“Become hard!” is the supposedly “new tablet” that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra has placed above us. It can hardly be denied that modernization in particular has relentlessly imposed a need to develop ...one’s hardness and strength. Is it even possible to imagine a form of modernization based on the commandment to “Become soft!”? While this is the old and always new instruction to which Lǎozǐ pointed in his advice to become like water, Nietzsche finds it unbearable. He asks, “Why so soft?”, and “Why so soft, so retiring, and yielding?” And Lǎozǐ answers that hardness is deadly: “The hard and strong are the followers of death.” Then Nietzsche responds, “Don’t you want to conquer and win?” And Lǎozǐ replies, “The soft and weak win over the hard and strong”. Where are the modernizers who believe in the old “tablet” Lǎozǐ has given us in the praise of softness and weakness? Where are the modernizers who know about the hard but are able to preserve the soft? Where are the modernizers who are able to philosophize not with the hammer but with the brush?
The “good old authoritarian character” (Theodor W. Adorno) has been educated to (masculine) hardness. For this mode of being human (feminine) softness is nothing but a form of weakness on which the creator wants to put his stamp. As a philosophical source of criticism of the authoritarian character, the Daoist classic Lǎozǐ has a value that can hardly be overestimated. It moves toward a paradigm of self-relation or subjectivity in which the eye and light cannot claim primacy as the means by which humans can access the true and the good, but touch and breath form a pivot by which they can learn to walk a Way that wanders between hardness and softness. Therefore, at the centre of character formation and cultivation is a self-relation described in the sixth chapter of the Lǎozǐ by the paradoxical image of the “ravine” (gǔ 谷).
The ravine is a natural image in which the hard stone of the mountain cliffs and the soft water flowing through them belong together. At the same time, this chapter of the Lǎozǐ has been associated with the motif of the female in commentaries since antiquity. Moreover, the analogy between the ravine and the female sex organ opens up a thought-provoking approach to the relation between the female and the soft in the Lǎozǐ. However, the ravine as a paradoxical image does not stop there. Rather, the Way it suggests leads in a direction that can be summed up in the phrase “knowing hardness and preserving softness”. In the following paper, the discussion of the female and the male in relation to the soft and the hard aims at a broader reflection on a theory and practice of breath (qì 氣) that constitutes a transcultural philosophy of the Way (dàozhéxué 道哲學).
»Postanite trdni!« je domnevno »novi« napotek, ki nam ga je dal Nietzschejev Zaratustra, in težko je zanikati, da je predvsem modernizacija neusmiljeno vsiljevala potrebo po razvijanju neomajnosti in moči. Ali si je sploh mogoče predstavljati obliko modernizacije, ki bi temeljila na napotku »Postani mehak!«? Čeprav je ta stari, a vselej nov napotek, naj postanemo kot voda, podal Lǎozǐ, se ta Nietzscheju zdi neznosen. Tako sprašuje: »Zakaj tako mehak?«, »Zakaj tako mehak, tako umaknjen in popustljiv?« Lǎozǐ odgovarja, da je trdota smrtonosna: »Trdi in močni so privrženci smrti.« In Nietzsche odgovori: »Ali ne želite osvojiti in zmagati?« Lǎozǐ odgovarja: »Mehki in šibki zmagajo nad trdimi in močnimi.« Kje so modernizatorji, ki poznajo trdo, a znajo ohraniti mehko? Kje so modernizatorji, ki znajo filozofirati, ne s kladivom, ampak s čopičem?
»Dobri stari avtoritarni značaj« (Adorno) je bil vzgojen v (moško) trdnost. Za tak način človeškega bivanja (ženska) mehkoba ni nič drugega kot oblika šibkosti, na kateri želi ustvarjalec pustiti svoj pečat. Kot filozofski vir kritike avtoritarnega značaja ima klasično delo Lǎozǐ vrednost, ki je skorajda ne moremo preceniti. Pomika se proti paradigmi samoodnosa ali subjektivnosti, v kateri oko in svetloba ne zahtevata prvenstvenosti kot sredstva, s katerim lahko ljudje dostopajo do resničnega in dobrega, ampak kot dotik in dih tvorita središče, s katerim se lahko naučijo hoditi po poti, ki vodi med trdoto in mehkobo. Zato je v središču oblikovanja značaja odnos do samega sebe, ki je v šestem poglavju daoistične klasike Lǎozǐ opisan s paradoksalno podobo »globeli« (gǔ 谷). Globel je naravna podoba, v kateri sta združeni trdota kamna gorskih pečin in mehkoba vode, ki teče skoznje. To poglavje dela Lǎozǐ je v komentarjih že od antike povezano z motivom ženske. Še več, analogija med globeljo in ženskim spolnim organom odpira razmišljanje o odnosu med ženskim in mehkim v delu Lǎozǐ. Vendar se globel kot paradoksalna podoba ne ustavi pri tem. Nasprotno, Pot, ki jo predlaga, vodi v smer, ki jo lahko povzamemo s frazo »poznavanje trdote in ohranjanje mehkobe«. V članku je razprava o ženskem in moškem v povezavi z mehkim in trdim namenjena širšemu razmišljanju o filozofiji dihanja.
