This paper shows possible inconsistencies in environmental law, in which regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and the polluter pays principle (PPP) coexist. While these norms can be compatible, we show ...that there are a number of realistic settings in which the PPP does not reach efficiency and systematically leads to regulatory failure. These systematic errors are due to the ex-ante restriction of possible actors, in combination with possible opportunistic behavior, market power issues, the existence of multiple optima and to the neglect of second-best problems in the PPP. We show that RIA, encompasses the polluter pays option and avoids these flaws.
Mit Präsident Bush’s Aufruf zum „War on Drugs“¹ im Herbst des Jahres 1989 hat die Prohibitionspolitik einmal mehr einen moralischen Höhepunkt erreicht. Die Durchsetzung einer drogenfreien Welt wird ...zum Kriegsziel erklärt, mit „Just say No“² ist es nicht mehr getan: „All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nations today is drugs. (…) It is turning our cities into battle zones, and it is murderlog our children“ (Bush (1989)).
Wen kümmern da schon die vor allem von Ökonomen immer wieder angeführten sozialen Kosten der Prohibition und ihre prognostizierbare Erfolglosigkeit — zumindest für die Fortführung in der bisherigen
International roaming – the ability to use one's mobile phone on foreign networks – has contributed to the success of GSM services in Europe, but has also been a constant concern for competition ...authorities. Whilst competition for subscribers has driven down the cost of owning and using mobile phones, roaming charges have remained high, and have been the subject of investigation for example by the European Commission.
However, in order to see whether high roaming charges are indeed the result of failing competition, and in order to identify appropriate remedies, one needs to understand how technological constraints impact on competition in the provision of roaming services. In particular, the limited ability to direct roaming traffic onto a particular network implies that price competition at the level of inter-operator tariffs (IOTs) is muted.
In this paper, we model competition in the provision of-wholesale roaming services, and its implications for retail offers, depending on the ability to direct roaming traffic onto particular partner networks. We examine the impact of cross-border mergers which are often seen to improve an operator's ability to offer seamless roaming service across an increasing number of countries as a result of an enlarged footprint.
This paper provides a discussion of the generic problems in the provision of narrowband services that might require regulatory action, the principles that should be followed in the choice of ...remedies, and a number of detailed regulatory measures that might be applied in the various narrowband markets. This discussion is based on the assumption that the New Regulatory Framework has a de-regulatory focus, that sustainable competition without regulatory intervention tends to require investments in infrastructure, and that therefore the impact of remedies on investment incentives needs to be considered very carefully. The paper also argues that likely implementation problems need to be considered when assessing the most appropriate form of intervention (and, indeed, whether such intervention is overall beneficial).
Strategic Power in the European Union Steunenberg, Bernard; Schmidtchen, Dieter; Koboldt, Christian
Journal of theoretical politics,
07/1999, Letnik:
11, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
In this paper we propose a new method to evaluate the distribution of power between decision-making bodies in the European Union. Conventional methods that measure the voting power of players, such ...as the Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Shapley-Shubik indices, are insufficient for this purpose. They take no account, in an endogenous way, of the differences in the abilities of players to affect the outcome of decision-making, which are a result of the existence of political institutions. We propose a different way to measure decision-making power based on the distance between a player's ideal point and the equilibrium outcome of a game. While all previous indices are based on cooperative game theory, the index developed in this paper is based on non-cooperative game theory, which has been the dominant thrust of theoretical politics and economics in the last years. The new index is applied to legislative procedures in the European Union.
Copyright protection, or more generally, intellectual property rights, can be regarded as a means for the stimulation of production of information goods. This paper analyses the basic problem of ...production and dissemination of information and the role of copyright protection as an incentive for the producers of creative works. Using a simple model, it is shown that not only a cause for limiting the extent of copyright protection does exist, but that also an argument for a minimum level of protection can be found. Even optimal copyright protection, given the restriction that production and dissemination of information goods has to be co-ordinated by a market mechanism, however, does not lead to a first-best (allocatively efficient) solution. Hence, the judgment that copyright protection is the best solution to the basic problem can be grounded only on a comparative institutional approach.
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