REDUCING CORRUPTION McMann, Kelly M
Corruption as a Last Resort,
10/2014
Book Chapter
Odprti dostop
Providing ordinary citizens with alternatives to corruption can be an effective anticorruption strategy. To the extent that markets, groups in society, and family members can meet individuals’ basic ...needs, individuals are less likely to engage in corruption with government officials. Creating market-enhancing institutions and reducing restrictions on groups in society can increase the availability of essential goods and services from these other sources.
These recommendations for reducing corruption depart in vital ways from existing anticorruption strategies. The new recommendations rest on a fundamental observation: corruption is a two-party exchange that can be a coping strategy for citizens, not just a
“Everybody lives on their own,” Marzhan said to explain how people cope now without the Soviet welfare state.¹ The idea of “living on one’s own,” in other words, being accountable for one’s own ...survival, is a frequent refrain among people in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is also the governments’ stance and thus a partial explanation for why individuals use corrupt practices when trying to obtain state resources. Through the media and their conversations with citizens, government officials tell individuals that they are responsible for their own economic success or failure because Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are now market reformers. Faced
“The mosque? What kind of help could we get from it?” Marzhan, the villager in southern Kazakhstan, responded to my question about the local mosque as a source of assistance.¹ My exchange with her ...highlights how societal institutions that observers have expected to provide assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to a large extent do not. Mosques, Islamic schools, and proselytizing Islamic groups along with local, secular charities have grown in number since the late Soviet era when restrictions on charity, religion, and organizing were reduced. This growth and the experiences of other countries in similar circumstances raised expectations among some
“I would need to have an acquaintance or pay a bribe,” Marzhan, the villager from Kazakhstan, said, explaining the standard approach for obtaining credit from the local government in her district.¹ ...Marzhan had decided to apply for credit through theraion akimat(district administrative office) and establish a business because her family has been in dire straits. Both she and her husband, Temir, have been unemployed for several years, except for a few weeks in the summer when Temir finds work driving a combine. They have four children to support, and they bring in only 23 USD per month when
“I do not like to give bribes,” Marzhan, a villager in Kazakhstan, said to me. She was explaining why she avoids seeking assistance from government officials. Instead, when she needs money, credit, ...or employment, she relies on her uncle Kanat, a successful private farmer.¹ Her experience illustrates a fundamental point about corruption: individuals contemplatealternativesbefore deciding to engage in corrupt behaviors. Government officials’ demands, in effective laws, cultural norms, or economic needs do not automatically propel ordinary citizens into illicit exchanges with officials, as studies of corruption have implied. Rather, citizens consider whether relatives, groups in society, the market,
“Workers who gave money to the sovkhoz received goods,” Marzhan, the woman in the village in Kazakhstan, recounted to me.¹ In the late 1990s when the sovkhoz (state farm) in the village collapsed, ...workers who gave bribes to the local authorities received goods from it, Marzhan and other village residents explained. Former sovkhoz workers needed these essential agricultural inputs for the new farms they were establishing; their limited income and access to credit made it difficult for them to obtain the goods elsewhere. Yet some villagers, like Marzhan and her family, opted not to pay bribes and thus not to
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Communist Party leaders in Central Asia were faced with the daunting task of building states where they previously had not existed: Kazakhstan, ...Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Their task was complicated by the institutional and ideological legacy of the Soviet system as well as by a more actively engaged international community. These nascent states inherited a set of institutions that included bloated bureaucracies, centralized economic planning, and patronage networks. Some of these institutions survived, others have mutated, and new institutions have been created. Experts on Central Asia here examine the emerging relationship between state actors and social forces in the region. Through the prism of local institutions, the authors reassess both our understanding of Central Asia and of the state-building process more broadly. They scrutinize a wide array of institutional actors, ranging from regional governments and neighborhood committees to transnational and non-governmental organizations. With original empirical research and theoretical insight, the volume's contributors illuminate an obscure but resource-rich and strategically significant region.
