The role of intuition in understanding in general and in scientific understanding in particular is still very much a subject of a lively philosophical discussion. The role of intuition in thought ...experimenting is much disputed in its own right, and the arguments range from those that deny any substantial role of intuition in the final inference that the thought experiment is meant to illustrate (eg. Norton or Williamson) to the pivotal role some form of intuition might play (eg. Brown or Miščević). So far, mostly Platonists were defenders of intuition, but in his recent book, Miščević takes on a formidable task to mount a defense of intuition as seen from a naturalist-evolutionist point of view and within his mental modelling approach to thought experiments. I will, while acclaiming certain – and considerable – merits of his approach, nevertheless, insist that certain aspects of intuitive comprehending as it is meant to be going on in the process of thought experimenting remains inexplicable in the naturalist scheme such as Miščević’s. The more mysterious (not to say Platonist) aspects of intuition will, hopefully, be revealed through the analyses of the two very famous thought experiments of Einstein which also figure quite importantly in his scientific opus. I will also have something to say about a few related problems as addressed by Miščević in his book regarding the description of thought experiment and more general imaginative enactments in thought, as well as on whether there is an essential difference between scientific (primarily physical) and metaphysical thought experiments and other thought experiments or related modes of thinking.
When people have the chance to help others at a cost to themselves, are cooperative decisions driven by intuition or reflection? To answer this question, recent studies have tested the relationship ...between reaction times (RTs) and cooperation, reporting both positive and negative correlations. To reconcile this apparent contradiction, we argue that decision conflict (rather than the use of intuition vs. reflection) drives response times, leading to an inverted-U shaped relationship between RT and cooperation. Studies 1 through 3 show that intermediate decisions take longer than both extremely selfish and extremely cooperative decisions. Studies 4 and 5 find that the conflict between self-interested and cooperative motives explains individual differences in RTs. Manipulating conflictedness causes longer RTs and more intermediate decisions, and RTs mediate the relationship between conflict and intermediate decisions. Finally, Studies 6 and 7 demonstrate that conflict is distinct from reflection by manipulating the use of intuition (vs. reflection). Experimentally promoting reliance on intuition increases cooperation, but has no effects on decision extremity or feelings of conflictedness. In sum, we provide evidence that RTs should not be interpreted as a direct proxy for the use of intuitive or reflective processes, and dissociate the effects of conflict and reflection in social decision making.
Both intuition and rationality can play important roles in strategic decision making. However, a framework that specifically accounts for the interplay between intuition and rationality is still ...missing. This study addresses this gap by using a paradox lens and conceptualizes the intuition–rationality duality as a paradoxical tension. We draw on seven case studies of innovation projects to empirically derive a three-step process for managing this intuition–rationality tension through paradoxical thinking. Our empirical data suggest that management of the tension starts with preparing the ground for paradoxical thinking by creating managerial acceptance for the contradictory elements of rational and intuitive approaches to decision making. The process then continues by developing decision-making outcomes through the integration of intuitive and rational practices. Finally, the outcomes of paradoxical thinking are embedded into the organizational context. For each step of the model, we indicate a set of practices that, by leveraging intuitive or rational characteristics of decision making, practitioners can use to deal with this cognitive tension in the different steps of our model.
The current crisis in scientific psychology about whether our findings are irreproducible was presaged years ago by Tversky and Kahneman (1971), who noted that even sophisticated researchers believe ...in the fallacious Law of Small Numbers—erroneous intuitions about how imprecisely sample data reflect population phenomena. Combined with the low power of most current work, this often leads to the use of misleading criteria about whether an effect has replicated. Rosenthal (1990) suggested more appropriate criteria, here labeled the continuously cumulating metaanalytic (CCMA) approach. For example, a CCMA analysis on a replication attempt that does not reach significance might nonetheless provide more, not less, evidence that the effect is real. Alternatively, measures of heterogeneity might show that two studies that differ in whether they are significant might have only trivially different effect sizes. We present a nontechnical introduction to the CCMA framework (referencing relevant software), and then explain how it can be used to address aspects of replicability or more generally to assess quantitative evidence from numerous studies. We then present some examples and simulation results using the CCMA approach that show how the combination of evidence can yield improved results over the consideration of single studies.
This study aims to find out more about intuition and its role in shaping students' mathematical reasoning abilities. In the discussion of the philosophy of mathematics intuition plays an important ...role. Intuition has been discussed by philosophers of mathematics for centuries. It is said that intuition is a provisional guess. In relation to mathematical reasoning ability, it is an indispensable ability for students because mathematical reasoning skills greatly contribute to the development of a set of 21st century skills. The method in this research is a library study approach. Researchers collect various references and sources, both international and national journals, books, and other articles related to the theme to be discussed. From the results of the discussion obtained intuition and mathematical reasoning ability are two things that complement each other in solving a mathematical problem. Intuition, which is a candidate for evidence, is then formally proven by mathematical reasoning with mathematical reasoning indicators. Intuitive processes direct the analytical process while quickly serving as a bridge in performing analytical reasoning. So if a person's intuition is good then his mathematical reasoning ability is also good. The potential of mathematical intuition in developing mathematical reasoning abilities is based on the theory that one component of intuition is reasoning
This research takes a moral perspective to studying third parties' reactions to injustice as a function of their moral identity. Drawing from theories of deontic justice, moral intuition, moral ...heuristics, and moral identity, we develop and test a model of the moral underpinnings of third parties' reactions to injustice. First, we compare third parties' responses with interpersonal, distributive, and procedural justice violations. We hypothesize that third parties are more likely to intuit that interpersonal justice violations are morally wrong, compared with distributive and procedural justice violations. As a result, third parties are more likely to experience stronger moral anger and punish violators in response to interpersonal transgressions compared with distributive and procedural justice transgressions. Second, we test the proposition that third parties with a strong moral identity will react more strongly to justice violations than third parties with a comparatively weak moral identity. Results from 3 studies support these predictions.
Morality is thought to underlie both ideological and punitive attitudes. In particular, moral foundations research suggests that group-oriented moral concerns promote a conservative orientation, ...while individual-oriented moral concerns promote a liberal orientation (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Drawing on classical sociological theory, we argue that endorsement of group-oriented moral concerns also elicits higher levels of punitiveness by promoting a view of crime as being perpetrated against society, while endorsement of individual-oriented moral concerns reduces punitiveness by directing attention toward the welfare of offenders as well as victims. Data from 2 independent samples (N = 1,464 and N = 1,025) showed that endorsement of group-oriented moral concerns was associated with more punitive and more conservative attitudes, while endorsement of individual-oriented moral concerns was associated with less punitive and less conservative attitudes. These results suggest that the association between conservatism and punitiveness is in part spurious because of their grounding in the moral foundations. Consequently, studies that do not take the moral foundations into account are at risk of overstating the relationship between conservatism and punitiveness.
► We substantiate a model of metacognitive monitoring and control in reasoning and decision-making. ► The fluency of generation determines the strength of the Feeling of Rightness for a decision. ► ...The strength of the Feeling of Rightness determines degree and type of subsequent analysis. ► Reasoning biasses may be confidently held because they are fluently retrieved. ► We integrate literatures on metacognition, confidence, and Dual Process Theories of reasoning.
Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (
N
=
60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (
N
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48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (
N
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128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (
N
=
64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.
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