Real-time forecasts based on mathematical models can inform critical decision-making during infectious disease outbreaks. Yet, epidemic forecasts are rarely evaluated during or after the event, and ...there is little guidance on the best metrics for assessment. Here, we propose an evaluation approach that disentangles different components of forecasting ability using metrics that separately assess the calibration, sharpness and bias of forecasts. This makes it possible to assess not just how close a forecast was to reality but also how well uncertainty has been quantified. We used this approach to analyse the performance of weekly forecasts we generated in real time for Western Area, Sierra Leone, during the 2013-16 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. We investigated a range of forecast model variants based on the model fits generated at the time with a semi-mechanistic model, and found that good probabilistic calibration was achievable at short time horizons of one or two weeks ahead but model predictions were increasingly unreliable at longer forecasting horizons. This suggests that forecasts may have been of good enough quality to inform decision making based on predictions a few weeks ahead of time but not longer, reflecting the high level of uncertainty in the processes driving the trajectory of the epidemic. Comparing forecasts based on the semi-mechanistic model to simpler null models showed that the best semi-mechanistic model variant performed better than the null models with respect to probabilistic calibration, and that this would have been identified from the earliest stages of the outbreak. As forecasts become a routine part of the toolkit in public health, standards for evaluation of performance will be important for assessing quality and improving credibility of mathematical models, and for elucidating difficulties and trade-offs when aiming to make the most useful and reliable forecasts.
Between October 2013 and April 2014, more than 30,000 cases of Zika virus (ZIKV) disease were estimated to have attended healthcare facilities in French Polynesia. ZIKV has also been reported in ...Africa and Asia, and in 2015 the virus spread to South America and the Caribbean. Infection with ZIKV has been associated with neurological complications including Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) and microcephaly, which led the World Health Organization to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern in February 2015. To better understand the transmission dynamics of ZIKV, we used a mathematical model to examine the 2013-14 outbreak on the six major archipelagos of French Polynesia. Our median estimates for the basic reproduction number ranged from 2.6-4.8, with an estimated 11.5% (95% CI: 7.32-17.9%) of total infections reported. As a result, we estimated that 94% (95% CI: 91-97%) of the total population of the six archipelagos were infected during the outbreak. Based on the demography of French Polynesia, our results imply that if ZIKV infection provides complete protection against future infection, it would take 12-20 years before there are a sufficient number of susceptible individuals for ZIKV to re-emerge, which is on the same timescale as the circulation of dengue virus serotypes in the region. Our analysis suggests that ZIKV may exhibit similar dynamics to dengue virus in island populations, with transmission characterized by large, sporadic outbreaks with a high proportion of asymptomatic or unreported cases.
Traveller screening is being used to limit further spread of COVID-19 following its recent emergence, and symptom screening has become a ubiquitous tool in the global response. Previously, we ...developed a mathematical model to understand factors governing the effectiveness of traveller screening to prevent spread of emerging pathogens (Gostic et al., 2015). Here, we estimate the impact of different screening programs given current knowledge of key COVID-19 life history and epidemiological parameters. Even under best-case assumptions, we estimate that screening will miss more than half of infected people. Breaking down the factors leading to screening successes and failures, we find that most cases missed by screening are fundamentally undetectable, because they have not yet developed symptoms and are unaware they were exposed. Our work underscores the need for measures to limit transmission by individuals who become ill after being missed by a screening program. These findings can support evidence-based policy to combat the spread of COVID-19, and prospective planning to mitigate future emerging pathogens.
Adjusting for delay from confirmation to death, we estimated case and infection fatality ratios (CFR, IFR) for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on the Diamond Princess ship as 2.6% (95% confidence ...interval (CI): 0.89-6.7) and 1.3% (95% CI: 0.38-3.6), respectively. Comparing deaths on board with expected deaths based on naive CFR estimates from China, we estimated CFR and IFR in China to be 1.2% (95% CI: 0.3-2.7) and 0.6% (95% CI: 0.2-1.3), respectively.
