Pork processing plants were apparent hotspots for SARS-CoV2 in the spring of 2020. As a result, the swine industry was confronted with a major occupational health, financial, and animal welfare ...crisis. The objective of this work was to describe the epidemiological situation within processing plants, develop mathematical models to simulate transmission in these plants, and test the effectiveness of routine PCR screening at minimizing SARS-CoV2 circulation. Cumulative incidence of clinical (PCR-confirmed) disease plateaued at ~2.5% to 25% across the three plants studied here. For larger outbreaks, antibody prevalence was approximately 30% to 40%. Secondly, we developed a mathematical model that accounts for asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and background "community" transmission. By calibrating this model to observed epidemiological data, we estimated the initial reproduction number (R) of the virus. Across plants, R generally ranged between 2 and 4 during the initial phase, but subsequently declined to ~1 after two to three weeks, most likely as a result of implementation/compliance with biosecurity measures in combination with population immunity. Using the calibrated model to simulate a range of possible scenarios, we show that the effectiveness of routine PCR-screening at minimizing disease spread was far more influenced by testing frequency than by delays in results, R, or background community transmission rates. Testing every three days generally averted about 25% to 40% of clinical cases across a range of assumptions, while testing every 14 days typically averted 7 to 13% of clinical cases. However, the absolute number of additional clinical cases expected and averted was influenced by whether there was residual immunity from a previous peak (i.e., routine testing is implemented after the workforce had experienced an initial outbreak). In contrast, when using PCR-screening to prevent outbreaks or in the early stages of an outbreak, even frequent testing may not prevent a large outbreak within the workforce. This research helps to identify protocols that minimize risk to occupational safety and health and support continuity of business for U.S. processing plants. While the model was calibrated to meat processing plants, the structure of the model and insights about testing are generalizable to other settings where large number of people work in close proximity.
The goal of this study was to evaluate survival of important viral pathogens of livestock in animal feed ingredients imported daily into the United States under simulated transboundary conditions. ...Eleven viruses were selected based on global significance and impact to the livestock industry, including Foot and Mouth Disease Virus (FMDV), Classical Swine Fever Virus (CSFV), African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV), Influenza A Virus of Swine (IAV-S), Pseudorabies virus (PRV), Nipah Virus (NiV), Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (PRRSV), Swine Vesicular Disease Virus (SVDV), Vesicular Stomatitis Virus (VSV), Porcine Circovirus Type 2 (PCV2) and Vesicular Exanthema of Swine Virus (VESV). Surrogate viruses with similar genetic and physical properties were used for 6 viruses. Surrogates belonged to the same virus families as target pathogens, and included Senecavirus A (SVA) for FMDV, Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus (BVDV) for CSFV, Bovine Herpesvirus Type 1 (BHV-1) for PRV, Canine Distemper Virus (CDV) for NiV, Porcine Sapelovirus (PSV) for SVDV and Feline Calicivirus (FCV) for VESV. For the remaining target viruses, actual pathogens were used. Virus survival was evaluated using Trans-Pacific or Trans-Atlantic transboundary models involving representative feed ingredients, transport times and environmental conditions, with samples tested by PCR, VI and/or swine bioassay. SVA (representing FMDV), FCV (representing VESV), BHV-1 (representing PRV), PRRSV, PSV (representing SVDV), ASFV and PCV2 maintained infectivity during transport, while BVDV (representing CSFV), VSV, CDV (representing NiV) and IAV-S did not. Notably, more viruses survived in conventional soybean meal, lysine hydrochloride, choline chloride, vitamin D and pork sausage casings. These results support published data on transboundary risk of PEDV in feed, demonstrate survival of certain viruses in specific feed ingredients ("high-risk combinations") under conditions simulating transport between continents and provide further evidence that contaminated feed ingredients may represent a risk for transport of pathogens at domestic and global levels.
