativen Mehrheitsregel in den Wahlkreisen kombiniert ist. Des Weiteren kommt es häufiger auch zu Umkehrungen der Parlamentsmehrheiten. Die bekannten Nachteile des Grabenwahlsystems werden also in keiner Weise abgeschwächt, ganz im Gegenteil verstärken sie sich noch.
This article develops a theory to account for the variation in electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes. We argue that resource-rich dictators are incentivized to employ proportional ...representation systems to alleviate the threat from the masses and pre-empt the emergence of new opposition, while resource-poor dictators tend to choose majoritarian systems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature. Using cross-national data on electoral authoritarian regimes, we find strong empirical evidence supporting our theory. We also explicitly illustrate the causal links between natural resources and electoral systems with additional statistical analyses and comparative case studies on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
This article analyses the political effects of the mixed parallel electoral system in Lithuania. According to the 'best of both worlds' logic, mixed systems could combine advantages from both the ...majoritarian and proportional formulas. However, counterarguments were also presented in the literature, pointing to the possibility of the ‘worst of both worlds’. According to presented analysis of Lithuanian parliamentary elections between 1992 and 2016, the pessimistic scenario is expected when a mixed parallel electoral system is used in a new democracy with a weakly institutionalised party system and high volatility. Lithuania's mixed parallel system produces relatively disproportional election results. However, it also facilitates the fragmentation of party system. Moreover, the effects in a concrete election are hardly predictable, especially the seat bonus of election winner. Evidence in the article points to a conclusion that mixed parallel electoral systems could contribute to the 'worst of all worlds' and new democracies should avoid them., This article analyses the political effects of the mixed parallel electoral system in Lithuania. According to the 'best of both worlds' logic, mixed systems could combine advantages from both the majoritarian and proportional formulas. However, counterarguments were also presented in the literature, pointing to the possibility of the 'worst of both worlds'. According to presented analysis of Lithuanian parliamentary elections between 1992 and 2016, the pessimistic scenario is expected when a mixed parallel electoral system is used in a new democracy with a weakly institutionalised party system and high volatility. Lithuania's mixed parallel system produces relatively disproportional election results. However, it also facilitates the fragmentation of party system. Moreover, the effects in a concrete election are hardly predictable, especially the seat bonus of election winner. Evidence in the article points to a conclusion that mixed parallel electoral systems could contribute to the 'worst of all worlds' and new democracies should avoid them.
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