In the middle of the outbreak, cases for which the outcome was as-yet unknown existed (appendix). Because the naive CFR calculation includes these cases--but not their outcomes--it generates a ...substantial underestimate of the actual CFR.
Households are important settings for the transmission of seasonal influenza. Previous studies found that the per-person risk of within-household transmission decreases with household size. However, ...more detailed heterogeneities driven by household composition and contact patterns have not been studied. We employed a mathematical model that accounts for infections both from outside and within the household. The model was applied to citywide primary school seasonal influenza surveillance and household surveys from 10,486 students during the 2014/15 season in Matsumoto city, Japan. We compared a range of models to estimate the structure of household transmission and found that familial relationship and household composition strongly influenced the transmission patterns of seasonal influenza in households. Children had a substantially high risk of infection from outside the household (up to 20%) compared with adults (1-3%). Intense transmission was observed within-generation (between children/parents/grandparents) and also between mother and child, with transmission risks typically ranging from 5-20% depending on the transmission route and household composition. Children were identified as the largest source of secondary transmission, with family structure influencing infection risk.
Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control ...depends on characteristics of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19.
We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R0), the delay from symptom onset to isolation, the probability that contacts were traced, the proportion of transmission that occurred before symptom onset, and the proportion of subclinical infections. We assumed isolation prevented all further transmission in the model. Outbreaks were deemed controlled if transmission ended within 12 weeks or before 5000 cases in total. We measured the success of controlling outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum number of cases traced to measure feasibility of public health effort.
Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R0 of 1·5, and 0% transmission before symptom onset could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability; however, the probability of controlling an outbreak decreased with the number of initial cases, when R0 was 2·5 or 3·5 and with more transmission before symptom onset. Across different initial numbers of cases, the majority of scenarios with an R0 of 1·5 were controllable with less than 50% of contacts successfully traced. To control the majority of outbreaks, for R0 of 2·5 more than 70% of contacts had to be traced, and for an R0 of 3·5 more than 90% of contacts had to be traced. The delay between symptom onset and isolation had the largest role in determining whether an outbreak was controllable when R0 was 1·5. For R0 values of 2·5 or 3·5, if there were 40 initial cases, contact tracing and isolation were only potentially feasible when less than 1% of transmission occurred before symptom onset.
In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts.
Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.
The pacific islands of Micronesia have experienced several outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases over the past decade. In outbreaks on small islands, the susceptible population is usually well ...defined, and there is no co-circulation of pathogens. Because of this, analysing such outbreaks can be useful for understanding the transmission dynamics of the pathogens involved, and particularly so for yet understudied pathogens such as Zika virus. Here, we compared three outbreaks of dengue and Zika virus in two different island settings in Micronesia, the Yap Main Islands and Fais, using a mathematical model of transmission dynamics and making full use of commonalities in disease and setting between the outbreaks. We found that the estimated reproduction numbers for Zika and dengue were similar when considered in the same setting, but that, conversely, reproduction number for the same disease can vary considerably by setting. On the Yap Main Islands, we estimated a reproduction number of 8.0-16 (95% Credible Interval (CI)) for the dengue outbreak and 4.8-14 (95% CI) for the Zika outbreak, whereas for the dengue outbreak on Fais our estimate was 28-102 (95% CI). We further found that the proportion of cases of Zika reported was smaller (95% CI 1.4%-1.9%) than that of dengue (95% CI: 47%-61%). We confirmed these results in extensive sensitivity analysis. They suggest that models for dengue transmission can be useful for estimating the predicted dynamics of Zika transmission, but care must be taken when extrapolating findings from one setting to another.
A severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), emerged in southeast England in September 2020 and is rapidly spreading toward fixation. Using ...a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, we estimate that this variant has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain dynamic transmission model shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases. Without stringent control measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths across England in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020. VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar transmission increase (59 to 74%) in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States.