Intuitive Prosociality Zaki, Jamil; Mitchell, Jason P.
Current directions in psychological science : a journal of the American Psychological Society,
12/2013, Letnik:
22, Številka:
6
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Prosocial behavior is a central feature of human life and a major focus of research across the natural and social sciences. Most theoretical models of prosociality share a common assumption: Humans ...are instinctively selfish, and prosocial behavior requires exerting reflective control over these basic instincts. However, findings from several scientific disciplines have recently contradicted this view. Rather than requiring control over instinctive selfishness, prosocial behavior appears to stem from processes that are intuitive, reflexive, and even automatic. These observations suggest that our understanding of prosociality should be revised to include the possibility that, in many cases, prosocial behavior—instead of requiring active control over our impulses—represents an impulse of its own.
Humans devote 30–40% of speech output solely to informing others of their own subjective experiences. What drives this propensity for disclosure? Here, we test recent theories that individuals place ...high subjective value on opportunities to communicate their thoughts and feelings to others and that doing so engages neural and cognitive mechanisms associated with reward. Five studies provided support for this hypothesis. Self-disclosure was strongly associated with increased activation in brain regions that form the mesolimbic dopamine system, including the nucleus accumbens and ventral tegmental area. Moreover, individuals were willing to forgo money to disclose about the self. Two additional studies demonstrated that these effects stemmed from the independent value that individuals placed on self-referential thought and on simply sharing information with others. Together, these findings suggest that the human tendency to convey information about personal experience may arise from the intrinsic value associated with self-disclosure.
Recent researchers have suggested that a region of right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) selectively subserves the attribution of beliefs to other people (Saxe R, Kanwisher N. 2003. People thinking ...about thinking people: fMRI investigations of theory of mind. NeuroImage. 19:1835–1842; Saxe R, Powell LJ. 2006. It's the thought that counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind. Psychol Sci. 17:692–699; Saxe R, Wexler A. 2005. Making sense of another mind: the role of the right temporo-parietal junction. Neuropsychologia. 43:1391–1399). At the same time, a similar RTPJ region has been observed repeatedly in a variety of nonsocial tasks that require participants to redirect attention to task-relevant stimuli (e.g., Corbetta M, Shulman GL. 2002. Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci. 3:201–215; Serences JT, Shomstein S, Leber AB, Golay X, Egeth HE, Yantis S. 2005. Coordination of voluntary and stimulus-driven attentional control in human cortex. Psychol Sci. 16:114–122). However, because these 2 sets of tasks have never been compared within the same participants, it remains unclear whether these observations refer to the exact same region of RTPJ or may instead involve neighboring regions with distinct functional profiles. To test the claim that there is a region of RTPJ selective for belief attribution, the current study used functional neuroimaging to examine the extent to which cortical loci identified by a “theory-of-mind localizer” also distinguish between trials on a target detection task that varied demands to reorient attention (i.e., a version of the “Posner cueing task”). Results were incompatible with claims of RTPJ selectivity for mental state attribution. Regardless of whether regions were defined from group analyses or were individually tailored for each participant, RTPJ activity was also modulated by the nonsocial attentional task. The overlap between theory-of-mind and attentional reorienting suggests the need for new accounts of RTPJ function that integrate across these disparate task comparisons.
Social influence—individuals' tendency to conform to the beliefs and attitudes of others—has interested psychologists for decades. However, it has traditionally been difficult to distinguish true ...modification of attitudes from mere public compliance with social norms; this study addressed this challenge using functional neuroimaging. Participants rated the attractiveness of faces and subsequently learned how their peers ostensibly rated each face. Participants were then scanned using functional MRI while they rated each face a second time. The second ratings were influenced by social norms: Participants changed their ratings to conform to those of their peers. This social influence was accompanied by modulated engagement of two brain regions associated with coding subjective value—the nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex—a finding suggesting that exposure to social norms affected participants' neural representations of value assigned to stimuli. These findings document the utility of neuroimaging to demonstrate the private acceptance of social norms.
