Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their ...supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.
Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to ...follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high sucker's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the learning method can provide a novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, and hence remains hidden in traditional models.
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they ...also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers-those that cooperate and punish-are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.
Abstract
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we ...may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.
Blood-brain barrier (BBB) is a natural protective membrane that prevents central nervous system (CNS) from toxins and pathogens in blood. However, the presence of BBB complicates the pharmacotherapy ...for CNS disorders as the most chemical drugs and biopharmaceuticals have been impeded to enter the brain. Insufficient drug delivery into the brain leads to low therapeutic efficacy as well as aggravated side effects due to the accumulation in other organs and tissues. Recent breakthrough in materials science and nanotechnology provides a library of advanced materials with customized structure and property serving as a powerful toolkit for targeted drug delivery. In-depth research in the field of anatomical and pathological study on brain and BBB further facilitates the development of brain-targeted strategies for enhanced BBB crossing. In this review, the physiological structure and different cells contributing to this barrier are summarized. Various emerging strategies for permeability regulation and BBB crossing including passive transcytosis, intranasal administration, ligands conjugation, membrane coating, stimuli-triggered BBB disruption, and other strategies to overcome BBB obstacle are highlighted. Versatile drug delivery systems ranging from organic, inorganic, and biologics-derived materials with their synthesis procedures and unique physio-chemical properties are summarized and analyzed. This review aims to provide an up-to-date and comprehensive guideline for researchers in diverse fields, offering perspectives on further development of brain-targeted drug delivery system.
•The optimal positive and negative incentive strategies with the minimal cumulative cost are theoretically obtained by using the approach of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation for well-mixed ...populations.•Numerical examples are provided to compare the obtained optimal incentive strategies with other given incentive ones which further confirm theoretical results.•The optimal punishing strategy is a cheaper way for obtaining an expected cooperation level when it is compared with the optimal rewarding strategy.
Prosocial incentive can promote cooperation, but providing incentive is costly. Institutions in human society may prefer to use an incentive strategy which is able to promote cooperation at a reasonable cost. However, thus far few works have explored the optimal institutional incentives which minimize related cost for the benefit of public cooperation. In this work, in combination with optimal control theory we thus formulate two optimal control problems to explore the optimal incentive strategies for institutional reward and punishment respectively. By using the approach of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation for well-mixed populations, we theoretically obtain the optimal positive and negative incentive strategies with the minimal cumulative cost respectively. Additionally, we provide numerical examples to verify that the obtained optimal incentives allow the dynamical system to reach the desired destination at the lowest cumulative cost in comparison with other given incentive strategies. Furthermore, we find that the optimal punishing strategy is a cheaper way for obtaining an expected cooperation level when it is compared with the optimal rewarding strategy.
In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail ...and the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we also consider a player's individual wealth when to decide about participation? To address this issue we propose a model in which the probabilistic participation in the public goods game is combined with a conditional investment mode that is based on individual wealth: if a player's wealth exceeds a threshold value then it is qualified and can participate in the joint venture. Otherwise, the participation is forbidden in the investment interactions. We show that if only probabilistic participation is considered, spatially structured populations cannot support cooperation better than well-mixed populations where full defection state can also be avoided for small participation probabilities. By adding the wealth-based criterion of participation, however, structured populations are capable to augment network reciprocity relevantly and allow cooperator strategy to dominate in a broader parameter interval.
Based on learning theory, we adopt a stochastic learning updating rule to investigate the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on Newman-Watts small-world networks with different ...payoff aspiration levels. Interestingly, simulation results show that the mechanism of intermediate aspiration promoting cooperation resembles a resonancelike behavior, and there exists a ping-pong vibration of cooperation for large payoff aspiration. To explain the nontrivial dependence of the cooperation level on the aspiration level, we investigate the fractions of links, provide analytical results of the cooperation level, and find that the simulation results are in close agreement with analytical ones. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the aspiration level in society.
Competing strategies in an evolutionary game model, or species in a biosystem, can easily form a larger unit which protects them from the invasion of an external actor. Such a defensive alliance may ...have two, three, four or even more members. But how effective can be such formation against an alternative group composed by other competitors? To address this question we study a minimal model where a two-member and a four-member alliances fight in a symmetric and balanced way. By presenting representative phase diagrams, we systematically explore the whole parameter range which characterizes the inner dynamics of the alliances and the intensity of their interactions. The group formed by a pair, who can exchange their neighboring positions, prevail in the majority of the parameter region. The rival quartet can only win if their inner cyclic invasion rate is significant while the mixing rate of the pair is extremely low. At specific parameter values, when neither of the alliances is strong enough, new four-member solutions emerge where a rock-paper-scissors-like trio is extended by the other member of the pair. These new solutions coexist hence all six competitors can survive. The evolutionary process is accompanied by serious finite-size effects which can be mitigated by appropriately chosen prepared initial states.
Summary Background Until now, polymyxin resistance has involved chromosomal mutations but has never been reported via horizontal gene transfer. During a routine surveillance project on antimicrobial ...resistance in commensal Escherichia coli from food animals in China, a major increase of colistin resistance was observed. When an E coli strain, SHP45, possessing colistin resistance that could be transferred to another strain, was isolated from a pig, we conducted further analysis of possible plasmid-mediated polymyxin resistance. Herein, we report the emergence of the first plasmid-mediated polymyxin resistance mechanism, MCR-1, in Enterobacteriaceae. Methods The mcr-1 gene in E coli strain SHP45 was identified by whole plasmid sequencing and subcloning. MCR-1 mechanistic studies were done with sequence comparisons, homology modelling, and electrospray ionisation mass spectrometry. The prevalence of mcr-1 was investigated in E coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae strains collected from five provinces between April, 2011, and November, 2014. The ability of MCR-1 to confer polymyxin resistance in vivo was examined in a murine thigh model. Findings Polymyxin resistance was shown to be singularly due to the plasmid-mediated mcr-1 gene. The plasmid carrying mcr-1 was mobilised to an E coli recipient at a frequency of 10−1 to 10−3 cells per recipient cell by conjugation, and maintained in K pneumoniae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa . In an in-vivo model, production of MCR-1 negated the efficacy of colistin. MCR-1 is a member of the phosphoethanolamine transferase enzyme family, with expression in E coli resulting in the addition of phosphoethanolamine to lipid A. We observed mcr-1 carriage in E coli isolates collected from 78 (15%) of 523 samples of raw meat and 166 (21%) of 804 animals during 2011–14, and 16 (1%) of 1322 samples from inpatients with infection. Interpretation The emergence of MCR-1 heralds the breach of the last group of antibiotics, polymyxins, by plasmid-mediated resistance. Although currently confined to China, MCR-1 is likely to emulate other global resistance mechanisms such as NDM-1. Our findings emphasise the urgent need for coordinated global action in the fight against pan-drug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria. Funding Ministry of Science and Technology of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China.
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