Abstract A pressing need exists to disentangle age-related changes from pathologic neurodegeneration. This study aims to characterize the spatial pattern and age-related differences of biologically ...relevant measures in vivo over the course of normal aging. Quantitative multiparameter maps that provide neuroimaging biomarkers for myelination and iron levels, parameters sensitive to aging, were acquired from 138 healthy volunteers (age range: 19–75 years). Whole-brain voxel-wise analysis revealed a global pattern of age-related degeneration. Significant demyelination occurred principally in the white matter. The observed age-related differences in myelination were anatomically specific. In line with invasive histologic reports, higher age-related differences were seen in the genu of the corpus callosum than the splenium. Iron levels were significantly increased in the basal ganglia, red nucleus, and extensive cortical regions but decreased along the superior occipitofrontal fascicle and optic radiation. This whole-brain pattern of age-associated microstructural differences in the asymptomatic population provides insight into the neurobiology of aging. The results help build a quantitative baseline from which to examine and draw a dividing line between healthy aging and pathologic neurodegeneration.
Human choice behavior often reflects a competition between inflexible computationally efficient control on the one hand and a slower more flexible system of control on the other. This distinction is ...well captured by model-free and model-based reinforcement learning algorithms. Here, studying human subjects, we show it is possible to shift the balance of control between these systems by disruption of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, such that participants manifest a dominance of the less optimal model-free control. In contrast, disruption of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impaired model-based performance only in those participants with low working memory capacity.
•Disrupting right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs flexible model-based choice•This drives behavior toward simpler, model-free control•Results provide causal evidence for neural underpinnings of flexible choice
Choices are governed by computationally simple as well as complex systems that compete with each other. In this Report, Smittenaar et al. present causal evidence that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is required for such complex, goal-directed decision making.
Successful behaviour depends on the right balance between maximising reward and soliciting information about the world. Here, we show how different types of information-gain emerge when casting ...behaviour as surprise minimisation. We present two distinct mechanisms for goal-directed exploration that express separable profiles of active sampling to reduce uncertainty. 'Hidden state' exploration motivates agents to sample unambiguous observations to accurately infer the (hidden) state of the world. Conversely, 'model parameter' exploration, compels agents to sample outcomes associated with high uncertainty, if they are informative for their representation of the task structure. We illustrate the emergence of these types of information-gain, termed active inference and active learning, and show how these forms of exploration induce distinct patterns of 'Bayes-optimal' behaviour. Our findings provide a computational framework for understanding how distinct levels of uncertainty systematically affect the exploration-exploitation trade-off in decision-making.
The nascent field computational psychiatry has undergone exponential growth since its inception. To date, much of the published work has focused on choice behaviors, which are primarily modeled ...within a reinforcement learning framework. While this initial normative effort represents a milestone in psychiatry research, the reality is that many psychiatric disorders are defined by disturbances in subjective states (e.g., depression, anxiety) and associated beliefs (e.g., dysmorphophobia, paranoid ideation), which are not considered in normative models. In this paper, we present interoceptive inference as a candidate framework for modeling subjective—and associated belief—states in computational psychiatry. We first introduce the notion and significance of modeling subjective states in computational psychiatry. Next, we present the interoceptive inference framework, and in particular focus on the relationship between interoceptive inference (i.e., belief updating) and emotions. Lastly, we will use drug craving as an example of subjective states to demonstrate the feasibility of using interoceptive inference to model the psychopathology of subjective states.
Dopamine plays a key role in learning; however, its exact function in decision making and choice remains unclear. Recently, we proposed a generic model based on active (Bayesian) inference wherein ...dopamine encodes the precision of beliefs about optimal policies. Put simply, dopamine discharges reflect the confidence that a chosen policy will lead to desired outcomes. We designed a novel task to test this hypothesis, where subjects played a "limited offer" game in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Subjects had to decide how long to wait for a high offer before accepting a low offer, with the risk of losing everything if they waited too long. Bayesian model comparison showed that behavior strongly supported active inference, based on surprise minimization, over classical utility maximization schemes. Furthermore, midbrain activity, encompassing dopamine projection neurons, was accurately predicted by trial-by-trial variations in model-based estimates of precision. Our findings demonstrate that human subjects infer both optimal policies and the precision of those inferences, and thus support the notion that humans perform hierarchical probabilistic Bayesian inference. In other words, subjects have to infer both what they should do as well as how confident they are in their choices, where confidence may be encoded by dopaminergic firing.
Active Inference: A Process Theory Friston, Karl; FitzGerald, Thomas; Rigoli, Francesco ...
