Self-alienation is a common characterization of various disturbing experiences in patients with schizophrenia. A vivid example comes from patient reports of not recognizing themselves when inspecting ...their specular image in the mirror. By applying the multisensory paradigm of the Enfacement Illusion, this study empirically addresses the specular Self-Other discrimination in patients with schizophrenia. 35 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 35 healthy matched controls were enrolled in the study. Results found that the group of patients with schizophrenia had a significant skewed self-other discrimination towards the other at baseline. Furthermore, the effect of visuo-tactile stimulation on self-recognition in the schizophrenia patients was significantly altered after both synchronous and asynchronous stimulation compared to baseline. This contrasted with healthy controls which in line with earlier studies only had significantly different self-recognition after synchronous stimulation. The study thus suggests that patients with schizophrenia have deviations in their specular self-recognition compared to healthy controls. Moreover, that temporal factors in multisensory integration may contribute to alterations of self-related stimuli in patients with schizophrenia.
In this paper, I examine the prospect of naturalizing phenomenology within the framework of Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology. In doing so, I follow two main objectives. The first is exegetical. ...Namely, there is a pronounced discrepancy between Varela’s earlier works on neurophenomenology and his later works on naturalizing phenomenology, with the former receiving considerable scholarly attention and the latter remaining comparatively unknown. This discrepancy is further exacerbated by the fact that, due to his untimely death, Varela failed to produce a comprehensive view of naturalization, leaving us with a plethora of suggestive fragments scattered throughout his later works (some of them published posthumously). Thus, briefly recapitulating the original neurophenomenological program in Section I, I bring some of these fragments together in Section II and make an attempt at elucidating Varela’s position on the topic. My second objective is critical. Section III thus opens with a question of whether the idea of naturalizing phenomenology in the context of neurophenomenology makes sense. I argue that it does not and should therefore be discarded. The reason for this is twofold. First, a strong case could be made that the idea of naturalization is ultimately at odds with the spirit of neurophenomenology; secondly, and relatedly, Varela’s lax use of the term naturalization not only puts it at odds with the more ordinary interpretations of naturalism but also risks emptying it of any substantive content.
This paper is a practical guide to neurophenomenology. Varela's neurophenomenological research program (NRP) aspires to bridge the gap between, and integrate, first-person (1P) and third-person (3P) ...approaches to understanding the mind. It does so by suggesting a methodological framework allowing these two irreducible phenomenal domains to relate and reciprocally support the investigation of one another. While highly appealing theoretically, neurophenomenology invites researchers to a challenging methodological endeavor. Based on our experience with empirical neurophenomenological implementation, we offer practical clarifications and insights learnt along the way. In the first part of the paper, we outline the theoretical principles of the NRP and briefly present the field of 1P research. We speak to the importance of phenomenological training and outline the utility of cooperating with meditators as skilled participants. We suggest that 1P accounts of subjective experience can be placed on a complexity continuum ranging between thick and thin phenomenology, highlighting the tension and trade-off inherent to the neurophenomenological attempt to naturalize phenomenology. We then outline a typology of bridges, which create mutual constraints between 1P and 3P approaches, and argue for the utility of alternating between the bridges depending on the available experimental resources, domain of interest and level of sought articulation. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate how the theory can be put into practice by describing a decade of neurophenomenological studies investigating the sense of self with increasing focus on its embodied, and minimal, aspects. These aspects are accessed via the dissolution of the sense-of-boundaries, shedding new light on the multi-dimensionality and flexibility of embodied selfhood. We emphasize the evolving neurophenomenological dialogue, showing how consecutive studies, placed differently on the thin-to-thick 1P continuum, advance the research project by using the bridging principles appropriate for each stage.
Empathy is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that plays a crucial role in human social interactions. Recent developments in social neuroscience have provided valuable insights into the neural ...underpinnings and bodily mechanisms underlying empathy. This methodology often prioritizes precision, replicability, internal validity, and confound control. However, fully understanding the complexity of empathy seems unattainable by solely relying on artificial and controlled laboratory settings, while overlooking a comprehensive view of empathy through an ecological experimental approach. In this article, we propose articulating an integrative theoretical and methodological framework based on the 5E approach (the "E"s stand for
), highlighting the relevance of studying empathy as an active interaction between embodied agents, embedded in a shared real-world environment. In addition, we illustrate how a novel multimodal approach including mobile brain and body imaging (MoBi) combined with phenomenological methods, and the implementation of interactive paradigms in a natural context, are adequate procedures to study empathy from the 5E approach. In doing so, we present the Empirical 5E approach (E5E) as an integrative scientific framework to bridge brain/body and phenomenological attributes in an interbody interactive setting. Progressing toward an E5E approach can be crucial to understanding empathy in accordance with the complexity of how it is experienced in the real world.
