Philosophy of the Arts presents a comprehensive and accessible introduction to those coming to aesthetics and the philosophy of art for the first time. The third edition is greatly enhanced by new ...sections on art and beauty, modern art, Aristotle and katharsis, and Hegel. Each chapter has been thoroughly revised with fresh material and extended discussions. As with previous editions, the book is jargon-free and will appeal to students of music, art history and literature as well as philosophy.
The purpose of this paper is to stress the common characteristics of Hegelian and Rawlsian thoughts. It is shown that Hegel and Rawls have similar objectives, since they both attempt to determine the ...possibility condition of the reconciliation of the reasonable and the rational, of the universal and the particular. They share a similar concern, which integrates but tries to overcome the Kantian one: their works examine how political freedom can be achieved and how an empirical and implementable theory can be built.
Within the context of structural theories this paper examines what health professionals say about their clinical service structures. We firstly trace various conceptual perspectives on clinical ...service structures, discussing multiple theoretical axes. These theories question whether clinical service structures represent either superficial or more profound changes in hospitals. We secondly explore which view is supported though a content analysis of the free text responses of 111 health professionals (44 doctors, 45 nurses and 22 allied health practitioners) about their clinical service structures in a questionnaire survey in two large hospitals that had implemented clinical service structures three years previously. Commentaries unfavourable toward clinical service structures were made by 47.7% of staff, favourable by 24.3%, mixed (both favourable and unfavourable) by 17.1% and non-evaluative statements were made by 10.8%. The most frequent criticisms were inefficient organisation of change (27%), poor management (24.3%), lack of cooperation between staff (15.9%) and failure to empower health practitioners (13.5%). All professions made more negative than positive evaluations of their clinical service structures but the ratio was highest for doctors and lowest for allied health. Ranking of nurses' and allied health staffs' specific evaluations were similar but both differed significantly from doctors'. Unfavourable or negative comments predominated, and change appears more superficial and less profound than advocates of structural contributions hope. Four types of belief systems about clinical service structures are apparent. Some study participants are disposed toward the status quo; others toward restructuring; yet others are team oriented; and a final group is tribally oriented. The implication of this paper for managers is that more work is needed if clinical service structures are to realise the promise of more multi-disciplinarity and less fragmentation across professional groups. For scholars, the implication is that marrying different theoretical frames with empirical data can serve to produce fresh perspectives and perhaps new insights.
When describing the thesis of this book, I occasionally hear a version of the following complaint:
“Who cares about people’s intuitions about free will and moral responsibility? I’m interested in ...thetruthabout free will and moral responsibility. Your project doesn’t tell me anything about that!”
This kind of objection has a sensible ring. In debates over, say, group selection in evolutionary theory, we do not examine folk intuitions about how Darwinian natural selection might work. We consider these intuitions to be largely irrelevant in our theorizing. Why shouldn’t level-headed philosophers regard free will and moral responsibility the same way?
Marián Zouhar in his article “Evidencia v analytickej filozofii” (“Self-Evidence in Analytical Philosophy”), published in the pages of this journal (Filosofický časopis, 62, 2014, No. 3, p. 323-375), ...points to reasons why we might call into doubt the self-evident status of intuitions in (analytical) philosophy. In this contribution I distinguish between diff erent theses that are the subject of M. Zouhar’s arguments. Since there are mutually non-equivalent claims at stake, it is only natural that arguments concerning them require the application of non-identical assumptions (premises). I attempt to show that (whether explicitly or implicitly) the assumptions of several arguments which M. Zouhar draws upon, are themselves problematic, or in certain cases require more clarification. Finally I point to the fact that the criteria of adequate richness, precision and transparency, which M. Zouhar applies to intuitions, are clearly not met by other kinds of givens which are standardly considered self-evident in philosophy and the methodology of science.
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