This paper analyzes the problems in designing a tax sharing system when there are two governments levels with rights over the same taxes. Using a principal-agent model, the optimality of the ...different tax sharing systems is discussed. The presence of efficiency problems derived from the lack of cooperation between governments is proved, using Bernheim & Winstons (1986) common agency theorems. It is finally shown how a cooperative result can be institutionally induced by creating, for example, a Common Tax Agency in which all implicated governments participate. El trabajo analiza los problemas de diseño de un sistema de participación en la gestión tributaria cuando existen dos niveles de gobierno con derechos sobre los mismos tributos. Con la ayuda de un esquema principal-agente, se discute la optimalidad de los resultados de los distintos sistemas de participación tributaria. Haciendo uso de los teoremas sobre agencia común de Bernheim y Winston (1986) se prueba la existencia de problemas de eficiencia derivados de la falta de cooperación entre los gobiernos. Finalmente se muestra cómo el resultado cooperativo podría ser inducido mediante algún remedio institucional, como la creación de una Agencia Tributaria Común, participada por todos los gobiernos implicados.
This paper deals with the problem of fiscal corresponsability of twogovemment levels in a game theory context. It is assumed that Nash equilibriaof the non-cooperative game between both Govemments ...are not Pareto optimal.Then, assurning the existence of non-equilibrium strategies, which would allowboth of them to improve, it is questioned whether the introduction ofinterposed agents (Tax Agencies) would be a way of getting the necessaryincentives for cooperation. Two results are proved. If each govemment createsits own Tax Agency, results replicate the ones derived from the initial game.Yet, if a Common Tax Agency is created, it behaves as an indirect mechanism,which allows the emergence of cooperation as an equilibrium of this newgame En este trabajo se plantea el problema de la corresponsabilización fiscalde dos niveles de gobierno en un contexto de teoría de juegos. En primer lugarse supone que los equilibrios Nash del juego no-cooperativo entre ambosGobiernos no son Pareto óptimos. En el supuesto de que existan estrategias, node equilibrio, que permitan mejorar a ambos, se plantea la pregunta de si lacreación de agentes interpuestos (Agencia Recaudadoras) sería una forma deconseguir los incentivos necesarios para la cooperación. Se demuestran dosresultados. Si cada gobierno crea una Agencia Recaudadora particular losresultados no varían respecto al juego inicial entre los gobiernos. Pero, síse crea una Agencia Recaudadora Común, ésta actúa como un mecanismo indirectoque posibilita la emergencia de cooperación como equilibrio de este nuevojuego.
We present a new refinement for signalling games: the Introspective Equilibrium. It is based on both a procedure for beliefs formation -called Incentive Dominance- and a global consistence ...requirement, closely related to that of the Undefeated equilibrium of mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite. The incentive Dominance criterion captures the principie of forward induction through explicitly modelling the players thought process when forming preliminary beliefs. The main idea is that they should exploit the information contained in the best reply structure about the incentives of the different types of a a rational Bayesian sender. Our criterion subsumes very intuitive ones as equilibrium dorninance and divinity. The Introspective Equilibrium asks for an unambigous explanation of any deviation from a given equilibrium. This means that the explanation should be unique, part of a sequential equilibrium and achievable from the preliminary beliefs defined by the Incentive Dominance Cnterion.
We present a finitely repeated bargaining game with complete information. The stage game is asimultaneous demand game with a fall-back position for both parties, in which we allow one party(say, the ...union) to estabilish a credible commitment to strike if it is not offered a determinedwage. We try to refine the equilibrium set of the repeated game using a formulation of ForwardInduction. In particular, we say that a path of Nash Equilibria in the repeated game is Consistentwith Forward Induction (CFI) if for all period t the cost of deviation (if it is strictly positive) is greateror equal than the maximal net gain in CFI paths with t-1 horizon. We present several cases in which the average payoff for the union in any CFI path, when thehorizon tends to infinity, is his preferred wage. These results are similar to those obtained with thereputation effects approach and reveal some connection between the FI notion and the approachconsisting of perturbing the game with some incomplete information.
Bargainning, reputation and strikes Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren; Vicente Calabuig Alcantara
IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc,
01/1997
Paper
Odprti dostop
This paper analyses a finitely repeated wage bargaining game, where the union's strike decision is endogenous, but there is incomplete information about his striking strategy space. We characterize ...the equilibrium path and the equilibrium payoff of all Sequential Equilibria, following the techniques of Schmidt (1993). We obtain a finite bound, independent of the horizon of the repeated game, in the number of periods in which the firm tests the union and in which there are strikes. We also show that for a sufficiently long horizon, the union can credibly threaten to strike and obtain a high wage for most of the periods.
Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium ...selection even for quite siniple games, as 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria. Our paper models the introspection process by which the selected equilibrium is achieved in this class of games. Players begin their analysis with imprecise priors, obtained under weak restrictions formulated as Axioms. For a large class of reasoning dynamics we obtain as the solution the risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
This paper analyzes the problems in designing a tax sharing system when there are two governments levels with rights over the same taxes. Using a principal-agent model, the optimality of the ...different tax sharing systems is discussed. The presence of efficiency problems derived from the lack of cooperation between governments is proved, using Bernheim & Winstons (1986) common agency theorems. It is finally shown how a cooperative result can be institutionally induced by creating, for example, a Common Tax Agency in which all implicated governments participate. El trabajo analiza los problemas de diseño de un sistema de participación en la gestión tributaria cuando existen dos niveles de gobierno con derechos sobre los mismos tributos. Con la ayuda de un esquema principal-agente, se discute la optimalidad de los resultados de los distintos sistemas de participación tributaria. Haciendo uso de los teoremas sobre agencia común de Bernheim y Winston (1986) se prueba la existencia de problemas de eficiencia derivados de la falta de cooperación entre los gobiernos. Finalmente se muestra cómo el resultado cooperativo podría ser inducido mediante algún remedio institucional, como la creación de una Agencia Tributaria Común, participada por todos los gobiernos implicados.
The labor contract usually assigns significant authority to the employer (hierarchical governance). The threat of hold-up of the employee by the employer, caused by this asymmetric distribution of ...decision rights, can be mitigated by a preference for reciprocity on the part of the employer or by a balance of power arising from the credible threat by the employee to retaliate if he or she is exploited. The authors of this working paper investigate the interaction between the employer s preferences for reciprocity and the feasibility and willingness to punish hostile behavior by the employee in an overlapping generations model where there is cultural transmission of preferences. The results show that if the net gains from specific investment are high enough, and the quantity of feasible punishment (i.e., the worker s power) is also high, the economy will converge from any initial condition to an efficient cooperative equilibrium. If either of these conditions does not hold, the market will settle down in an inefficient equilibrium where not all types of workers make specific investment or, even if they do, there is surplus destruction, because selfish firms offer low wages. Positive reciprocity on the part of the employer is not enough to achieve an efficient labor culture. There is also a need for a significant allocation of power to the workers, so as to make the threat of punishment a powerful tool to enhance efficiency and cooperation.
This paper deals with the problem of fiscal corresponsability of twogovemment levels in a game theory context. It is assumed that Nash equilibriaof the non-cooperative game between both Govemments ...are not Pareto optimal.Then, assurning the existence of non-equilibrium strategies, which would allowboth of them to improve, it is questioned whether the introduction ofinterposed agents (Tax Agencies) would be a way of getting the necessaryincentives for cooperation. Two results are proved. If each govemment createsits own Tax Agency, results replicate the ones derived from the initial game.Yet, if a Common Tax Agency is created, it behaves as an indirect mechanism,which allows the emergence of cooperation as an equilibrium of this newgame En este trabajo se plantea el problema de la corresponsabilización fiscalde dos niveles de gobierno en un contexto de teoría de juegos. En primer lugarse supone que los equilibrios Nash del juego no-cooperativo entre ambosGobiernos no son Pareto óptimos. En el supuesto de que existan estrategias, node equilibrio, que permitan mejorar a ambos, se plantea la pregunta de si lacreación de agentes interpuestos (Agencia Recaudadoras) sería una forma deconseguir los incentivos necesarios para la cooperación. Se demuestran dosresultados. Si cada gobierno crea una Agencia Recaudadora particular losresultados no varían respecto al juego inicial entre los gobiernos. Pero, síse crea una Agencia Recaudadora Común, ésta actúa como un mecanismo indirectoque posibilita la emergencia de cooperación como equilibrio de este nuevojuego.
We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences, in which players face in each period a two-stage coordination game that consists of a production stage followed ...by a distribution phase. In the globally stable steady state of society, there will be a mixed distribution of preferences where both selfish and other-regarding preference sare present and, more importantly, players coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium of the coordination game. The presence of a significant fraction of individuals with other-regarding preferences acts as a stock of social capital in the society, reducing personal risk. If the proportion of selfish individuals in the initial condition of the dynamics is very high, there is still multiplicity of equilibria. We show that if there is heterogeneity in the behavior among groups and a positive rate of migration, then all groups will converge to the cooperative result.
