In this paper I suggest a pragmatic model for the notion of 'information' used in molecular biology in the description of protein synthesis. Discarding any ontological commitments of the term ...'information', I propose a view of information based on an analogy with communication. This view could at least supplement the existing information-metaphor that should be updated for two reasons: (i) the concept of information it presupposes, and (ii) the origin of the metaphor itself. Besides, the metaphorical nature of the notion of 'information' is still often overlooked, which leads to a false sense of understanding of the underlying genetic phenomena it should describe. The advantages of a model based on communication, as it is seen by the field of pragmatics, is twofold: (i) it provides a rather simple analogy between human communication and basic genetic processes, and (ii) it supplies the tools for the understanding of the non-literal use of the term 'information'.
In this paper, I start from the assumption that sex education, either as a separate subject or in the form of an interdisciplinary topic, is an indispensable part of the modern school curriculum. ...Although it has not yet entered the Croatian education system under this name, certain important topics related to human sexuality can be found in the school curriculum. However, what is missing now is the issue of intimate and sexual communication. By this I do not mean conversations about sexuality and sexual relations with parents or teachers, but those among partners who are considering entering an intimate relationship or have already done so. In recent years, the term “consent” has been widely discussed, but this speech act is only one form of sexual communication. In this paper, I consider other speech acts important in the intimate sphere, such as “invitations”, “gifts”, the use of “safe words” and “intimate overtures”, whose proper use and understanding are based on general criteria of appropriate and successful communication. By mastering these general principles and discussing specific communicational interactions between partners, young people can learn to communicate better in the intimate sphere, which would lead to the improvement of their private relationships.
In the paper I suggest that a loose notion of logical form can be a useful tool for the understanding or evaluation of everyday language and the explicit and implicit content of communication. ...Reconciling ordinary language and logic provides formal guidelines for rational communication, giving strength and order to ordinary communication and content to logical schemas. The starting point of the paper is the idea that the bearers of logical form are not natural language sentences, but what we communicate with them, that is, their content in a particular context. On the basis of that idea, I propose that we can ascribe logical proprieties to what is communicated using ordinary language and suggest a continuum between semantic phenomena such as explicatures and pragmatic communicational strategies such as (particularized) conversational implicatures, which challenges the idea that an implicatum is completely separate from what is said. I believe that this continuum can be best explained by the notion of logical form, taken as a propriety of sentences relative to particular interpretations.
In the paper I suggest that a loose notion of logical form can be a useful tool for the understanding or evaluation of everyday language and the explicit and implicit content of communication. ...Reconciling ordinary language and logic provides formal guidelines for rational communication, giving strength and order to ordinary communication and content to logical schemas. The starting point of the paper is the idea that the bearers of logical form are not natural language sentences, but what we communicate with them, that is, their content in a particular context. On the basis of that idea, I propose that we can ascribe logical proprieties to what is communicated using ordinary language and suggest a continuum between semantic phenomena such as explicatures and pragmatic communicational strategies such as (particularized) conversational implicatures, which challenges the idea that an implicatum is completely separate from what is said. I believe that this continuum can be best explained by the notion of logical form, taken as a propriety of sentences relative to particular interpretations.
Cilj je rada propitati tradicionalnu definiciju laži. U radu ne pružam vlastitu definiciju te pojave, ali pokušavam pokazati da je tradicionalna definicija laži, po kojoj je za laganje nužno ...iskazivanje neistinitih tvrdnji, neadekvatna. Kako bih to učinila, u prvom dijelu predstavljam teoriju Herberta Paula Gricea o razgovornim implikaturama, čije su hotimično neistinite inačice izrijekom isključene iz tradicionalne definicije. U nastavku, pozivajući se na teoriju o zadanim značenjima, odbacujem rašireni stav da se govornik uvijek može ograditi od pragmatički prenesene poruke. Potom, predstavljam standardnu definiciju laži i sagledavam koju ulogu u njoj imaju govornikova namjera i slušateljeva odgovornost. U drugom dijelu, dotadašnje uvide primjenjujem na Shakespeareovu tragediju Otelo. Nakon kratkog predstavljanja odnosa između Otela i Jaga, razlažem tri dramska primjera onoga što smatram lažima ostvarenima razgovornom implikaturom. Takva analiza ima dvojaku ulogu. Prva joj je zadaća pokazati nedostatnost tradicionalne definicije laži kroz tvrdnju da Jago, iako ne izgovara neistine, laže. Druga je zadaća ukazivanje na ograničeni doseg mogućnosti poništavanja pragmatički prenesene poruke; Jagove pragmatičke poruke toliko su snažne da se, iako to pokušava učiniti, od njih ne uspijeva ograditi.
This paper aims to question the traditional definition of lying. I do not present my definition of this phenomenon. Instead, I try to show that the traditional definition – to lie one must utter a false claim – is inadequate. To do that, in the first part of the paper, I present Herbert Paul Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures, which are explicitly excluded from the traditional definition. Next, relying on the theory of default meanings, I reject the widespread idea that the speaker can always distance themselves from a pragmatically conveyed message. Then I present the traditional definition of lying and the role that the intention of the speaker and the responsibility of the hearer play in it. In the second part, I apply the insights gathered by that point to Shakespeare’s tragedy Othello. After a brief presentation of the relation between Othello and Iago, I present three examples of dialogues from the play that I consider to be the cases of lying accomplished with conversational implicatures. This kind of analysis has a dual role. The first one is to show the inadequacy of the traditional definition of lying. Even though Iago does not utter a single false claim, he is lying. The second one to point to the limited scope of the possibility of denying a pragmatically conveyed message. Iago’s pragmatic messages are so strong that he cannot distance himself from them, even when he tries to.
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