•Novice meditators can be trained to report their phenomenological experience.•Self-reports are associated with history of practice, not with desirable responding.•Balance between focused attention ...(FA) and open monitoring (OM) practices predicts the ability to dissociate them.•Daily practice of FA predicts the felt stability of long sessions.•Total practice of OM predicts phenomenological proficiency.
Empirical descriptions of the phenomenology of meditation states rely on practitioners’ ability to provide accurate information on their experience. We present a meditation training protocol that was designed to equip naive participants with a theoretical background and experiential knowledge that would enable them to share their experience. Subsequently, novices carried on with daily practice during several weeks before participating in experiments. Using a neurophenomenological experiment designed to explore two different meditation states (focused attention and open monitoring), we found that self-reported phenomenological ratings (i) were sensitive to meditation states, (ii) reflected meditation dose and fatigue effects, and (iii) correlated with behavioral measures (variability of response time). Each of these effects was better predicted by features of participants’ daily practice than by desirable responding. Our results provide evidence that novice practitioners can reliably report their experience along phenomenological dimensions and warrant the future investigation of this training protocol with a longitudinal design.
The contents of consciousness are complex and dynamic and are embedded in perception and cognition. The study of consciousness and subjective experience has been central to philosophy for centuries. ...However, despite its relevance for understanding cognition and behaviour, the empirical study of consciousness is relatively new, embroiled by the seemingly opposing subjective and objective sources of data. Francisco Varela (1946–2001) pioneered the empirical study of consciousness by developing novel, naturalised and rich approaches in a non-reductive and comprehensive manner. In this article, we review the main conceptual distinctions and philosophical challenges of consciousness research and highlight the main contributions of Varela and his associates: the development of neurophenomenology as a methodological framework that builds a bridge between subjective and objective sources of data and the discovery of gamma-band phase synchronisation as a neural marker of perceptual awareness. Finally, we describe the work of Varela on time consciousness, his philosophical approach and the implementation of his neurophenomenological framework for its study by integrating subjective reports with neural measures.
Based on autoethnography, this article adopts a (neuro)phenomenological lens to explore sensory experiences following a traumatic brain injury (TBI). Although focussing particularly on pain, vision, ...hearing, and somatic experiences connected with sleep, we also touch on how these are interwoven with other symptoms associated with TBIs. We use these experiences to enliven, and thereby enrich, clinical constructions and understandings of ‘sensitivity’ to light and to noise, as well as ‘sleep disturbance’. We conclude with a discussion of how these sensory experiences can be understood in relation to embodied dynamics of vibration, oscillation, and (stochastic) resonance. The article closes with the suggestion that an embodied, sensorial, and phenomenologically informed analysis of the experiences of people with TBIs, particularly in relation, for example, to embodied sensations and perceptions of vibration, might provide novel insights for research and clinical practice.
•Provides 1st person account of sensory experiences after a traumatic brain injury.•Considers subjective experiences of vibrations in brain research and treatment.•Examines lived experience of sleep disturbance following brain injury.•Appraises meaning of sensitivity to light and noise from subjective perspective.•Argues for the need for neurophenomenological research on concussions.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospect of using neurophenomenology to understand, design and test phygital consumer experiences. It aims to clarify interpretivist approaches to ...consumer neuroscience, wherein theoretical models of individual phenomenology can be combined with modern neuroimaging techniques to detect and interpret the first-person accounts of phygital experiences. Design/methodology/approach The argument is conceptual in nature, building its position through synthesizing insights from phenomenology, phygital marketing, theoretical neuroscience and other related fields. Findings Ultimately, the paper presents the argument that interpretivist neuroscience in general, and neurophenomenology specifically, provides a valuable new perspective on phygital marketing experiences. In particular, we argue that the approach to studying first-personal experiences within the phygital domain can be significantly refined by adopting this perspective. Research limitations/implications One of the primary goals of this paper is to stimulate a novel approach to interpretivist phygital research, and in doing so, provide a foundation by which the impact of phygital interventions can be empirically tested through neuroscience, and through which future research into this topic can be developed. As such, the success of such an approach is yet untested. Originality/value Phygital marketing is distinguished by its focus on the quality of subjective first-personal consumer experiences, but few papers to date have explored how neuroscience can be used as a tool for exploring these inner landscapes. This paper addresses this lacuna by providing a novel perspective on “interpretivist neuroscience” and proposes ways that current neuroscientific models can be used as a practical methodology for addressing these questions.
