Multi-year budget frameworks are often considered as instruments for controlling spending, including in the context of the European Union. This paper shows that the effects of multi-year budgeting ...depends on several conditions, some of which, may lead to more rather than less spending. The analysis is based on a model of a finance minister’s decision to enforce a previously accepted budget ceiling in subsequent negotiations with a spending minister. The analysis takes account of uncertainty about preferences in these negotiations, positive transaction costs to the finance minister, and the possibility of political mediation through the prime minister. The findings of this paper show that compliance with budget frameworks improves under temporarily stable preferences (e.g. the absence of external shocks), more homogenous preferences within the government (e.g. majoritarian governments in contrast to coalition government), preference similarity between the finance minister and the prime minister (in case of mediation), and increasing transaction costs. In other circumstances, multi-annual frameworks will not be able to block any upward pressure on expenditures.
In this paper, I focus on how national policy implementation affects policy revision at the EU level. The main argument is that when policy is implemented in a decentralized manner, it affects the ...current situation or status quo in member states. This affects the possibilities of any further legislative change at the EU level. The analyses suggests that heterogeneity in national preferences and homogeneity in national status quo points make it less easy to adopt a revised policy. This result is illustrated by the recent discussion on revising the Posting of Workers Directive. Having rather different views on this policy while faced with limited possibilities to shape this policy nationally, makes it difficult to change the Posting Directive. The rather long and difficult negotiations, especially among the member states, about its revision support this implication.
In this contribution I propose to broaden the concept of 'policy' used in responsiveness research. When citizens also have preferences over 'what governments deliver', it is important to analyze the ...link between these preferences and policy outcomes. The EU policy implementation literature may help in further exploring this link. Empirical findings from this literature show that citizen preferences sometimes have an impact on the policy-as-implemented. Furthermore, the policy-as-implemented differs from the policy-as-adopted, as often used in responsiveness studies, which nuances current findings. The discussion of both literatures highlights the importance of more clearly specifying the kind of policies that are researched as well as the relevant group of citizens. At the same time, the responsiveness literature offers an additional and interesting reason for why differences in EU policy implementation are rather the rule than the exception by emphasizing the importance of 'local' citizen preferences.
State aid rules are an important part of the European Union's (EU) competition policy that aims to ensure a fair competition in the common market. These rules directly affect national and ...sub‐national governments of member states, which are sometimes confronted with different and opposing claims about what to do. The question is how implementing civil servants interpret and resolve these claims in practice. In this article, discourse analysis is applied to identify how civil servants apply and interpret state aid rules based on empirical research in the Netherlands. The main finding is that, even within the existing regulatory framework of one member state, the application of state aid rules is understood differently based on the discourses we identified. We describe the content, dissemination amongst civil servants and the relationship of these discourses with compliance. The article shows that discourses matter and help to understand how state aid rules are applied.
Transposition performance differs significantly across countries and policy sectors in the EU. In this article we analyse the transposition efforts of all 27 member states with regard to four EC ...directives expected to create considerable difficulties for compliance at the national level. Using Cox proportional hazards regression, we find that discretion and legal fit are significant factors in explaining transposition. Furthermore, we discover that the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe are not doing any worse than the rest of the EU in terms of transposition timeliness. Surprisingly, government effectiveness has a negative relationship with compliance, while periods of absence of functioning government do not increase transposition time. Our findings emphasize the importance of legal-administrative factors for compliance with EU law.
Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies ...implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition.
In this article I analyse the role of the European Commission in monitoring the transposition and implementation of EU Directives. The point of departure is that the Commission, like any political ...actor, has policy preferences that affect how it shapes its overseeing role. The Commission’s responses may vary between being ‘the guardian of the treaties’, not allowing for any changes, and a ‘silent witness’, permitting member states to set their own, deviating national policies. These different responses are consistent with empirical findings showing that the Commission is rather selective in starting infringement procedures. ‘Big brother is watching’ the member states, but this is evident only when interests clash and the Commission receives sufficient support from the European Court of Justice or the other member states.
This article analyses how the policies specified in EU directives are transposed by EU member states. In contrast to existing transposition studies it develops a policy-specific approach to explain ...how directives are transposed by national actors. In this approach the outcome of transposition depends on the institutional arena in which decision-making takes place and the interests of the domestic actors involved. These institutional arenas can vary from parliament to national ministries and agencies. Domestic actors are taken as policy-specific veto players. Their preferences may lead to two different responses to the requirements of a directive. First, they can transpose a directive literally, keeping deviations to a minimum. Second, domestic actors can adopt a non-literal interpretation of the directive, leading to more substantial deviations within the boundaries allowed by the European Commission. These responses are illustrated by two cases of transposition of EU directives, the tobacco products directive and the animal trade directive. The case analysis shows that the policy-specific approach proposed in this article helps in understanding transposition. It clarifies how the ambitions formulated in Brussels are transformed by national administrations into policies.
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