Most infectious diseases that recently emerged in humans originated in animals. Besides close contact between animals and humans, other factors probably contribute to the cross-species transmission ...of infectious diseases. It is critical to establish effective mechanisms for coordination and collaboration between the animal, human, and environmental health sectors before new threats emerge by bringing the different sectors together to tackle endemic zoonotic diseases of greatest concern. Such multisectoral partnerships should begin by identifying priority zoonotic diseases for national engagement with equal input from the different sectors. Improvements in surveillance and data sharing for prioritized zoonotic diseases and enhancements of laboratory testing and joint outbreak response capacities in the human and animal health sectors will create and strengthen the mechanisms necessary to effectively detect and respond to emerging health threats, and thereby enhance global health security.
Effectively preventing and controlling zoonotic diseases requires a One Health approach that involves collaboration across sectors responsible for human health, animal health (both domestic and ...wildlife), and the environment, as well as other partners. Here we describe the Generalizable One Health Framework (GOHF), a five-step framework that provides structure for using a One Health approach in zoonotic disease programs being implemented at the local, sub-national, national, regional, or international level. Part of the framework is a toolkit that compiles existing resources and presents them following a stepwise schematic, allowing users to identify relevant resources as they are required. Coupled with recommendations for implementing a One Health approach for zoonotic disease prevention and control in technical domains including laboratory, surveillance, preparedness and response, this framework can mobilize One Health and thereby enhance and guide capacity building to combat zoonotic disease threats at the human-animal-environment interface.
In Bangladesh, live bird market environments are frequently contaminated with avian influenza viruses. Shop-level biosecurity practices might increase risk for environmental contamination. We sought ...to determine which shop-level biosecurity practices were associated with environmental contamination. We surveyed 800 poultry shops to describe biosecurity practices and collect environmental samples. Samples from 205 (26%) shops were positive for influenza A viral RNA, 108 (14%) for H9, and 60 (8%) for H5. Shops that slaughtered poultry, kept poultry overnight, remained open without rest days, had uneven muddy floors, held poultry on the floor, and housed sick and healthy poultry together were more frequently positive for influenza A viruses. Reported monthly cleaning seemed protective, but disinfection practices were not otherwise associated with influenza A virus detection. Slaughtering, keeping poultry overnight, weekly rest days, infrastructure, and disinfection practices could be targets for interventions to reduce environmental contamination.
Highlights • During 2006–2010 in Vietnam, influenza viruses co-circulated most years and often peaked multiple times each year. • 22% of patients with ILI enrolled in the National Influenza ...Surveillance System (NISS) in Vietnam were influenza positive. • 9.3% of ILI patients in NISS in Vietnam were reported as subsequently hospitalized, of which 19% were influenza positive. • NISS suggests influenza is an important cause of ILI and reported subsequent hospitalization among outpatients in Vietnam.
Avian influenza (AI) virus detections occurred frequently in 2022 and continue to pose a health, economic, and food security risk. The most recent global analysis of official reports of animal ...outbreaks and human infections with all reportable AI viruses was published almost a decade ago. Increased or renewed reports of AI viruses, especially high pathogenicity H5N8 and H5N1 in birds and H5N1, H5N8, and H5N6 in humans globally, have established the need for a comprehensive review of current global AI virus surveillance data to assess the pandemic risk of AI viruses.
This study aims to provide an analysis of global AI animal outbreak and human case surveillance information from the last decade by describing the circulating virus subtypes, regions and temporal trends in reporting, and country characteristics associated with AI virus outbreak reporting in animals; surveillance and reporting gaps for animals and humans are identified.
We analyzed AI virus infection reports among animals and humans submitted to animal and public health authorities from January 2013 to June 2022 and compared them with reports from January 2005 to December 2012. A multivariable regression analysis was used to evaluate associations between variables of interest and reported AI virus animal outbreaks.
From 2013 to 2022, 52.2% (95/182) of World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Member Countries identified 34 AI virus subtypes during 21,249 outbreaks. The most frequently reported subtypes were high pathogenicity AI H5N1 (10,079/21,249, 47.43%) and H5N8 (6722/21,249, 31.63%). A total of 10 high pathogenicity AI and 6 low pathogenicity AI virus subtypes were reported to the WOAH for the first time during 2013-2022. AI outbreaks in animals occurred in 26 more Member Countries than reported in the previous 8 years. Decreasing World Bank income classification was significantly associated with decreases in reported AI outbreaks (P<.001-.02). Between January 2013 and June 2022, 17/194 (8.8%) World Health Organization (WHO) Member States reported 2000 human AI virus infections of 10 virus subtypes. H7N9 (1568/2000, 78.40%) and H5N1 (254/2000, 12.70%) viruses accounted for the most human infections. As many as 8 of these 17 Member States did not report a human case prior to 2013. Of 1953 human cases with available information, 74.81% (n=1461) had a known animal exposure before onset of illness. The median time from illness onset to the notification posted on the WHO event information site was 15 days (IQR 9-30 days; mean 24 days). Seasonality patterns of animal outbreaks and human infections with AI viruses were very similar, occurred year-round, and peaked during November through May.
Our analysis suggests that AI outbreaks are more frequently reported and geographically widespread than in the past. Global surveillance gaps include inconsistent reporting from all regions and human infection reporting delays. Continued monitoring for AI virus outbreaks in animals and human infections with AI viruses is crucial for pandemic preparedness.