Contemporary philosophical and neurocognitive studies of the self have dissociated two distinct types of self-awareness: a "narrative" self-awareness (NS) weaving together episodic memory, future ...planning and self-evaluation into a coherent self-narrative and identity, and a "minimal" self-awareness (MS) focused on present momentary experience and closely tied to the sense of agency and ownership. Long-term Buddhist meditation practice aims at realization of a "selfless" mode of awareness (SL), where identification with a static sense of self is replaced by identification with the phenomenon of experiencing itself. NS-mediating mechanisms have been explored by neuroimaging, mainly fMRI, implicating prefrontal midline structures, but MS processes are not well characterized and SL even less so. To this end we tested 12 long-term mindfulness meditators using a neurophenomenological study design, incorporating both magnetoencephalogram (MEG) recordings and first person descriptions. We found that (1) NS attenuation involves extensive frontal, and medial prefrontal gamma band (60-80 Hz) power decreases, consistent with fMRI and intracranial EEG findings; (2) MS attenuation is related to beta-band (13-25 Hz) power decreases in a network that includes ventral medial prefrontal, medial posterior and lateral parietal regions; and (3) the experience of selflessness is linked to attenuation of beta-band activity in the right inferior parietal lobule. These results highlight the role of dissociable frequency-dependent networks in supporting different modes of self-processing, and the utility of combining phenomenology, mindfulness training and electrophysiological neuroimaging for characterizing self-awareness.
Visual hallucinations (VHs) are perceptions of objects or events in the absence of the sensory stimulation that would normally support such perceptions. Although all VHs share this core ...characteristic, there are substantial phenomenological differences between VHs that have different aetiologies, such as those arising from Neurodegenerative conditions, visual loss, or psychedelic compounds. Here, we examine the potential mechanistic basis of these differences by leveraging recent advances in visualising the learned representations of a coupled classifier and generative deep neural network-an approach we call 'computational (neuro)phenomenology'. Examining three aetiologically distinct populations in which VHs occur-Neurodegenerative conditions (Parkinson's Disease and Lewy Body Dementia), visual loss (Charles Bonnet Syndrome, CBS), and psychedelics-we identified three dimensions relevant to distinguishing these classes of VHs: realism (veridicality), dependence on sensory input (spontaneity), and complexity. By selectively tuning the parameters of the visualisation algorithm to reflect influence along each of these phenomenological dimensions we were able to generate 'synthetic VHs' that were characteristic of the VHs experienced by each aetiology. We verified the validity of this approach experimentally in two studies that examined the phenomenology of VHs in Neurodegenerative and CBS patients, and in people with recent psychedelic experience. These studies confirmed the existence of phenomenological differences across these three dimensions between groups, and crucially, found that the appropriate synthetic VHs were rated as being representative of each group's hallucinatory phenomenology. Together, our findings highlight the phenomenological diversity of VHs associated with distinct causal factors and demonstrate how a neural network model of visual phenomenology can successfully capture the distinctive visual characteristics of hallucinatory experience.
Neurophenomenological studies seek to utilize first-person self-report to elucidate cognitive processes related to physiological data. Grounded theory offers an approach to the qualitative analysis ...of self-report, whereby theoretical constructs are derived from empirical data. Here we used grounded theory methodology (GTM) to assess how the first-person experience of meditation relates to neural activity in a core region of the default mode network-the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). We analyzed first-person data consisting of meditators' accounts of their subjective experience during runs of a real time fMRI neurofeedback study of meditation, and third-person data consisting of corresponding feedback graphs of PCC activity during the same runs. We found that for meditators, the subjective experiences of "undistracted awareness" such as "concentration" and "observing sensory experience," and "effortless doing" such as "observing sensory experience," "not efforting," and "contentment," correspond with PCC deactivation. Further, the subjective experiences of "distracted awareness" such as "distraction" and "interpreting," and "controlling" such as "efforting" and "discontentment," correspond with PCC activation. Moreover, we derived several novel hypotheses about how specific qualities of cognitive processes during meditation relate to PCC activity, such as the difference between meditation and "trying to meditate." These findings offer novel insights into the relationship between meditation and mind wandering or self-related thinking and neural activity in the default mode network, driven by first-person reports.
