'Taking Philosophy Seriously' initiates a meta-philosophical dialogue that challenges the division between academic and practical philosophy. In contradistinction to the perfectionist tradition of ...philosophy, it offers a melioristic view of philosophy that rethinks the approach to philosophy, reinvigorates its academic teaching and secures the respectability of its practitioners outside the academe. It addresses the neglected topic of philosophers' education through a subtle analysis of the mentor-apprentice relationship and the remedies philosophers have found to its tensions.
In this volume, an international group of prominent philosophical practitioners brings new methods, aims, problems and audiences to the practice of philosophy. The twelve chapters here exemplify how ...philosophers can fulfill their responsibility towards their communities, and, ultimately, towards civilization at large. This anthology will prove to be valuable not only to philosophers, both practical and theoretical, but also to professionals and students in education and the helping disciplines. Written in a clear and engaging style, it will be of interest to the general public as well.
Calling on philosophers as the custodians of rationality to reconsider their responsibility toward their communities and the state of civilization at large, this book considers philosophy to be a ...practical discipline. Largely foreign to philosophers and non-philosophers alike, this conception of philosophy discloses the relevance of its unique contributions to contemporary society. The book offers a compelling and accessible analysis of philosophy also in relation to religion, psychology, the New Age Movement, and globalization, and exemplifies through a wide range of current problems how philosophers can fulfil their responsibility. Its argument that responsibility lies where one is capable of doing what is needed, and even more so, when no one else can do it, targets philosophers. However, its innovative study of contemporary philosophy coupled with its original contributions to the problems at hand will engage academics and students from other disciplines, as well as a general readership.
This volume presents the state of the art of philosophical practice worldwide from the perspectives of leading philosophical practitioners, both counselors and institutional consultants. ...Philosophical practice has developed in different directions in different parts of the world, with the focus in Europe and North America being mostly on client counseling and corporate consultancy, while in Asia it is more community-based and more closely aligned with psychotherapy. In all cases, philosophical practitioners strive to transcend the boundaries of academic philosophy and reach out to the public, to corporations, to the policy makers, to the medical, legal and many other professions. The chapters of this book illustrate both the breadth of philosophical practice and its various methodological directions, while, at the same time, showing how philosophy can be relevant to everyday life, not just for individuals, but for the economy, the government, international organizations, the helping and therapeutic professions, and the educational system. The volume is primarily a companion for students of applied philosophy on all levels, as well as for modern psychotherapists, educational professionals and academics. It is designed to support a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in philosophy and applied psychology, ranging from ancient ethics to philosophical practice sui generis, or to the philosophy of psychology.
Shaftesbury has assigned humor an unparalleled role within philosophy, which may be encapsulated in the following tenets: (1) ridicule is the test of truth; (2) humor and good humor have a ...habilitating function with regard to truth; (3) the most effective criticism is humorous; and (4) humor is the mark of rationality. In the present article, I introduce Shaftesbury’s views on ridicule, good humor and humor in order to assess both the originality and viability of Shaftesbury’s contribution. I argue, first, that Shaftesbury’s views on ridicule as a test of truth and on good-humor as habilitating truth are thoroughly original, but cannot be implemented without adhering to his metaphysics and epistemology. Second, Shaftesbury’s views on humor are only partially original, though these can be implemented independently of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions for the greatest benefit of philosophers in general and critical rationalists in particular. I conclude that not only does Shaftesbury anticipate the view that critical thinking is the core of rationality, the main principle of the view known as critical rationalism associated with the renown 20th century philosopher of science and social philosopher, Karl Popper, but he also offers a viable means to enhance criticism as rationality by taking into consideration the psychological resistance to criticism that Popper acknowledges but refuses to address.
As an introduction to the six essays written in honor of Joseph Agassi’s last book, I explain the book structure and Agassi’s purpose in writing it. To the contrary of what I had in mind when I ...invited Agassi to pen this manuscript—his Cynic- and Zen-like educational practices, on which I have elaborated elsewhere and which required further clarification—Agassi chose to write on the intersection of the philosophy of life with academic philosophy. Following Socrates, he called for an active collaboration of both. By explaining why “philosophy is nothing … if it is not the advocacy of reason,” Agassi summed up his entire philosophy in what turned out to be his clearest and most insightful work, his testament.
Agassi on Morality and Ethics Amir, Lydia
Philosophy of the social sciences,
01/2023, Letnik:
53, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This paper presents Agassi’s views of morality and ethics. Agassi proposes a non-reductive psychological theory of moral judgments, complemented by duties, and a psychological hypothesis regarding ...the psychological and social conditions that invite openness to criticism. His opposition to moralism, his objection to justification, his emphasis on red lines and grey areas, and his rejection of abstract moral debates in favor of public moralism result in a distinct approach to moral philosophy that is in conflict with most of the mainstream work in this field. Following Socrates, he takes education for autonomy as the critical rationalist life-style.
It is often said that humor is a powerful tool that is helpful for living a good life. When saying this, we assume that humor is used sporadically for chance encounters with the spontaneously funny. ...In what follows, however, I lay out the educational premises of a new worldview, which, by making systematic use of self-referential humor in order to handle events that are not immediately funny, leads to a stable state which philosophers call the good life. The multifaceted philosophic notion of the “good life” will be reduced to the principles proposed below; but humor as presented here can help achieve any philosophical ideal, even one that is not in the spirit of the view articulated here.
However, the form of philosophic humor that I advance in this article requires education, mainly self-education, as is often the case with much successful education. Thus, as intimated by existential philosophers, I maintain, first, that laughter can and should be learned; and second, that the discipline of laughter is philosophically significant because laughter enables to endorse new norms and to change one’s attitude towards oneself, others, and the world. To achieve the educational aims of this article, the theoretical clarification of the worldview that I introduce,
or the ridiculous human being, is illustrated by exercises that help implementing it.
This article evaluates the significance of the personal liberation that Santayana offers in relation to previous proposals in Western modern philosophy. These include the ideas of liberation present ...in the philosophies of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. I argue that Santayana endorses Spinoza’s project, as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche did, of a philosophic redemption as an alternative to an established religion. Yet, he also follows Schopenhauer in rectifying Spinoza’s attempt of recapturing the philosophic truth of Christianity, a project undertaken in Medieval times for Judaism and Islam, but not for Christianity. The result is an explicit philosophic reconstruction of the esoteric truth of Christianity. This, I argue, is the content of the lay religion and the deliverance it provides that Santayana sees as genuine philosophy and that is exemplified by the work of his hero and master, Spinoza.
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