Estimates of climate change damage are central to the design of climate policies. Here, we develop a flexible architecture for computing damages that integrates climate science, econometric analyses, ...and process models. We use this approach to construct spatially explicit, probabilistic, and empirically derived estimates of economic damage in the United States from climate change. The combined value of market and nonmarket damage across analyzed sectors—agriculture, crime, coastal storms, energy, human mortality, and labor—increases quadratically in global mean temperature, costing roughly 1.2% of gross domestic product per +1°C on average. Importantly, risk is distributed unequally across locations, generating a large transfer of value northward and westward that increases economic inequality. By the late 21st century, the poorest third of counties are projected to experience damages between 2 and 20% of county income (90% chance) under business-as-usual emissions (Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5).
Estimates of global economic damage caused by carbon dioxide (CO
) emissions can inform climate policy
. The social cost of carbon (SCC) quantifies these damages by characterizing how additional CO
...emissions today impact future economic outcomes through altering the climate
. Previous estimates have suggested that large, warming-driven increases in energy expenditures could dominate the SCC
, but they rely on models
that are spatially coarse and not tightly linked to data
. Here we show that the release of one ton of CO
today is projected to reduce total future energy expenditures, with most estimates valued between -US$3 and -US$1, depending on discount rates. Our results are based on an architecture that integrates global data, econometrics and climate science to estimate local damages worldwide. Notably, we project that emerging economies in the tropics will dramatically increase electricity consumption owing to warming, which requires critical infrastructure planning. However, heating reductions in colder countries offset this increase globally. We estimate that 2099 annual global electricity consumption increases by about 4.5 exajoules (7 per cent of current global consumption) per one-degree-Celsius increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), whereas direct consumption of other fuels declines by about 11.3 exajoules (7 per cent of current global consumption) per one-degree-Celsius increase in GMST. Our finding of net savings contradicts previous research
, because global data indicate that many populations will remain too poor for most of the twenty-first century to substantially increase energy consumption in response to warming. Importantly, damage estimates would differ if poorer populations were given greater weight
.
Abstract
Using 40 countries’ subnational data, we estimate age-specific mortality-temperature relationships and extrapolate them to countries without data today and into a future with climate change. ...We uncover a U-shaped relationship where extre6me cold and hot temperatures increase mortality rates, especially for the elderly. Critically, this relationship is flattened by higher incomes and adaptation to local climate. Using a revealed-preference approach to recover unobserved adaptation costs, we estimate that the mean global increase in mortality risk due to climate change, accounting for adaptation benefits and costs, is valued at roughly 3.2% of global GDP in 2100 under a high-emissions scenario. Notably, today’s cold locations are projected to benefit, while today’s poor and hot locations have large projected damages. Finally, our central estimates indicate that the release of an additional ton of CO2 today will cause mortality-related damages of $36.6 under a high-emissions scenario, with an interquartile range accounting for both econometric and climate uncertainty of −$7.8, $73.0. These empirically grounded estimates exceed the previous literature’s estimates by an order of magnitude.
This study reports a new and significantly enhanced analysis of US flood hazard at 30 m spatial resolution. Specific improvements include updated hydrography data, new methods to determine channel ...depth, more rigorous flood frequency analysis, output downscaling to property tract level, and inclusion of the impact of local interventions in the flooding system. For the first time, we consider pluvial, fluvial, and coastal flood hazards within the same framework and provide projections for both current (rather than historic average) conditions and for future time periods centered on 2035 and 2050 under the RCP4.5 emissions pathway. Validation against high‐quality local models and the entire catalog of FEMA 1% annual probability flood maps yielded Critical Success Index values in the range 0.69–0.82. Significant improvements over a previous pluvial/fluvial model version are shown for high‐frequency events and coastal zones, along with minor improvements in areas where model performance was already good. The result is the first comprehensive and consistent national‐scale analysis of flood hazard for the conterminous US for both current and future conditions. Even though we consider a stabilization emissions scenario and a near‐future time horizon, we project clear patterns of changing flood hazard (3σ changes in 100 years inundated area of −3.8 to +16% at 1° scale), that are significant when considered as a proportion of the land area where human use is possible or in terms of the currently protected land area where the standard of flood defense protection may become compromised by this time.
Plain Language Summary
We develop a method to estimate past, present, and future flood risk for all properties in the conterminous United States whether affected by river, coastal or rainfall flooding. The analysis accounts for variability within environmental factors including changes in sea level rise, hurricane intensity and landfall locations, precipitation patterns, and river discharge. We show that even for a conservative climate change trajectory we can expect locally significant changes in the land area at risk from floods by 2050, and by this time defenses protecting 2,200 km2 of land may be compromised. The complete dataset has been made available via a website (https://floodfactor.com/) created by the First Street Foundation in order to increase public awareness of the threat posed by flooding to safety and livelihoods.
