IoT devices are being widely deployed. But the huge variance among them in the level of security and requirements for network resources makes it unfeasible to manage IoT networks using a common ...generic policy. One solution to this challenge is to define policies for classes of devices based on device type . In this paper, we present AuDI, a system for quickly and effectively identifying the type of a device in an IoT network by analyzing their network communications. AuDI models the periodic communication traffic of IoT devices using an unsupervised learning method to perform identification. In contrast to prior work, AuDI operates autonomously after initial setup, learning, without human intervention nor labeled data, to identify previously unseen device types. AuDI can identify the type of a device in any mode of operation or stage of lifecycle of the device. Via systematic experiments using 33 off-the-shelf IoT devices, we show that AuDI is effective (98.2% accuracy).
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are transitioning from legacy-electromechanical-based systems to modern information and communication technology (ICT)-based systems creating a close coupling ...between cyber and physical components. In this paper, we explore the ICS cybersecurity landscape including: 1) the key principles and unique aspects of ICS operation; 2) a brief history of cyberattacks on ICS; 3) an overview of ICS security assessment; 4) a survey of "uniquely-ICS" testbeds that capture the interactions between the various layers of an ICS; and 5) current trends in ICS attacks and defenses.
Today, embedded, mobile, and cyberphysical systems are ubiquitous and used in many applications, from industrial control systems, modern vehicles, to critical infrastructure. Current trends and ...initiatives, such as "Industrie 4.0" and Internet of Things (IoT), promise innovative business models and novel user experiences through strong connectivity and effective use of next generation of embedded devices. These systems generate, process, and exchange vast amounts of security-critical and privacy-sensitive data, which makes them attractive targets of attacks. Cyberattacks on IoT systems are very critical since they may cause physical damage and even threaten human lives. The complexity of these systems and the potential impact of cyberattacks bring upon new threats.
This paper gives an introduction to Industrial IoT systems, the related security and privacy challenges, and an outlook on possible solutions towards a holistic security framework for Industrial IoT systems.
Secure firmware update is an important stage in the Internet of Things (IoT) device life-cycle. Prior techniques, designed for other computational settings, are not readily suitable for IoT devices, ...since they do not consider idiosyncrasies of a realistic large-scale IoT deployment. This motivates our design of architecture for secure software update of realistic embedded devices ( ASSURED ), a secure and scalable update framework for IoT. ASSURED includes all stakeholders in a typical IoT update ecosystem, while providing end-to-end security between manufacturers and devices. To demonstrate its feasibility and practicality, ASSURED is instantiated and experimentally evaluated on two commodity hardware platforms. Results show that ASSURED is considerably faster than current update mechanisms in realistic settings.
IoT devices are increasingly deployed in daily life. Many of these devices are, however, vulnerable due to insecure design, implementation, and configuration. As a result, many networks already have ...vulnerable IoT devices that are easy to compromise. This has led to a new category of malware specifically targeting IoT devices. However, existing intrusion detection techniques are not effective in detecting compromised IoT devices given the massive scale of the problem in terms of the number of different types of devices and manufacturers involved. In this paper, we present DÏoT, an autonomous self-learning distributed system for detecting compromised IoT devices. DÏoT builds effectively on device-type-specific communication profiles without human intervention nor labeled data that are subsequently used to detect anomalous deviations in devices' communication behavior, potentially caused by malicious adversaries. DÏoT utilizes a federated learning approach for aggregating behavior profiles efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first system to employ a federated learning approach to anomaly-detection-based intrusion detection. Consequently, DÏoT can cope with emerging new and unknown attacks. We systematically and extensively evaluated more than 30 off-the-shelf IoT devices over a long term and show that DÏoT is highly effective (95.6% detection rate) and fast (257 ms) at detecting devices compromised by, for instance, the infamous Mirai malware. DÏoT reported no false alarms when evaluated in a real-world smart home deployment setting.