Our species of hominin, Homo sapiens, is an extremely social animal. We are born with social brains. The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is a methodological approach to social consciousness that ...offers significant advantages in terms of uncovering and describing the essential structures of our social perceptions and actions. This is especially true in this period of post‐neuro‐turn social science, because the structures described by Husserlian “pure” phenomenology with its emphasis upon “returning to the things,” performing reductions, and developing the skills available to the phenomenological attitude are in synch with neuroscientific research on the neural correlates of consciousness. For the anthropology of consciousness, the Husserlian methodology allows us to explore consciousness in cross‐cultural settings in greater detail and depth of understanding. This is especially the case with respect to the experience of intersubjectivity, the roots of which are found to be part of the inherent life‐world that all normal humans depend upon to true their experiences of the environing world, regardless of cultural background. The Husserlian approach to intersubjectivity challenges the discipline of anthropology to move past its knee‐jerk distinction between nature and nurture, and its erroneous assumption that human experience is somehow “culture all the way down.”
We introduce a novel hypothesis which states that the therapeutic utilisation of psilocybin has beneficial effects on genetic aging. Ex hypothesi, we predict a priori that controlled psilocybin ...interventions exert quantifiable positive impact on leucocyte telomere length (telomeres are a robust predictor of mortality and multifarious aging-related diseases). Our hypothesising follows the Popperian logic of scientific discovery, viz., bold (and refutable) conjectures form the very foundation of scientific progress. The ‘psilocybin-telomere hypothesis‘ is formalised as a logically valid deductive (syllogistic) argument and we provide substantial evidence to support the underlying premises. Impetus for our theorising derives from a plurality of converging empirical sources indicating that psilocybin has persistent beneficial effects on various aspects of mental health (e.g., in the context of depression, anxiety, PTSD, OCD, addiction, etc.). Additional support is based on a large corpus of studies that establish reliable correlations between mental health and telomere attrition (improved mental health is generally correlated with longer telomeres). Another pertinent component of our argument is based on recent studies which demonstrate that “meditative states of consciousness” provide beneficial effects on genetic aging. Similarly, psilocybin can induce states of consciousness that are neurophysiologically and phenomenologically significantly congruent with meditative states. Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that a single dose of psilocybin can occasion life-changing transformative experiences (≈ 70% of healthy volunteers rate their experience with psilocybin amongst the five personally most meaningful lifetime events, viz., ranked next to giving birth to a child or losing a loved one). We postulate that these profound psychological events leave quantifiable marks at the molecular genetic/epigenetic level. Given the ubiquitous availability and cost effectiveness of telomere length assays, we suggest that quantitative telomere analysis should be regularly included in future psilocybin studies as an adjunctive biological marker (i.e., to facilitate scientific consilience via methodological triangulation). In order to substantiate the ‘psilocybin-telomere hypothesis’ potential neuropsychopharmacological, endocrinological, and genetic mechanisms of action are discussed (e.g., HPA-axis reactivity, hippocampal neurogenesis, neurotropic growth factors such as BDNF, 5-HT2A receptor agonism, neuroplasticity/synaptoplasticity, brain-wide alterations in neuronal functional connectivity density, involvement of the SLC6A4 serotonin transporter gene, inter alia). The proposed research agenda is thus intrinsically highly interdisciplinary, and it has deep ramifications from a philosophy of science perspective as it connects the epistemic level (qualitative experiential phenomenology) with the ontic level (quantitative molecular genetics) of analysis. In the long term, multidisciplinary and innovative investigations of the ‘psilocybin-telomere hypothesis‘ could contribute to the improvement of senotherapeutic psychological interventions and the identification of novel geroprotective and neuroprotective/restorative pharmaceutical targets to decelerate genetic aging and improve well-being and quality of life during the aging process.
The neuroscience of empathy has enormously expanded in the past two decades, thereby making instrumental progress for the understanding of neural substrates involved in affective and cognitive ...aspects of empathy. Yet, these conclusions have relied on ultrasimplified tasks resulting in the affective/cognitive dichotomy that was often modeled and overemphasized in pathological, developmental, and genetic studies of empathy. As such, the affective/cognitive model of empathy could not straightforwardly accommodate and explain the recent surge of neuroscientific data obtained from studies employing naturalistic approaches and intergroup conditions. Inspired by phenomenological philosophy, this article paves the way for a new scientific perspective on empathy that breaks thorough the affective/cognitive dichotomy. This neuro-phenomenological account leans on phenomenological analyses and can straightforwardly explain recent neuroscience data. It emphasizes the dynamic, subjective, and piecemeal features of empathic experiences and unpicks the graded nature of empathy.
postulates that attending to others' expressions always facilitates empathy, but the parametric modulation in the levels of the empathic experience varies as a function of one's social interest (e.g., via intergroup or inter-personal cues) in the observed other. Drawing on multiple resources that integrate neuroscience with phenomenology, we describe the potential of this graded framework in an era of real-life experimentation. By wearing lenses of neuro-phenomenology, this original perspective can change the way empathy is considered.
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