A striking feature of psychedelics is their ability to increase attribution of truth and meaningfulness to specific contents and ideas experienced, which may persist long after psychedelic effects ...have subsided. We propose that processes underlying conferral of meaning and truth in psychedelic experiences may act as a double-edged sword: while these may drive important therapeutic benefits, they also raise important considerations regarding the validation and mediation of knowledge gained during these experiences. Specifically, the ability of psychedelics to induce noetic feelings of revelation may enhance the significance and attribution of reality to specific beliefs, worldviews, and apparent memories which might exacerbate the risk of iatrogenic complications that other psychotherapeutic approaches have historically faced, such as false memory syndrome. These considerations are timely, as the use of psychedelics is becoming increasingly mainstream, in an environment marked by the emergence of strong commercial interest for psychedelic therapy. We elaborate on these ethical challenges via three examples illustrating issues of validation and mediation in therapeutic, neo-shamanic and research contexts involving psychedelic use. Finally, we propose a pragmatic framework to attend to these challenges based on an ethical approach which considers the embeddedness of psychedelic experiences within larger historical and cultural contexts, their intersubjective character and the use of practices which we conceptualise here as forms of psychedelic apprenticeship. This notion of apprenticeship goes beyond current approaches of preparation and integration by stressing the central importance of validation practices based on empathic resonance by an experienced therapist or guide.
We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a ...projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field's cognitive and affective dynamics for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory, reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience, and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership, and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development, offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called "phenomenal selfhood."
Empathy is foundational in our intersubjective interactions, connecting with others across bodily, emotional, and cognitive dimensions. Previous evidence suggests that observing individuals in ...painful situations elicits whole bodily responses, unveiling the interdependence of the body and empathy. Although the role of the body has been extensively described, the temporal structure of bodily responses and its association with the comprehension of subjective experiences remain unclear.
Building upon the enactive approach, our study introduces and examines "bodyssence," a neologism formed from "body" and "essence." Our primary goal is to analyze the temporal dynamics, physiological, and phenomenological elements in synchrony with the experiences of sportspersons suffering physical accidents.
Using the empirical 5E approach, a refinement of Varela's neurophenomenological program, we integrated both objective third-person measurements (postural sway, electrodermal response, and heart rate) and first-person descriptions (phenomenological data). Thirty-five participants watched videos of sportspersons experiencing physical accidents during extreme sports practice, as well as neutral videos, while standing on a force platform and wearing electrodermal and heart electrodes. Subsequently, micro-phenomenological interviews were conducted.
Bodyssence is composed of three distinct temporal dynamics. Forefeel marks the commencement phase, encapsulating the body's pre-reflective consciousness as participants anticipate impending physical accidents involving extreme sportspersons, manifested through minimal postural movement and high heart rate. Fullfeel, capturing the zenith of empathetic engagement, is defined by profound negative emotions, and significant bodily and kinesthetic sensations, with this stage notably featuring an increase in postural movement alongside a reduction in heart rate. In the Reliefeel phase, participants report a decrease in emotional intensity, feeling a sense of relief, as their postural control starts to reach a state of equilibrium, and heart rate remaining low. Throughout these phases, the level of electrodermal activity consistently remains high.
This study through an enactive approach elucidates the temporal attunement of bodily experience to the pain experienced by others. The integration of both first and third-person perspectives through an empirical 5E approach reveals the intricate nature of bodyssence, offering an innovative approach to understanding the dynamic nature of empathy.
Finding a scientific, third-person explanation of subjective experience or phenomenal content is commonly called the "hard problem" of consciousness. There has recently been a surge in ...neuropsychological research on meditation in general and long-term meditators in particular. These experimental subjects are allegedly capable of generating a stable state of consciousness over a prolonged period of time, which makes experimentation with them an interesting paradigm for consciousness research. This perspective article starts out with a historical reconstruction of the "hard problem," tracing it back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Emil du Bois-Reymond in the 18th and 19th century, respectively, and the problem of introspection as already acknowledged by Wilhelm Wundt in the 19th century. It then discusses the prospects of research on long-term meditators from a contemporary perspective and with respect to the neurophenomenological research program already advocated by Francisco J. Varela.
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