With the rapid growth of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), concerns about the security of IoT devices have become prominent. Several vendors are producing IP-connected devices for home and small office ...networks that often suffer from flawed security designs and implementations. They also tend to lack mechanisms for firmware updates or patches that can help eliminate security vulnerabilities. Securing networks where the presence of such vulnerable devices is given, requires a brownfield approach: applying necessary protection measures within the network so that potentially vulnerable devices can coexist without endangering the security of other devices in the same network. In this paper, we present IoT Sentinel, a system capable of automatically identifying the types of devices being connected to an IoT network and enabling enforcement of rules for constraining the communications of vulnerable devices so as to minimize damage resulting from their compromise. We show that IoT Sentinel is effective in identifying device types and has minimal performance overhead.
Dual‐salt magnesium/lithium‐ion batteries (MLIBs) benefit from fast lithium ion diffusion on the cathode side while providing safety due to the dendrite‐free Mg2+ stripping/plating mechanism on the ...anode side. Bulk MoS2 (B‐MoS2), as a cathode for magnesium‐ion batteries (MIBs), suffers from low conductivity and relatively van der Waals gaps and, consequently, resists against divalent Mg2+ insertion due to the high Coulombic interactions. In MLIBs, it exhibits a Daniell‐cell type mechanism with the sole accommodation of Li+. In this paper, the synthesis of a 1T/2H mixed‐phase MoS2(MP‐MoS2) modified with a hyperbranched polyethylene ionomer, I@MP‐MoS2, for high‐capacity MLIBs with a distinct Mg2+/Li+ co‐intercalation mechanism is reported. Benefiting from the enhanced conductivity (due to 53% metallic 1T phase), expanded van der Waals gaps (79% expansion compared to B‐MoS2, 1.11 vs 0.62 nm), and enhanced interactions with THF‐based electrolytes following the modification, I@MP‐MoS2 shows a dramatically increased Mg2+ storage compared to its parent analogue (144 mAh g−1 vs ≈2 mAh g−1 at 20 mA g−1). In MLIBs, I@MP‐MoS2 is demonstrated to exhibit remarkable specific capacities up to ≈270 mAh g−1 at 20 mA g−1 through a Mg2+/Li+ co‐intercalation mechanism with 87% of capacity retention over 200 cycles at 100 mA g−1.
Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) have become prevalent techniques to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities in software programs. A variety of corresponding defenses ...has been proposed, of which some have already been successfully bypassed -- and the arms race continues. In this paper, we perform a systematic assessment of recently proposed CFI solutions and other defenses against code reuse attacks in the context of C++. We demonstrate that many of these defenses that do not consider object-oriented C++ semantics precisely can be generically bypassed in practice. Our novel attack technique, denoted as counterfeit object-oriented programming (COOP), induces malicious program behavior by only invoking chains of existing C++ virtual functions in a program through corresponding existing call sites. COOP is Turing complete in realistic attack scenarios and we show its viability by developing sophisticated, real-world exploits for Internet Explorer 10 on Windows and Fire fox 36 on Linux. Moreover, we show that even recently proposed defenses (CPS, T-VIP, vfGuard, and VTint) that specifically target C++ are vulnerable to COOP. We observe that constructing defenses resilient to COOP that do not require access to source code seems to be challenging. We believe that our investigation and results are helpful contributions to the design and implementation of future defenses against control flow hijacking attacks.
The ability to independently control the expression of different genes is important for quantitative biology. Using budding yeast, we characterize GAL1pr, GALL, MET3pr, CUP1pr, PHO5pr, tetOpr, ...terminator-tetOpr, Z
EV, blue-light inducible optogenetic systems El222-LIP, El222-GLIP, and red-light inducible PhyB-PIF3. We report kinetic parameters, noise scaling, impact on growth, and the fundamental leakiness of each system using an intuitive unit, maxGAL1. We uncover disadvantages of widely used tools, e.g., nonmonotonic activity of MET3pr and GALL, slow off kinetics of the doxycycline- and estradiol-inducible systems tetOpr and Z
EV, and high variability of PHO5pr and red-light activated PhyB-PIF3 system. We introduce two previously uncharacterized systems: strongLOV, a more light-sensitive El222 mutant, and ARG3pr, which is induced in the absence of arginine or presence of methionine. To demonstrate fine control over gene circuits, we experimentally tune the time between cell cycle Start and mitosis, artificially simulating near-wild-type timing. All strains, constructs, code, and data ( https://promoter-benchmark.epfl.ch/ ) are made available.
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