Neural computation,
01/2017, Letnik:
29, Številka:
1
Journal Article
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This article describes a process theory based on active inference and belief propagation. Starting from the premise that all neuronal processing (and action selection) can be explained by maximizing ...Bayesian model evidence—or minimizing variational free energy—we ask whether neuronal responses can be described as a gradient descent on variational free energy. Using a standard (Markov decision process) generative model, we derive the neuronal dynamics implicit in this description and reproduce a remarkable range of well-characterized neuronal phenomena. These include repetition suppression, mismatch negativity, violation responses, place-cell activity, phase precession, theta sequences, theta-gamma coupling, evidence accumulation, race-to-bound dynamics, and transfer of dopamine responses. Furthermore, the (approximately Bayes’ optimal) behavior prescribed by these dynamics has a degree of face validity, providing a formal explanation for reward seeking, context learning, and epistemic foraging. Technically, the fact that a gradient descent appears to be a valid description of neuronal activity means that variational free energy is a Lyapunov function for neuronal dynamics, which therefore conform to Hamilton’s principle of least action.
Dopamine is implicated in a diverse range of cognitive functions including cognitive flexibility, task switching, signalling novel or unexpected stimuli as well as advance information. There is also ...longstanding line of thought that links dopamine with belief formation and, crucially, aberrant belief formation in psychosis. Integrating these strands of evidence would suggest that dopamine plays a central role in belief updating and more specifically in encoding of meaningful information content in observations. The precise nature of this relationship has remained unclear. To directly address this question we developed a paradigm that allowed us to decompose two distinct types of information content, information-theoretic surprise that reflects the unexpectedness of an observation, and epistemic value that induces shifts in beliefs or, more formally, Bayesian surprise. Using functional magnetic-resonance imaging in humans we show that dopamine-rich midbrain regions encode shifts in beliefs whereas surprise is encoded in prefrontal regions, including the pre-supplementary motor area and dorsal cingulate cortex. By linking putative dopaminergic activity to belief updating these data provide a link to false belief formation that characterises hyperdopaminergic states associated with idiopathic and drug induced psychosis.
•Recent work suggests a central role of dopamine in (aberrant) belief formation.•Using fMRI we show that dopamine-rich midbrain regions encode shifts in beliefs.•Performance correlated negatively with the effect size of midbrain activation.•Shifts in beliefs are dissociated from surprise signalled in prefrontal regions.•These data provide a link to false belief formation in psychosis.
Idiopathic generalised epilepsy (IGE) has a genetic basis. The mechanism of seizure expression is not fully known, but is assumed to involve large-scale brain networks. We hypothesised that abnormal ...brain network properties would be detected using EEG in patients with IGE, and would be manifest as a familial endophenotype in their unaffected first-degree relatives. We studied 117 participants: 35 patients with IGE, 42 unaffected first-degree relatives, and 40 normal controls, using scalp EEG. Graph theory was used to describe brain network topology in five frequency bands for each subject. Frequency bands were chosen based on a published Spectral Factor Analysis study which demonstrated these bands to be optimally robust and independent. Groups were compared, using Bonferroni correction to account for nonindependent measures and multiple groups. Degree distribution variance was greater in patients and relatives than controls in the 6-9 Hz band (p = 0.0005, p = 0.0009 respectively). Mean degree was greater in patients than healthy controls in the 6-9 Hz band (p = 0.0064). Clustering coefficient was higher in patients and relatives than controls in the 6-9 Hz band (p = 0.0025, p = 0.0013). Characteristic path length did not differ between groups. No differences were found between patients and unaffected relatives. These findings suggest brain network topology differs between patients with IGE and normal controls, and that some of these network measures show similar deviations in patients and in unaffected relatives who do not have epilepsy. This suggests brain network topology may be an inherited endophenotype of IGE, present in unaffected relatives who do not have epilepsy, as well as in affected patients. We propose that abnormal brain network topology may be an endophenotype of IGE, though not in itself sufficient to cause epilepsy.
Deciding how much evidence to accumulate before making a decision is a problem we and other animals often face, but one that is not completely understood. This issue is particularly important because ...a tendency to sample less information (often known as reflection impulsivity) is a feature in several psychopathologies, such as psychosis. A formal understanding of information sampling may therefore clarify the computational anatomy of psychopathology. In this theoretical letter, we consider evidence accumulation in terms of active (Bayesian) inference using a generic model of Markov decision processes. Here, agents are equipped with beliefs about their own behavior—in this case, that they will make informed decisions. Normative decision making is then modeled using variational Bayes to minimize surprise about choice outcomes. Under this scheme, different facets of belief updating map naturally onto the functional anatomy of the brain (at least at a heuristic level). Of particular interest is the key role played by the expected precision of beliefs about control, which we have previously suggested may be encoded by dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain. We show that manipulating expected precision strongly affects how much information an agent characteristically samples, and thus provides a possible link between impulsivity and dopaminergic dysfunction. Our study therefore represents a step toward understanding evidence accumulation in terms of neurobiologically plausible Bayesian inference and may cast light on why this process is disordered in psychopathology.
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