So‐called Neo‐Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘n is F’ in a context c is the singular proposition ⟨o, P⟩, where o is the referent of the name n in c, and P is the property expressed by the predicate F in c. This is also known as the Neo‐Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo‐Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo‐Russellian theory.