Despite broad interest, experimental evidence for gender differences in social abilities remains inconclusive. Two important factors may have limited previous results: (i) a lack of clear ...distinctions between empathy (sharing another's feelings), compassion (a feeling of concern toward others), and Theory of Mind (ToM; inferring others' mental states), and (ii) the absence of robust, naturalistic social tasks. Overcoming these limitations, in Study 1 (N = 295) we integrate three independent, previously published datasets, each using a dynamic and situated, video-based paradigm which disentangles ToM, empathy, and compassion, to examine gender differences in social abilities. We observed greater empathy and compassion in women compared to men, but found no evidence that either gender performed better in ToM. In Study 2 (n = 226) we extend this paradigm to allow participants to engage in prosocial donations. Along with replicating the findings of Study 1, we also observed greater prosocial donations in women compared to men. Additionally, we discuss an exploratory, novel finding, namely that ToM performance is positively associated with prosocial donations in women, but not men. Overall, these results emphasize the importance of establishing experimental designs that incorporate dynamic, complex stimuli to better capture the social realities that men and women experience in their daily lives.
•Socio-affective and socio-cognitive processes are separable; behaviorally and neurally.•The related neural networks co-activate and interact in complex social situations.•Prosocial behavior ...necessitates both socio-affective and socio-cognitive functions.
Empathy, compassion and Theory of Mind (ToM) are central topics in social psychology and neuroscience. While empathy enables the sharing of others’ emotions and may result in empathic distress, a maladaptive form of empathic resonance, or compassion, a feeling of warmth and concern for others, ToM provides cognitive understanding of someone else's thoughts or intentions. These socio-affective and socio-cognitive routes to understanding others are subserved by separable, independent brain networks. Nonetheless they are jointly required in many complex social situations. A process that is critical for both, empathy and ToM, is self-other distinction, which is implemented in different temporoparietal brain regions. Thus, adaptive social behavior is a result of dynamic interplay of socio-affective and socio-cognitive processes.
Successful social interactions require both affect sharing (empathy) and understanding others' mental states (Theory of Mind, ToM). As these two functions have mostly been investigated in isolation, ...the specificity of the underlying neural networks and the relation of these networks to the respective behavioral indices could not be tested. Here, we present a novel fMRI paradigm (EmpaToM) that independently manipulates both empathy and ToM. Experiments 1a/b (N=90) validated the task with established empathy and ToM paradigms on a behavioral and neural level. Experiment 2 (N=178) employed the EmpaToM and revealed clearly separable neural networks including anterior insula for empathy and ventral temporoparietal junction for ToM. These distinct networks could be replicated in task-free resting state functional connectivity. Importantly, brain activity in these two networks specifically predicted the respective behavioral indices, that is, inter-individual differences in ToM related brain activity predicted inter-individual differences in ToM performance, but not empathic responding, and vice versa. Taken together, the validated EmpaToM allows separation of affective and cognitive routes to understanding others. It may thus benefit future clinical, developmental, and intervention studies on identifying selective impairments and improvement in specific components of social cognition.
Along with the increased interest in and volume of social cognition research, there has been higher awareness of a lack of agreement on the concepts and taxonomy used to study social processes. Two ...central concepts in the field, empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM), have been identified as overlapping umbrella terms for different processes of limited convergence. Here, we review and integrate evidence of brain activation, brain organization, and behavior into a coherent model of social-cognitive processes. We start with a meta-analytic clustering of neuroimaging data across different social-cognitive tasks. Results show that understanding others' mental states can be described by a multilevel model of hierarchical structure, similar to models in intelligence and personality research. A higher level describes more broad and abstract classes of functioning, whereas a lower one explains how functions are applied to concrete contexts given by particular stimulus and task formats. Specifically, the higher level of our model suggests 3 groups of neurocognitive processes: (a) predominantly cognitive processes, which are engaged when mentalizing requires self-generated cognition decoupled from the physical world; (b) more affective processes, which are engaged when we witness emotions in others based on shared emotional, motor, and somatosensory representations; (c) combined processes, which engage cognitive and affective functions in parallel. We discuss how these processes are explained by an underlying principal gradient of structural brain organization. Finally, we validate the model by a review of empathy and ToM task interrelations found in behavioral studies.