Standard economic and evolutionary models assume that humans are fundamentally selfish. On this view, any acts of prosociality—such as cooperation, giving, and other forms of altruism—result from ...covert attempts to avoid social injunctions against selfishness. However, even in the absence of social pressure, individuals routinely forego personal gain to share resources with others. Such anomalous giving cannot be accounted for by standard models of social behavior. Recent observations have suggested that, instead, prosocial behavior may reflect an intrinsic value placed on social ideals such as equity and charity. Here, we show that, consistent with this alternative account, making equitable interpersonal decisions engaged neural structures involved in computing subjective value, even when doing so required foregoing material resources. By contrast, making inequitable decisions produced activity in the anterior insula, a region linked to the experience of subjective disutility. Moreover, inequity-related insula response predicted individuals’ unwillingness to make inequitable choices. Together, these data suggest that prosocial behavior is not simply a response to external pressure, but instead represents an intrinsic, and intrinsically social, class of reward.
Abstract
Social life requires making inferences about other people. What information do perceivers spontaneously draw upon to make such inferences? Here, we test 4 major theories of person ...perception, and 1 synthetic theory that combines their features, to determine whether the dimensions of such theories can serve as bases for describing patterns of neural activity during mentalizing. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants made social judgments about well-known public figures. Patterns of brain activity were then predicted using feature encoding models that represented target people's positions on theoretical dimensions such as warmth and competence. All 5 theories of person perception proved highly accurate at reconstructing activity patterns, indicating that each could describe the informational basis of mentalizing. Cross-validation indicated that the theories robustly generalized across both targets and participants. The synthetic theory consistently attained the best performance-approximately two-thirds of noise ceiling accuracy--indicating that, in combination, the theories considered here can account for much of the neural representation of other people. Moreover, encoding models trained on the present data could reconstruct patterns of activity associated with mental state representations in independent data, suggesting the use of a common neural code to represent others' traits and states.
Although typically defined as the study of how people and groups interact, the field of social psychology comprises several disparate domains that make only indirect contributions to understanding ...interpersonal interaction, such as emotion, attitudes and the self. Although these various phenomena seem to have little in common, recent evidence indicates that the topics at the core of social psychology form a natural group of domains with a common functional neuroanatomy, centered on the medial prefrontal cortex. That self-referential, attitudinal, affective and other social phenomena converge on this region might reflect their shared reliance on inexact and internally generated estimates that differ from the more precise representations underlying other psychological phenomena.
Human beings have an unusual proclivity for altruistic behavior, and recent commentators have suggested that these prosocial tendencies arise from our unique capacity to understand the minds of ...others (i.e., to mentalize). The current studies test this hypothesis by examining the relation between altruistic behavior and the reflexive engagement of a neural system reliably associated with mentalizing. Results indicated that activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex--a region consistently involved in understanding others' mental states--predicts both monetary donations to others and time spent helping others. These findings address long-standing questions about the proximate source of human altruism by suggesting that prosocial behavior results, in part, from our broader tendency for social-cognitive thought.
Social-cognitive deficits in normal aging Moran, Joseph M; Jolly, Eshin; Mitchell, Jason P
The Journal of neuroscience,
2012-Apr-18, 2012-04-18, 20120418, Letnik:
32, Številka:
16
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
A sizeable number of studies have implicated the default network (e.g., medial prefrontal and parietal cortices) in tasks that require participants to infer the mental states of others (i.e., to ...mentalize). Parallel research has demonstrated that default network function declines over the lifespan, suggesting that older adults may show impairments in social-cognitive tasks that require mentalizing. Older and younger human adults were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing three different social-cognitive tasks. Across three mentalizing paradigms, younger and older adults viewed animated shapes in brief social vignettes, stories about a person's moral actions, and false belief stories. Consistent with predictions, older adults responded less accurately to stories about others' false beliefs and made less use of actors' intentions to judge the moral permissibility of behavior. These impairments in performance during social-cognitive tasks were accompanied by age-related decreases across all three paradigms in the BOLD response of a single brain region, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest specific task-independent age-related deficits in mentalizing that are localizable to changes in circumscribed subregions of the default network.
How do people understand the minds of others? Existing psychological theories have suggested a number of dimensions that perceivers could use to make sense of others’ internal mental states. However, ...it remains unclear which of these dimensions, if any, the brain spontaneously uses when we think about others. The present study used multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) of neuroimaging data to identify the primary organizing principles of social cognition. We derived four unique dimensions of mental state representation from existing psychological theories and used functional magnetic resonance imaging to test whether these dimensions organize the neural encoding of others’ mental states. MVPA revealed that three such dimensions could predict neural patterns within the medial prefrontal and parietal cortices, temporoparietal junction, and anterior temporal lobes during social thought: rationality, social impact, and valence. These results suggest that these dimensions serve as organizing principles for our understanding of other people.
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