Cilj je rada istražiti stabilnost koalicijskih vlada u Hrvatskoj 2000. – 2020. te se polazi od teze da je nestabilnost vlada uvjetovana nedovoljno obuhvatnim koalicijskim sporazumima i neučinkovitim mehanizmima rješavanja koalicijskih sukoba. U radu se prvo analiziraju koalicijski sporazumi s obzirom na veličinu i sadržaj koji je u njima zastupljen, a zatim se istražuju stvarni procesi koalicijskog upravljanja koji se događaju unutar „crne kutije“ identificiranjem najčešćih sukoba i mehanizama s pomoću kojih se oni nastoje riješiti. U analizi se upotrebljavaju izvorni empirijski podaci prikupljeni intervjuima s bivšim članovima koalicijskih vlada, kao i koalicijski sporazumi, vladini programi, arhivska građa dviju dnevnih novina te arhivske baze vlade i parlamenta. Rezultati istraživanja doveli su do glavnog zaključka da zbog nedovoljno razrađenih i formaliziranih koalicijskih sporazuma koalicijske stranke nisu uspješne u upravljanju koalicijskim sukobima, stoga pribjegavaju ad hoc mehanizmu neformanog i vrlo personaliziranog odlučivanja koje se izgrađuje u malom gremiju čelnika koalicijskih stranaka. The aim of this paper is to explore the stability of coalition governments in Croatia in the period 2000–2020, starting with the premise that cabinet instability is influenced by the limited scope of coalition agreements and ineffective conflict resolution mechanisms. The paper first analyses coalition agreements with regard to their scope and content, and goes on to explore the actual processes of coalition governance that occur within the “black box” by identifying the most common conflicts and the mechanisms which are used to resolve these. The analysis uses original empirical data collected through interviews with former members of coalition governments, as well as coalition agreements, government programmes, the archives of two daily newspapers, and archival databases of the government and parliament. Research results have led to the main conclusion that due to insufficiently developed and formalised coalition agreements, coalition parties are not successful at managing coalition conflicts, so they resort to the ad hoc mechanism of informal and highly personalised decision-making which is generated by a small group of coalition leaders.