Public Significance Statement
Empathy and Theory of Mind are important human capacities for understanding others. Here, we present a meta-analysis of neuroimaging data from 4,207 participants, which shows that these abilities can be deconstructed into specific and partially shared neurocognitive subprocesses. Our findings provide systematic, large-scale support for the hypothesis that understanding others' mental states can be described by a multilevel model of hierarchical structure, similar to models in intelligence and personality research.
•We targeted the sociocognitive and neural mechanisms linking status and altruism.•Subjective socioeconomic status (SES) positively predicted charitable giving.•This link was mediated by increased ...mentalizing capacity in higher-status individuals.•Subjective SES was linked to mentalizing-related neural value coding in the rTPJ.•Higher SES was associated with increased negative rTPJ-putamen connectivity.
Socioeconomic status (SES), a concept related to an individual's economic and social position relative to others, can shape social interactions like altruistic behaviors. However, little is known about the exact neurocognitive mechanisms that link SES with altruism. Our study aimed to provide a comprehensive account of the sociocognitive and neural mechanisms through which SES affects charitable giving – an important variant of human altruism. To this end, participants completed a charitable donation task while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We also assessed participants’ socio-cognitive ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) – a driver of prosocial behavior – in an independent social task. Behaviorally, we found that both charitable giving and social cognition were status-dependent, as subjective SES positively predicted donations and mentalizing capacity. Moreover, the link between SES and charitable giving was mediated by individuals’ mentalizing capacity. At the neural level, a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data revealed that higher subjective SES was associated with stronger value coding in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). The strength of this value representation predicted charitable giving and was linked to mentalizing. Furthermore, we observed an increased negative functional coupling between rTPJ and left putamen with higher SES. Together, increased charitable giving in higher-status individuals could be explained by status-dependent recruitment of mentalizing-related value coding and altered functional connectivity in the brain. Our findings provide insights into the socio- and neurocognitive mechanisms explaining why and when higher SES leads to prosociality, which might ultimately inform targeted interventions to promote prosocial behavior in human societies.
Aggressive, violent behaviour is a major burden and challenge for society. It has been linked to deficits in social understanding, but the evidence is inconsistent and the specifics of such deficits ...are unclear. Here, we investigated affective (empathy) and cognitive (Theory of Mind) routes to understanding other people in aggressive individuals. Twenty-nine men with a history of legally relevant aggressive behaviour (i.e. serious assault) and 32 control participants were tested using a social video task (EmpaToM) that differentiates empathy and Theory of Mind and completed questionnaires on aggression and alexithymia. Aggressive participants showed reduced empathic responses to emotional videos of others' suffering, which correlated with aggression severity. Theory of Mind performance, in contrast, was intact. A mediation analysis revealed that reduced empathy in aggressive men was mediated by alexithymia. These findings stress the importance of distinguishing between socio-affective and socio-cognitive deficits for understanding aggressive behaviour and thereby contribute to the development of more efficient treatments.
Meditation-based mental training interventions show physical and mental health benefits. However, it remains unclear how different types of mental practice affect emotion processing at both the ...neuronal and the behavioural level. In the context of the ReSource project, 332 participants underwent an fMRI scan while performing an emotion anticipation task before and after three 3-month training modules cultivating 1) attention and interoceptive awareness (Presence); 2) socio-affective skills, such as compassion (Affect); 3) socio-cognitive skills, such as theory of mind (Perspective). Only the Affect module led to a significant reduction of experienced negative affect when processing images depicting human suffering. In addition, after the Affect module, participants showed significant increased activation in the right supramarginal gyrus when confronted with negative stimuli. We conclude that socio-affective, but not attention- or meta-cognitive based mental training is specifically effective to improve emotion regulation capabilities when facing adversity.
