From a social-market perspective, European integration has reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social ...inequality. The article summarises the institutional asymmetries which have done most to constrain democratic political choices and to shift the balance between capital, labour and the state: the priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratise European politics will not be able to overcome these asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove them. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re-foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that might facilitate democratic political action at both European and national levels.
Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it ...has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, 'integration through law' does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio-economic regimes of European Union member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian social market economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level. Adapted from the source document.
To be at the same time effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In ...Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct, but coexistent traditions of ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’ political philosophy. Judged by these criteria, the European Union – when considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the ‘European democratic deficit’) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated, by member states, whereas the Union appears as a ‘government of governments’, which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance–legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance–legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could, and should, be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in ‘communicative discourses’ in the national public space. That is not necessarily so for ‘non-political’ policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). By enforcing its ‘liberal’ programme of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the ‘republican’ bases of member-state legitimacy. Where that is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.
The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited SCHARPF, FRITZ W.
Journal of common market studies,
November 2006, Letnik:
44, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The original analysis appears as a basically valid ‐ if simplified ‐ account of the institutional conditions of political policy choices in the EU and their consequences. It needs to be complemented, ...however, by a similar account of non‐political policy‐making in the supranational‐hierarchical mode of governance by the ECB or ECJ.
European integration has long relied on the democratic legitimacy of its Member States without paying much attention to the increasing importance of its multilevel governing processes. At this time, ...however, Europe is caught in the intersection of multiple crises, all of which-Brexit as well as the euro crisis, the refugee crisis as well as the crises in Europe's relations with its Eastern and Southern 'near abroad'-are challenging the effectiveness as well as the democratic legitimacy of government on European and national levels. These dual challenges are connected: Democratic legitimacy presupposes effective governing and problem-solving capacity. Hence the failure of output legitimacy may undermine or even destroy the possibility of input legitimacy-a risk for which the fate of the Weimar Republic remains a most disturbing memento. At the same time, however, the lack of input legitimacy in the present European context will constrain and may ultimately destroy the effectiveness of measures based on non-accountable supranational authority.
European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. The open method of coordination is now being ...applied in the social policy field. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, but tries to improve these through promoting common objectives and common indicators, and through comparative evaluations of national policy performance. These efforts are useful but cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry. Hence there is reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration. The article discusses two such options: closer cooperation and a combination of differentiated framework directives with the open method of coordination. (Original abstract - amended)
At the most general level, the perpetual momentum of 'integration through law' is driven by the substantive dynamics of legal doctrines extending the protection of individual interests and by ...procedural conditions facilitating the use of European law to challenge the institutional regimes of EU member states. Given the supremacy and direct effect of European law, and the decision rules of EU policy making, this momentum could not be halted through political or judicial intervention.
The article examines the difficulties of European welfare states in the face of European economic integration. Taking a clue from the experience of territorial sub-units in economically integrated ...federal nation states, the implication seems to be that economic competition impedes welfare state regulations that impose unequal burdens on capital incomes and mobile business, and that effective welfare state policies depend on the powers of central governments. By analogy, that would suggest a need for the Europeanization of social policy. At the European level, however, welfare state policies are impeded not only by the European democratic deficit, but also by deeprooted conflicts of economic interest among member states, and by the widely divergent structural characteristics of national welfare states. The article examines the implications of this constellation for democratic legitimacy. In the concluding section, discussion focuses on social policy options that may still be viable at the national level, and on European-level strategies that might be able to reduce economic competition among national welfare states.
European integration has come to constrain the capacity for democratic political action in EU member states through the judicial constitutionalization of "economic liberties". At the same time, the ...capacity for effective political action at the European level is narrowly constrained by the multiple-veto character of the Union's "ordinary legislative procedure" – which is considered essential for preserving the legitimacy of European government in the absence of a politically integrated European polity. The article explores conditions under which democratic governing capacity could be legitimately increased on both levels.
Solange die strukturelle Nord-Süd-Divergenz ihrer Mitglieder andauert, bleibt die Währungsunion instabil. Das asymmetrische Euro-Regime soll Konvergenz durch eine strukturelle Transformation der ...politischen Ökonomien des Südens erzwingen. Wegen der Größe und der nicht einholbaren Wettbewerbsvorteile der deutschen Wirtschaft kann dieses Ziel aber nicht erreicht werden. Daran wird die deutsche Politik kaum etwas ändern können. Ihr sachlich begründeter Widerstand gegen die Entwicklung zu einer Transferunion wird politisch kaum durchzuhalten sein, aber die Folge wäre eine dauerhafte Dominanz der wettbewerbsfähigen über die weniger wettbewerbsfähigen Ökonomien. Stattdessen käme es darauf an, institutionelle Regeln vorzubereiten, die den Übergang zu einem flexiblen und zweistufigen Europäischen Währungsverbund ermöglichen. The structural divergence of Northern and Southern economies continues to threaten the stability of the Monetary Union. The asymmetric Euro regime is meant to achieve convergence through the enforced structural transformation of the Southern political economies. In spite of significant progress, however, the goal will ultimately not be reached because of the size and the exceptional competitiveness of the German economy. Since the German government will not be able to change these conditions, the most likely course of events will lead to a transfer union – which is likely to establish the permanent dominance of the more competitive Northern over the less competitive Southern economies. In order to avoid this course, it would be useful to establish institutional rules that facilitate the transition to a flexible two-tiered European Monetary Community.
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