The trial objective was to compare the performance and animal health parameters of pigs raised according to one of 3 antibiotic (AB) protocols: standard AB medication consisting of mass treatment on ...days 4 and 21 and judicious AB therapy given therapeutically thereafter as group medication in water and feed or by individual injection (group T1, N = 702); modified AB medication identical to group T1 but with mass treatment only on day 4 and without subsequent therapeutic feed medication (group T2, N = 675); or an antibiotic-free (ABF) regimen (group T3, N = 702). All pigs were vaccinated with a modified-live porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) vaccine 3 days after weaning. Using a seeder pig model to mimic endemic field infection dynamics, pigs were contact-challenged with virulent PRRSV lineage 1 strain 174 four weeks after vaccination. At finishing, average daily gain (ADG) and mean feed conversion ratio (FCR) were significantly better (p ≤ 0.05) for the T1 and T2 groups compared to the T3 group. There were no significant differences in post-weaning ADG and FCR between the T1 and T2 groups. Mortality and removals significantly favored (p ≤0.05) the T1 and T2 groups (20.94% and 24.89%, respectively) versus the T3 group (57.98%). Net revenue per pig was $105.43, $98.79, and $33.81 for the T1, T2 and T3 groups, respectively. Under the conditions of this study, these results indicate that in a PRRSV-endemic setting involving bacterial co-infections, an ABF production strategy may leave pigs at considerable risk of exposure to severe clinical disease and that judicious use of antibiotics can significantly improve animal health.
Viruses of veterinary significance are known to survive for extended periods in plant‐based feed ingredients imported into North America. To reduce the likelihood of virus introduction, high‐risk ...ingredients, such as oil seed meals, are stored in designated facilities for extended periods under controlled environmental conditions to minimize viral infectivity prior to use in diets. While 30 days has become a standard storage period, the required ambient temperature to inactivate viruses during this time is not known. To address the question, 1‐metric tonne totes of conventional soybean meal were inoculated with PRRSV 144 lineage 1C variant and SVA prior to storage for 30 days at 23.9°C, 15.5°C or 10°C, and feeding to pigs. Virus infectivity was evaluated through detection of viral RNA in oral fluid samples, along with clinical signs. Results indicated that inactivation of both viruses occurred in soy stored at 23.9°C. In contrast, SVA infectivity was observed in soy stored at both 15.5°C and 10°C, while PRRSV 144 L1C variant infectivity was only observed in soy stored at 10°C. These results suggest that a storage period of 30 days and a temperature of 23.9°C may assist in the reduction of the risk of virus contaminated plant‐based feed ingredients, such as soybean meal.
An introduction of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) like African Swine Fever Virus (ASF) would be financially devastating. For example, ASF, a highly contagious pathogen with high mortality rates, is a ...World Health Organization reportable disease that has recently been spreading across Asia and Europe. Control of ASF would likely require mass euthanasia of infected and exposed animals similar to the United Kingdom’s elimination of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Subsequent disposal of infectious carcasses must adequately eliminate the virus and prevent further transmission of the disease. Although composting swine carcasses is widely used throughout the industry, limited data is available describing pathogen survival or elimination during this process. While current methods have evaluated the composting of swine carcasses under temperature‐controlled settings, they have not considered the effects of adverse weather conditions (e.g., cold winter conditions) where composting is routinely performed. This study utilized preprocessing (grinding) of swine carcasses prior to composting, which decreases the amount of required carbon material and land space. The ability of composting to reduce the level of viral nucleic acid during cold weather conditions and the risk of environmental contamination that may occur during preprocessing was evaluated. In this study, pigs challenged with Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (PRRSV) and Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea Virus (PEDV), common domestic diseases, before euthanasia provided infectious carcasses containing pathogen surrogates. Composting of preprocessed carcasses achieved adequate temperatures necessary to eliminate FAD and common swine pathogens during cold weather conditions (monitored by compost temperature over time, virus diagnostic testing, and swine bioassay for PRRSV and PEDV). Under the conditions of this study, composting preprocessed carcasses presents minimal risk to air and groundwater contamination. In conclusion, composting preprocessed euthanized swine under adverse weather conditions is a safe and feasible option for mass disposal of infected carcasses.