Key Points
First complete high‐resolution flood hazard analysis of conterminous US flood risk from all major sources (fluvial, pluvial, and coastal)
In validation tests the model achieved Critical Success Index scores of 0.69–0.82, similar to many local custom‐built 2D models
By 2050, flood hazard increases for the Eastern seaboard and Western states, but decreases or changes little for the center and South‐West
As political momentum surrounding climate change builds in the US, policymakers are taking a fresh look at national climate policy and American involvement in multilateral climate negotiations. And ...as in years past, the potential economic impact of any US effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions stands as a central question in the Washington policy debate. Of particular concern is the effect climate policy would have on carbon-intensive US manufacturing. Many of these industries are already under pressure from foreign competition, particularly large emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil that are not bound to reduce emissions under the current international climate framework. As the Congress takes up domestic climate legislation and the Administration reengages in multilateral climate negotiations, policymakers are looking for ways to avoid putting US industry at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis countries without similar climate policy, lest a decline in industrial emissions at home is simply replaced by increases in emissions abroad. * While this would be best achieved through harmonized international climate policy, the differences between countries in level of economic development, obligations stemming from historic emissions and responsibilities arising from future emissions, mean harmonization is still a long way off. The question then, in the design of domestic US climate policy today, is how to level the playing field for carbon-intensive industries during a period of transition, where trading partners are moving at different speeds and adopting a variety of policies to reduce emissions...and how to do so in a way that doesn't threaten the prospects of broader international agreement down the road. This book, a collaboration between the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the World Resources Institute, tackles these issues through an assessment of the economics and trade flows of key carbon-intensive industries. They evaluate a wide range of policy options, including those that would impose carbon costs on foreign-produced goods at the border (currently included in draft US legislation and under consideration in the EU) in terms of their effectiveness in reducing emissions and addressing competitiveness issues and their impact on health of multilateral trade and climate negotiations.
Sea level rise (SLR) may impose substantial economic costs to coastal communities worldwide, but characterizing its global impact remains challenging because SLR costs depend heavily on natural ...characteristics and human investments at each location – including topography, the spatial distribution of assets, and local adaptation decisions. To date, several impact models have been developed to estimate the global costs of SLR. Yet, the limited availability of open-source and modular platforms that easily ingest up-to-date socioeconomic and physical data sources restricts the ability of existing systems to incorporate new insights transparently. In this paper, we present a modular, open-source platform designed to address this need, providing end-to-end transparency from global input data to a scalable least-cost optimization framework that estimates adaptation and net SLR costs for nearly 10 000 global coastline segments and administrative regions. Our approach accounts both for uncertainty in the magnitude of global mean sea level (g.m.s.l.) rise and spatial variability in local relative sea level rise. Using this platform, we evaluate costs across 230 possible socioeconomic and SLR trajectories in the 21st century. According to the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report (AR6), g.m.s.l. is likely to rise during the 21st century by 0.40–0.69 m if late-century warming reaches 2 ∘C and by 0.58–0.91 m with 4 ∘C of warming (Fox-Kemper et al., 2021). With no forward-looking adaptation, we estimate that annual costs of sea level rise associated with a 2 ∘C scenario will likely fall between USD 1.2 and 4.0 trillion (0.1 % and 1.2 % of GDP, respectively) by 2100, depending on socioeconomic and sea level rise trajectories. Cost-effective, proactive adaptation would provide substantial benefits, lowering these values to between USD 110 and USD 530 billion (0.02 and 0.06 %) under an optimal adaptation scenario. For the likely SLR trajectories associated with 4 ∘C warming, these costs range from USD 3.1 to 6.9 trillion (0.3 % and 2.0 %) with no forward-looking adaptation and USD 200 billion to USD 750 billion (0.04 % to 0.09 %) under optimal adaptation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that deeply uncertain physical processes like marine ice cliff instability could drive substantially higher global sea level rise, potentially approaching 2.0 m by 2100 in very high emission scenarios. Accordingly, we also model the impacts of 1.5 and 2.0 m g.m.s.l. rises by 2100; the associated annual cost estimates range from USD 11.2 to 30.6 trillion (1.2 % and 7.6 %) under no forward-looking adaptation and USD 420 billion to 1.5 trillion (0.08 % to 0.20 %) under optimal adaptation. Our modeling platform used to generate these estimates is publicly available in an effort to spur research collaboration and support decision-making, with segment-level physical and socioeconomic input characteristics provided at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7693868 (Bolliger et al., 2023a) and model results at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7693869 (Bolliger et al., 2023b).
This article examines the confluence of domestic factors, both economic and political, that shape the behavior of Chinese oil companies abroad and the implications for energy security in China and ...the rest of the world.
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