Other People's Wars explores key US efforts involving
direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations
throughout its history. Sterling shows how initiatives to learn
from other nations' ...wars can yield significant benefits,
emphasisizing comprehensive qualitative learning to foster better
military preparedness and adaptability.
Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation
and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign
wars
Preparing for the next war at an unknown date against an
undetermined opponent is a difficult undertaking with extremely
high stakes. Even the most detailed exercises and wargames do not
truly simulate combat and the fog of war. Thus, outside of their
own combat, militaries have studied foreign wars as a valuable
source of battlefield information. The effectiveness of this
learning process, however, has rarely been evaluated across
different periods and contexts.
Through a series of in-depth case studies of the US Army, Navy,
and Air Force, Brent L. Sterling creates a better understanding of
the dynamics of learning from "other people's wars," determining
what types of knowledge can be gained from foreign wars,
identifying common pitfalls, and proposing solutions to maximize
the benefits for doctrine, organization, training, and
equipment.
Other People's Wars explores major US efforts involving
direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations at key
junctures for the US armed forces: the Crimean War (1854-56),
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Spanish Civil War (1936-39), and Yom
Kippur War (1973), which preceded the US Civil War, First and
Second World Wars, and major army and air force reforms of the
1970s, respectively. The case studies identify learning pitfalls
but also show that initiatives to learn from other nations' wars
can yield significant benefits if the right conditions are met.
Sterling puts forth a process that emphasizes comprehensive
qualitative learning to foster better military preparedness and
adaptability.
Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars Preparing for the next war at an unknown date against an undetermined opponent is a ...difficult undertaking with extremely high stakes. Even the most detailed exercises and wargames do not truly simulate combat and the fog of war. Thus, outside of their own combat, militaries have studied foreign wars as a valuable source of battlefield information. The effectiveness of this learning process, however, has rarely been evaluated across different periods and contexts. Through a series of in-depth case studies of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, Brent L. Sterling creates a better understanding of the dynamics of learning from “other people’s wars,” determining what types of knowledge can be gained from foreign wars, identifying common pitfalls, and proposing solutions to maximize the benefits for doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Other People’s Wars explores major US efforts involving direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations at key junctures for the US armed forces: the Crimean War (1854–56), Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), Spanish Civil War (1936–39), and Yom Kippur War (1973), which preceded the US Civil War, First and Second World Wars, and major army and air force reforms of the 1970s, respectively. The case studies identify learning pitfalls but also show that initiatives to learn from other nations’ wars can yield significant benefits if the right conditions are met. Sterling puts forth a process that emphasizes comprehensive qualitative learning to foster better military preparedness and adaptability.
A number of nations, conspicuously Israel and the United States, have been increasingly attracted to the use of strategic barriers to promote national defense. InDo Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?, ...defense analyst Brent Sterling examines the historical use of strategic defenses such as walls or fortifications to evaluate their effectiveness and consider their implications for modern security. Sterling studies six famous defenses spanning 2,500 years, representing both democratic and authoritarian regimes: the Long Walls of Athens, Hadrian's Wall in Roman Britain, the Ming Great Wall of China, Louis XIV's Pré Carré, France's Maginot Line, and Israel's Bar Lev Line. Although many of these barriers were effective in the short term, they also affected the states that created them in terms of cost, strategic outlook, military readiness, and relations with neighbors. Sterling assesses how modern barriers against ground and air threats could influence threat perceptions, alter the military balance, and influence the builder's subsequent policy choices. Advocates and critics of strategic defenses often bolster their arguments by selectively distorting history. Sterling emphasizes the need for an impartial examination of what past experience can teach us. His study yields nuanced lessons about strategic barriers and international security and yields findings that are relevant for security scholars and compelling to general readers.
President Theodore Roosevelt reflected the views of many American civilian and military leaders in writing that “I am greatly interested in the Russian and Japanese War” two days after the Imperial ...Japanese Navy’s surprise attack on Port Arthur (February 8, 1904).¹ With the conflict’s potential strategic significance, given the recent American acquisition of the Philippines as well as its expected military lessons, correspondent Charles à Court Repington commented that the Americans, along with the English, “were more deeply interested in this great quarrel than in any other campaign that had been fought by foreign nations within the memory of living
In contrast to the eagerly anticipated Russo-Japanese War, news of the Spanish Civil War’s outbreak in July 1936 generated scant interest among American officers. Understandably, they did not expect ...a struggle between elements of this lowly regarded, poorly equipped military to yield valuable insights on modern warfare. Foreign power intervention, however, rapidly intensified the combat’s scale and significance. The initial success of the German- and Italian-backed Nationalist rebels prompted a reluctant Joseph Stalin in late September to provide the leftist government with sufficient assistance to reverse battlefield fortunes. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini responded by increasing their contribution, resulting in
THE CRIMEAN WAR Sterling, Brent L
Other People's Wars,
03/2021
Book Chapter
The Crimean War, the first major conflict between European great powers since the Napoleonic era, generated considerable attention in the United States. Diplomats and politicians weighed the foreign ...policy implications while a curious public devoured unprecedented coverage from far-off battlefields. The most interested Americans were those in the business of war. Reflective of this last group, Cdr. David Farragut, USN, requested in April 1854 appointment to any commission or command sent to the deployed English and French fleets “with a view to ascertaining whether in the outfits and preparations for war they possess any advantages over our ships of war,
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR Sterling, Brent L
Other People's Wars,
03/2021
Book Chapter
By October 1973 few officers remained from the small, pre–World War II force examined in the last chapter. The American military had been a global power for over three decades, fighting in World War ...II, two limited wars, and many smaller engagements. Given such experience, it would not have been surprising to ignore a less than three-week battle among Middle Eastern nations. Yet American officers extensively studied the Yom Kippur War, for good reason. Military historian Frederick Kagan declares that the conflict “rocked the American defense establishment to its foundations.”¹ Although not all analysts would go that far, lessons
This paper is the result of studies of policymakers' choices when the events of a limited war required policy shifts. While there has been much study on the political processes that start wars & end ...wars, but not on policy shifts during a conflict. Higher policy risks may be traded for lower political risks if the war is not going well, or vice versa. The author discusses policies & political issues involved in limited wars, describes risk-taking theory, & presents theories concerning leaders' behaviors at important decision points. Of four wars studied, three support this hypothesis, while the War of 1812 is more ambiguous. Decisionmakers during the War of 1812 preferred long-term to short-term political risks, yet they still focused on protecting their positions. Congress, however, responded as predicted & worked for a short-term goal by blocking the decisionmakers' policy initiatives. 1 Figure. L. A. Hoffman
INTRODUCTION Brent L. Sterling
Other People's Wars,
03/2021
Book Chapter
On Thursday, April 5, 1855, three highly regarded soldiers (Maj. Richard Delafield, Maj. Alfred Mordecai, and Capt. George McClellan) entered the War Department building, located just northwest of ...the White House, to be briefed on their unprecedented mission. Awaiting them was Jefferson Davis, whose heroic exploits as commander of the 1st Mississippi Rifles in the Mexican-American War had propelled him to prominence and his current office. Victory in that conflict less than ten years earlier instilled a healthy confidence in the US officer corps about its ability to meet defense challenges. Davis, not wanting the army to rest on its