A longitudinal study was conducted to assess the impact of different antimicrobial exposures of nursery-phase pigs on patterns of phenotypic antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in fecal indicator ...organisms throughout the growing phase. Based on practical approaches used to treat moderate to severe porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV)-associated secondary bacterial infections, two antimicrobial protocols of differing intensities of exposure 44.1 and 181.5 animal-treatment days per 1000 animal days at risk (ATD) were compared with a control group with minimal antimicrobial exposure (2.1 ATD). Litter-matched pigs (
= 108) with no prior antimicrobial exposure were assigned randomly to the treatment groups. Pen fecal samples were collected nine times during the wean-to-finish period and cultured for Escherichia coli and
spp. Antimicrobial-susceptibility testing was conducted using NARMS Gram-negative and Gram-positive antibiotic panels. Despite up to 65-fold difference in ATD, few and modest differences were observed between groups and over time. Resistance patterns at marketing overall remained similar to those observed at weaning, prior to any antimicrobial exposures. Those differences observed could not readily be reconciled with the patterns of antimicrobial exposure. Resistance of E. coli to streptomycin was higher in the group exposed to 44.1 ATD, but no aminoglycosides were used. In all instances where resistances differed between time points, the higher resistance occurred early in the trial prior to any antimicrobial exposures. These minimal impacts on AMR despite substantially different antimicrobial exposures point to the lack of understanding of the drivers of AMR at the population level and the likely importance of factors other than antimicrobial exposure.
Despite a recognized need for more longitudinal studies to assess the effects of antimicrobial use on resistance in food animals, they remain sparse in the literature, and most longitudinal studies of pigs have been observational. The current experimental study had the advantages of greater control of potential confounding, precise measurement of antimicrobial exposures which differed markedly between groups and tracking of pigs until market age. Overall, resistance patterns were remarkably stable between the treatment groups over time, and the differences observed could not be readily reconciled with the antimicrobial exposures, indicating the likely importance of other determinants of AMR at the population level.
African swine fever virus is transmissible through animal consumption of contaminated feed. To determine virus survival during transoceanic shipping, we calculated the half-life of the virus in 9 ...feed ingredients exposed to 30-day shipment conditions. Half-lives ranged from 9.6 to 14.2 days, indicating that the feed matrix environment promotes virus stability.
African swine fever virus (ASFV) can survive in soya‐based products for 30 days with T ½ ranging from 9.6 to 12.9 days in soya bean meals and soya oil cake. As the United States imports soya‐based ...products from several ASFV‐positive countries, knowledge of the type and quantity of these specific imports, and their ports of entry (POE), is necessary information to manage risk. Using the data from the International Trade Commission Harmonized Tariff Schedule website in conjunction with pivot tables, we analysed imports across air, land and sea POE of soya‐based products from 43 ASFV‐positive countries to the United States during 2018 and 2019. In 2018, 104,366 metric tons (MT) of soya‐based products, specifically conventional and organic soya bean meal, soya beans, soya oil cake and soya oil were imported from these countries into the United States via seaports only. The two largest suppliers were China (52.7%, 55,034 MT) and the Ukraine (42.9%, 44,775 MT). In 2019, 73,331 MT entered the United States and 54.7% (40,143 MT) came from the Ukraine and 8.4% (6,182 MT) from China. Regarding POE, 80.9%–83.2% of soya‐based imports from China entered the United States at the seaports of San Francisco, CA, and Seattle, WA, while 89.4%–100% entered from the Ukraine via the seaports of New Orleans, LA, and Charlotte, NC. Analysis of five‐year trends (2015–2019) of the volume of soya imports from China indicated reduction over time (with a noticeably sharp decrease between 2018 and 2019), and seaport utilization was consistent. In contrast, volume remained high for Ukrainian soya imports, and seaport utilization was inconsistent. Overall, this exercise introduced a new approach to collect objective data on an important risk factor, providing researchers, government officials and industry stakeholders a means to objectively identify and quantify potential channels of foreign animal disease entry into the United States.
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