Touch and Breath Fabian Heubel
Asian Studies/Asian studies,
05/2024, Letnik:
12, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Odprti dostop
“Become hard!” is the supposedly “new tablet” that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra has placed above us. It can hardly be denied that modernization in particular has relentlessly imposed a need to develop ...one’s hardness and strength. Is it even possible to imagine a form of modernization based on the commandment to “Become soft!”? While this is the old and always new instruction to which Lǎozǐ pointed in his advice to become like water, Nietzsche finds it unbearable. He asks, “Why so soft?”, and “Why so soft, so retiring, and yielding?” And Lǎozǐ answers that hardness is deadly: “The hard and strong are the followers of death.” Then Nietzsche responds, “Don’t you want to conquer and win?” And Lǎozǐ replies, “The soft and weak win over the hard and strong”. Where are the modernizers who believe in the old “tablet” Lǎozǐ has given us in the praise of softness and weakness? Where are the modernizers who know about the hard but are able to preserve the soft? Where are the modernizers who are able to philosophize not with the hammer but with the brush? The “good old authoritarian character” (Theodor W. Adorno) has been educated to (masculine) hardness. For this mode of being human (feminine) softness is nothing but a form of weakness on which the creator wants to put his stamp. As a philosophical source of criticism of the authoritarian character, the Daoist classic Lǎozǐ has a value that can hardly be overestimated. It moves toward a paradigm of self-relation or subjectivity in which the eye and light cannot claim primacy as the means by which humans can access the true and the good, but touch and breath form a pivot by which they can learn to walk a Way that wanders between hardness and softness. Therefore, at the centre of character formation and cultivation is a self-relation described in the sixth chapter of the Lǎozǐ by the paradoxical image of the “ravine” (gǔ 谷). The ravine is a natural image in which the hard stone of the mountain cliffs and the soft water flowing through them belong together. At the same time, this chapter of the Lǎozǐ has been associated with the motif of the female in commentaries since antiquity. Moreover, the analogy between the ravine and the female sex organ opens up a thought-provoking approach to the relation between the female and the soft in the Lǎozǐ. However, the ravine as a paradoxical image does not stop there. Rather, the Way it suggests leads in a direction that can be summed up in the phrase “knowing hardness and preserving softness”. In the following paper, the discussion of the female and the male in relation to the soft and the hard aims at a broader reflection on a theory and practice of breath (qì 氣) that constitutes a transcultural philosophy of the Way (dàozhéxué 道哲學).
Being Between Heubel, Fabian
Azijske študije (Spletna izd.),
10/2023, Letnik:
11, Številka:
1
Journal Article
This essay argues that comparative and transcultural philosophy are interdependent, and so opting for only one of the two is an impossibility. The comparative approach persists as long as we ...distinguish identities and make differences. As long as people do not speak only one language, the need to move between different languages and to translate, and thus the need to relate and compare different possibilities of philosophical articulation, will remain. Any attempt to free oneself from the problem of cultural identity is doomed to failure, as it leads to further entrapment in the very same problem. Comparative philosophy works with more or less fixed identities, transcultural philosophy transforms them and thereby creates new identities. Those two approaches combined constitute what I call intercultural philosophy.
In this essay I try to explain the relation between comparative and transcultural philosophy by connecting François Jullien’s “comparative” and Martin Heidegger’s “transcultural” understanding of “Being” (Sein) and “Between” (Zwischen). In part 1 I argue that by turning Between and Being into opposing paradigms of Chinese and Greek thinking, respectively, Jullien causes both to become more or less fixed representatives of different cultural identities within a comparative framework: Greek thinking ossifies into traditional metaphysics, and Chinese thinking ossifies into the non-metaphysical thinking of immanence. Part 2 argues that Heidegger takes a decisively different direction. He explores the Between in Being, and even makes an attempt to think of Being as Between. Heidegger’s invocation of “Greekdom” is undoubtedly Eurocentric. But, ironically, Heidegger’s “Greek thinking” is less Eurocentric than Jullien’s “Chinese thinking”, because he discovers the “Chinese” Between in the midst of “Greek” Being. Part 3 touches upon the task of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. While modern Chinese philosophers frequently speak about Chinese philosophy in European terms, Heidegger’s work points to the possibility of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. Because Jullien and Heidegger both connect Greek and Chinese thought, it seems to me that the discussion of their different approaches is helpful in clarifying perspectives for intercultural philosophy between China and Europe.