In 2015, human influenza surveillance identified a human infection with A/H9N2 in Dhaka, Bangladesh with evidence of exposure to a sick quail. We conducted in-depth interviews with household quail ...caregivers, pet bird retail shop owners, and mobile vendors, key informant interviews with pet bird wholesale shop owners, one group discussion with pet bird retail shop workers and unstructured observations in households, pet bird wholesale and retail markets, and mobile bird vendor’s travelling areas to explore quail rearing and selling practices among households, mobile vendors, and retail pet bird and wholesale bird markets in Dhaka. Every day, quail were supplied from 23 districts to two wholesale markets, and then sold to households and restaurants directly, or through bird shops and mobile vendors. All respondents (67) reported keeping quail with other birds in cages, feeding quail, cleaning feeding pots, removing quail faeces, slaughtering sick quail, and discarding dead quail. Children played with quail and assisted in slaughtering of quail. Most respondents (94%) reported rinsing hands with water only after slaughtering and disposing of wastes and dead quail. No personal protective equipment was used during any activities. Frequent unprotected contact with quail and their by-products potentially increased the risk of cross-species avian influenza virus transmission. Avian influenza surveillance in retail pet bird and wholesale bird markets, mobile vendors, and households may identify cases promptly and reduce the risk of virus transmission.
Zoonotic diseases represent a heavy global burden, causing important economic losses, impacting animal health and production, and costing millions of human lives. The vaccination of animals and ...humans to prevent inter-species zoonotic disease transmission is an important intervention. However, efforts to develop and implement vaccine interventions to reduce zoonotic disease impacts are often limited to the veterinary and agricultural sectors and do not reflect the shared burden of disease. Multisectoral collaboration, including co-development opportunities for human and animal vaccines, expanding vaccine use to include animal reservoirs such as wildlife, and strategically using vaccines to interrupt complex transmission cycles is needed. Addressing zoonoses requires a multi-faceted One Health approach, wherein vaccinating people and animals plays a critical role.
During February 2013-March 2015, a total of 602 human cases of low pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) were reported; no autochthonous cases were reported outside mainland China. In contrast, since ...highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) reemerged during 2003 in China, 784 human cases in 16 countries and poultry outbreaks in 53 countries have been reported. Whether the absence of reported A(H7N9) outside mainland China represents lack of spread or lack of detection remains unclear. We compared epidemiologic and virologic features of A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) and used human and animal influenza surveillance data collected during April 2013-May 2014 from 4 Southeast Asia countries to assess the likelihood that A(H7N9) would have gone undetected during 2014. Surveillance in Vietnam and Cambodia detected human A(H5N1) cases; no A(H7N9) cases were detected in humans or poultry in Southeast Asia. Although we cannot rule out the possible spread of A(H7N9), substantial spread causing severe disease in humans is unlikely.
Abstract
Cross-species virus transmission events can lead to dire public health emergencies in the form of epidemics and pandemics. One example in animals is the emergence of the H3N8 equine ...influenza virus (EIV), first isolated in 1963 in Miami, FL, USA, after emerging among horses in South America. In the early 21st century, the American lineage of EIV diverged into two ‘Florida’ clades that persist today, while an EIV transferred to dogs around 1999 and gave rise to the H3N8 canine influenza virus (CIV), first reported in 2004. Here, we compare CIV in dogs and EIV in horses to reveal their host-specific evolution, to determine the sources and connections between significant outbreaks, and to gain insight into the factors controlling their different evolutionary fates. H3N8 CIV only circulated in North America, was geographically restricted after the first few years, and went extinct in 2016. Of the two EIV Florida clades, clade 1 circulates widely and shows frequent transfers between the USA and South America, Europe and elsewhere, while clade 2 was globally distributed early after it emerged, but since about 2018 has only been detected in Central Asia. Any potential zoonotic threat of these viruses to humans can only be determined with an understanding of its natural history and evolution. Our comparative analysis of these three viral lineages reveals distinct patterns and rates of sequence variation yet with similar overall evolution between clades, suggesting epidemiological intervention strategies for possible eradication of H3N8 EIV.
Background. In 2003, human monkeypox was first identified in the United States. The outbreak was associated with exposure to infected prairie dogs, but the potential for person-to-person transmission ...was a concern. This study examines health care worker (HCW) exposure to 3 patients with confirmed monkeypox. Methods. Exposed HCWs, defined as HCWs who entered a 2-m radius surrounding case patients with confirmed monkeypox, were identified by infection-control practitioners. A self-administered questionnaire and analysis of paired serum specimens determined exposure status, immune response, and postexposure signs and symptoms of monkeypox. Results. Of 81 exposed HCWs, 57 (70%) participated in the study. Among 57 participants, 40 (70%) had ⩾1 unprotected exposure; none reported signs or symptoms consistent with monkeypox illness. One exposed HCW (2%), who had been vaccinated for smallpox within the past year, had serological evidence of recent orthopoxvirus infection; acute- and convalescent-phase serum specimens tested positive for anti-orthopoxvirus IgM. No exposed HCWs had signs and symptoms consistent with monkeypox. Conclusion. More than three-quarters of exposed HCWs reported at least 1 unprotected encounter with a patient who had monkeypox. One asymptomatic HCW showed laboratory evidence of recent orthopoxvirus infection, which was possibly attributable to either recent infection or smallpox vaccination. Transmission of monkeypox likely is a rare event in the health care setting.