We study the effect of blind punishment in a team production experiment, in which subjects choose non-observable effort levels. In this setting, a random exclusion mechanism is introduced, linked to ...the normalized group performance (
R, from 0 to 1). Every round, each subject is non-excluded from the collective profit with probability
R (and with probability 1
−
R gets no benefit from the group account). Punishment does not depend on the individual behavior, but the probability of being punished reflects collective performance. As the exclusion probability is computed at the group level, no individual information is needed to implement exclusion. However, the probabilistic punishment risks to be perceived by subjects as procedurally unfair, as all subjects are treated in an identical, non-equitable manner (justice is blind). Our results suggest that random exclusion promotes a significant increase in cooperation. The effect seems to be associated with
hot behavioral responses to punishment. However, convergence to full contribution is not observed.
This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat ...treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment.
Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. This paper tests the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same ...decisions in a team work environment under four different organizational networks: the line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subject types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete network. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.
The possibility of using TTF-derivatized SAMs as platforms for the construction of electrochemical biosensors is explored. The properties and characteristics of the electroactive SAMs formed with ...4-mercaptotetrathiafulvalene (HSTTF) and 4-(mercapto-ethan-2-thiol)-tetrathiafulvalene (HSC
2STTF), and their ability to promote the electron transfer between the active center of the immobilized enzyme, HRP, and the electrode surface is evaluated. Calculations from electrochemical impedance spectroscopy data showed a microarray behavior for HSC
2STTF-SAMs. However, semi-infinite diffusion was not obtained for HSTTF-SAMs. The slope value of the H
2O
2 calibration plot obtained by flow-injection with amperometric detection at 0.00
V was more than one order of magnitude higher with the HSTTF design, which is attributed to the larger number of TTF moieties present at the electrode surface. The performance of the bioelectrocatalytic integrated devices is shown to be very dependent on the molecular structure of the TTF derivative.
The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the ...responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.
As part of the current debate on the reform of pension systems, this paper presents an original experimental test where subjects face three different payoff sequences with identical expected value. ...Two central questions are analyzed. First, whether the distribution of retirement benefits across time influences the retirement decision. And second, whether actuarially fair pension systems distort the retirement decision. The results indicate both that a lump‐sum payment rather than annuity benefits is far more effective in delaying the retirement decision and that recent reforms that encourage the link between lifetime contributions and pension benefits to delay the retirement decision should take into account timing considerations. (JEL C91, H55, J26)
Blind Fines in Cooperatives Fatas, Enrique; Jimenez-Jimenez, Francisca; Morales, Antonio J.
Applied economic perspectives and policy,
December 2010, Letnik:
32, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In this paper we focus on inefficient product quality arising from a free-riding problem in agricultural cooperatives. Individual incentives are not aligned with group gains in cooperatives because ...individual members bear the costs of offering higher qualities, whereas the benefits from these higher qualities are shared among all members. We present a blind mechanism whose quality-enhancing properties are analyzed in a theoretical model. This mechanism, which does not require individual monitoring, consists of individually punishing co-op members by using aggregate co-op performance in such way that the better the co-op quality, the lower the exclusion probability. In a computerized environment, using experimental methods, we specifically test the effectiveness of our mechanism in alleviating the incentive problem. Experimental results show that our blind punishment mechanism achieves significant efficiency gains.
Public goods and decay in networks Fatas, Enrique; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A; Morales, Antonio J ...
SERIEs : journal of the Spanish Economic Association,
03/2015, Letnik:
6, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past ...behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of thewhole group. Themodel assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.
. We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within‐team competition significantly increases effort levels relative ...to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay‐off‐dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within‐team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.
Counterterrorism strategies in the lab Arce, Daniel G.; Bakshi, Sneha; Croson, Rachel T.A. ...
Public choice,
12/2011, Letnik:
149, Številka:
3/4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
We conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies. Defensive policies are associated with creating public 'bads' (e.g., a ...commons) whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods. When combined, the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated, resulting in a situation known as a Prisoner's Dilemma squared (PD²). Deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting. Experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments, and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome; as individuals gain more experience, they become even more self-interested.
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