Being Between Fabian Heubel
Asian Studies/Asian studies,
01/2023, Letnik:
11, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Odprti dostop
This essay argues that comparative and transcultural philosophy are interdependent, and so opting for only one of the two is an impossibility. The comparative approach persists as long as we ...distinguish identities and make differences. As long as people do not speak only one language, the need to move between different languages and to translate, and thus the need to relate and compare different possibilities of philosophical articulation, will remain. Any attempt to free oneself from the problem of cultural identity is doomed to failure, as it leads to further entrapment in the very same problem. Comparative philosophy works with more or less fixed identities, transcultural philosophy transforms them and thereby creates new identities. Those two approaches combined constitute what I call intercultural philosophy. In this essay I try to explain the relation between comparative and transcultural philosophy by connecting François Jullien’s “comparative” and Martin Heidegger’s “transcultural” understanding of “Being” (Sein) and “Between” (Zwischen). In part 1 I argue that by turning Between and Being into opposing paradigms of Chinese and Greek thinking, respectively, Jullien causes both to become more or less fixed representatives of different cultural identities within a comparative framework: Greek thinking ossifies into traditional metaphysics, and Chinese thinking ossifies into the non-metaphysical thinking of immanence. Part 2 argues that Heidegger takes a decisively different direction. He explores the Between in Being, and even makes an attempt to think of Being as Between. Heidegger’s invocation of “Greekdom” is undoubtedly Eurocentric. But, ironically, Heidegger’s “Greek thinking” is less Eurocentric than Jullien’s “Chinese thinking”, because he discovers the “Chinese” Between in the midst of “Greek” Being. Part 3 touches upon the task of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. While modern Chinese philosophers frequently speak about Chinese philosophy in European terms, Heidegger’s work points to the possibility of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. Because Jullien and Heidegger both connect Greek and Chinese thought, it seems to me that the discussion of their different approaches is helpful in clarifying perspectives for intercultural philosophy between China and Europe.
Ohne-Tun und Selbstwandel Heubel, Fabian
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,
12/2021, Letnik:
69, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In the text “The Principles of a Liberal Social Order”, Friedrich A. von Hayek quotes from Chapter 57 of the Daoist classic
老子 (alternative transliterations are Lao Tzu, Laotse, etc.; the text is ...also known under the title
or
道德經). Appearing in a text devoted primarily to the concept of “spontaneous order”, the quote opens up questions regarding the relationship between liberalism and Daoism, which I address in this essay. The discussion comprises three parts. In the first part, I turn to the translation cited by Hayek and, by way of a commentary to the translation, I attempt to gain access to the motifs of “effortless action/without doing” (
無為), “self-transformation” (
自化) and “self-government” (
自治); the second part offers a hermeneutic commentary through which I discuss interpretative approaches found in the Chinese commentarial tradition; finally, the third part outlines transcultural correspondences which explore the political meaning of the Daoist “without doing” and the idea of “spontaneous order” in the context of the discursive struggle between the “democratic West” and “authoritarian China”.
Ohne-Tun und Selbstwandel Heubel, Fabian
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,
12/2021, Letnik:
69, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Abstract
In the text “The Principles of a Liberal Social Order”, Friedrich A. von Hayek quotes from Chapter 57 of the Daoist classic
Lǎozǐ
老子 (alternative transliterations are Lao Tzu, Laotse, etc.; ...the text is also known under the title
Dàodéjīng
or
Tao Te King
道德經). Appearing in a text devoted primarily to the concept of “spontaneous order”, the quote opens up questions regarding the relationship between liberalism and Daoism, which I address in this essay. The discussion comprises three parts. In the first part, I turn to the translation cited by Hayek and, by way of a commentary to the translation, I attempt to gain access to the motifs of “effortless action/without doing” (
wúwéi
無為), “self-transformation” (
zìhuà
自化) and “self-government” (
zìzhì
自治); the second part offers a hermeneutic commentary through which I discuss interpretative approaches found in the Chinese commentarial tradition; finally, the third part outlines transcultural correspondences which explore the political meaning of the Daoist “without doing” and the idea of “spontaneous order” in the context of the discursive struggle between the “democratic West” and “authoritarian China”.