Altruistic behavior varies considerably across people and decision contexts. The relevant computational and motivational mechanisms that underlie its heterogeneity, however, are poorly understood. ...Using a charitable giving task together with multivariate decoding techniques, we identified three distinct psychological mechanisms underlying altruistic decision-making (empathy, perspective taking, and attentional reorienting) and linked them to dissociable neural computations. Neural responses in the anterior insula (AI) (but not temporoparietal junction TPJ) encoded trial-wise empathy for beneficiaries, whereas the TPJ (but not AI) predicted the degree of perspective taking. Importantly, the relative influence of both socio-cognitive processes differed across individuals: participants whose donation behavior was heavily influenced by affective empathy exhibited higher predictive accuracies for generosity in AI, whereas those who strongly relied on cognitive perspective taking showed improved predictions of generous donations in TPJ. Furthermore, subject-specific contributions of both processes for donations were reflected in participants' empathy and perspective taking responses in a separate fMRI task (EmpaToM), suggesting that process-specific inputs into altruistic choices may reflect participants' general propensity to either empathize or mentalize. Finally, using independent attention task data, we identified shared neural codes for attentional reorienting and generous donations in the posterior superior temporal sulcus, suggesting that domain-general attention shifts also contribute to generous behavior (but not in TPJ or AI). Overall, our findings demonstrate highly specific roles of AI for affective empathy and TPJ for cognitive perspective taking as precursors of prosocial behavior and suggest that these discrete routes of social cognition differentially drive intraindividual and interindividual differences in altruistic behavior.
Human societies depend on the altruistic behavior of their members, but teasing apart its underlying motivations and neural mechanisms poses a serious challenge. Using multivariate decoding techniques, we delineated three distinct processes for altruistic decision-making (affective empathy, cognitive perspective taking, and domain-general attention shifts), linked them to dissociable neural computations, and identified their relative influence across individuals. Distinguishing process-specific computations both behaviorally and neurally is crucial for developing complete theoretical and neuroscientific accounts of altruistic behavior and more effective means of increasing it. Moreover, information on the relative influence of subprocesses across individuals and its link to people's more general propensity to engage empathy or perspective taking can inform training programs to increase prosociality, considering their "fit" with different individuals.
Humans have the capacity to share others' emotions, be they positive or negative. Elicited by the observed or imagined emotion of another person, an observer develops a similar emotional state ...herself. This capacity, empathy, is one of the pillars of social understanding and interaction as it creates a representation of another's inner, mental state. Empathy needs to be dissociated from other social emotions and, crucially, also from cognitive mechanisms of understanding others, the ability to take others' perspective. Here, we describe the conceptual distinctions of these constructs and review behavioral and neural evidence that dissociates them. The main focus of the present review lies on the intraindividual changes in empathy and perspective-taking across the lifespan and on interindividual differences on subclinical and clinical levels. The data show that empathy and perspective-taking recruit distinct neural circuits and can be discerned already during early and throughout adult development. Both capacities also vary substantially between situations and people. Differences can be systematically related to situational characteristics as well as personality traits and mental disorders. The clear distinction of affect sharing from other social emotions like compassion and from cognitive perspective-taking, argues for a clear-cut terminology to describe these constructs. In our view, this speaks against using empathy as an umbrella term encompassing all affective and cognitive routes to understanding others. Unifying the way we speak about these phenomena will help to further research on their underlying mechanisms, psychopathological alterations, and plasticity in training and therapy.
Abstract Event-related potentials (ERP) were recorded in two experiments to examine the effects of concreteness and emotionality on visual word processing. Concrete and abstract words of negative, ...neutral or positive valence, as well as pseudowords were presented in a hemifield lexical decision task. Experiment 1 yielded early (P2) and late (N400, late positive component/LPC) emotional word effects. Concreteness affected the N400 and the LPC. In line with the extended dual coding model and with previous studies, the N400 effect represents greater semantic activation, whereas the LPC effect may result from mental imagery being activated by concrete words. Experiment 2 engaged participants in a go/no-go task pressing a button for pseudowords. Here, emotionality and concreteness modulated the N400 independently, but interacted in the LPC time window. Only concrete emotional words differed in the LPC response suggesting that concrete negative words such as “wound” or “bomb” differ from neutral and positive words as a function of mental imagery.
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