Curiously, economists, whose discipline has much to do with human well-being, have shied away from factoring the study of happiness into their work. Happiness, they might say, is an ''unscientific'' ...concept. This is the first book to establish empirically the link between happiness and economics--and between happiness and democracy. Two respected economists, Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, integrate insights and findings from psychology, where attempts to measure quality of life are well-documented, as well as from sociology and political science. They demonstrate how micro- and macro-economic conditions in the form of income, unemployment, and inflation affect happiness. The research is centered on Switzerland, whose varying degrees of direct democracy from one canton to another, all within a single economy, allow for political effects to be isolated from economic effects.
Not surprisingly, the authors confirm that unemployment and inflation nurture unhappiness. Their most striking revelation, however, is that the more developed the democratic institutions and the degree of local autonomy, the more satisfied people are with their lives. While such factors as rising income increase personal happiness only minimally, institutions that facilitate more individual involvement in politics (such as referendums) have a substantial effect. For countries such as the United States, where disillusionment with politics seems to be on the rise, such findings are especially significant. By applying econometrics to a real-world issue of general concern and yielding surprising results, Happiness and Economics promises to spark healthy debate over a wide range of the social sciences.
Actors of public interest today have to fear the adverse impact that stems from social media platforms. Any controversial behavior may promptly trigger temporal, but potentially devastating storms of ...emotional and aggressive outrage, so called online firestorms. Popular targets of online firestorms are companies, politicians, celebrities, media, academics and many more. This article introduces social norm theory to understand online aggression in a social-political online setting, challenging the popular assumption that online anonymity is one of the principle factors that promotes aggression. We underpin this social norm view by analyzing a major social media platform concerned with public affairs over a period of three years entailing 532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions. Results show that in the context of online firestorms, non-anonymous individuals are more aggressive compared to anonymous individuals. This effect is reinforced if selective incentives are present and if aggressors are intrinsically motivated.
•Impact factors are still highly influential because a majority of authors benefit.•Changes in performance management must occur at the institutional level.•Evaluation has to take fundamental ...uncertainty in research into account.•Focal randomization mitigates biased selection of articles.•Scholarly diversity instead of one-dimensional rankings is supported.
Publications in top journals today have a powerful influence on academic careers although there is much criticism of using journal rankings to evaluate individual articles. We ask why this practice of performance evaluation is still so influential. We suggest this is the case because a majority of authors benefit from the present system due to the extreme skewness of citation distributions. “Performance paradox” effects aggravate the problem. Three extant suggestions for reforming performance management are critically discussed. We advance a new proposal based on the insight that fundamental uncertainty is symptomatic for scholarly work. It suggests focal randomization using a rationally founded and well-orchestrated procedure.
Research summary: Awards are a valuable strategic resource. Motivation theory and the emerging body of empirical literature suggest that awards can have a significant effect on employee motivation ...and corporate performance, though not always in the intended direction. Awards can also destroy value. The organizational award literature has so far largely neglected this important issue. We develop a synthesis of the dimensions critical for successful award bestowals, and analyze under which conditions awards generate firm-specific value that is sustained and difficult for competitors to imitate. The process of value creation and capture is contingent on the given firm's organizational characteristics and nature of production. The article concludes by laying out empirical implications. Managerial summary: Awards are widely used in the corporate sector. They fundamentally differ from monetary incentives, which risk crowding out employees' intrinsic motivation. Among the variety of awards, two general types can be distinguished: confirmatory awards based on explicit, pre-determined performance criteria, and discretionary awards, which rely on broad performance evaluations and may be used ex post to honor outstanding performance. Appropriately designed and adjusted to the specific firm's characteristics, awards enhance employees' motivation and corporate performance. They express recognition and support their recipients' perceived competence and social status. Awards help to retain valuable employees and to establish role models. However, awards may also backfire, for instance, when they provoke envy among coworkers. We propose when awards risk destroying value and when they are particularly useful.
Under certain conditions, output related performance measurement and pay-for-performance produce negative outcomes. We argue that in public service, these negative effects are stronger than in the ...private sector. We combine Behavioural Economics and Management Control Theory to determine under which conditions this is the case. We suggest as alternatives to the dominant output related pay-for-performance systems selection and socialization, exploratory use of output performance measures, and awards.
Many important activities, such as charitable giving, voting, and paying taxes, are difficult to explain by the narrow self-interest hypothesis. This paper tests conditional cooperation in a field ...experiment. The field experiment about charitable giving supports the theory of conditional cooperation: contributions increase, on average, if people know that many others contribute. The effect varies, however, depending on past contribution behavior - those who never contributed do not change their behavior, while people who are indifferent about contributions react most strongly to information about others' behavior. Section I presents the field experiment and the empirical strategy to test the hypotheses, Section II shows the results, and Section III offers concluding remarks.
TOWARDS AN ECONOMICS OF AWARDS Frey, Bruno S.; Gallus, Jana
Journal of economic surveys,
February 2017, Letnik:
31, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Awards are a widespread phenomenon. They cater to the fundamental desire for social recognition and serve as a valuable incentive to influence behaviour. The study of awards such as medals, prizes ...and titles has in recent years gained momentum in economics, complementing the longstanding focus on material incentives. To evaluate the effectiveness of awards as a motivator is difficult as the effect of awards must be separated from the fact that awards are meant to be given to the best. We show how research on awards has advanced over the last couple of years, thus providing points of departure for future work.
One can be independent, or one can be subject to decisions made by others. This paper argues that this difference, embodied in the institutional distinction between the decision-making procedures ...'market' and 'hierarchy', affects individual wellbeing beyond outcomes. Taking self-employment as an important case of independence, it is shown that the self-employed derive higher satisfaction from work than those employed in organizations, irrespective of income gained or hours worked. This is evidence for procedural utility: people value not only outcomes, but also the processes leading to outcomes.
Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state’s political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to ...survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage.
People spend a lot of time commuting and often find it a burden. According to standard economics, the burden of commuting is chosen when compensated either on the labor or on the housing market so ...that individuals' utility is equalized. However, in a direct test of this strong notion of equilibrium with panel data, we find that people with longer commuting time report systematically lower subjective well-being. This result is robust with regard to a number of alternative explanations. We mention several possibilities of an extended model of human behavior able to explain this "commuting paradox".
PDF
