Los derechos humanos se suponen sin requerir justificación de por qué deben ser tenidos respecto a otras formas de vida. No bastan suposiciones, por ello, los objetivos de investigación fueron: ...analizar la fundamentación del texto rortiano Derechos humanos, racionalidad y sentimentalismo e indagar argumentos para las intuiciones y las convenciones tácitas que tal propuesta encierra. Aplicando la hermenéutica dialógica, se obtuvo que, según Rorty, el discurso moral justificó la dignidad humana desde la racionalidad, sin éxito de persuasión; considerándose que el discurso rortiano, no escapa de la racionalidad y que su propuesta de fundamentación no está exenta de riesgos sociales. Palabras clave: Derechos humanos; Fundamentación emotiva; Richard Rorty; Ética social. Human rights are assumed without requiring justification as to why they should be held in relation to other forms of life. Assumptions are not enough, therefore, the research objectives were: to analyze the foundation of the Rortian text Human rights, rationality and sentimentality and to investigate arguments for the intuitions and the tacit conventions that such a proposal contains. Applying dialogic hermeneutics, it was obtained that, according to Rorty, moral discourse justified human dignity from rationality, without success in persuasion; considering that the Rortian discourse does not escape rationality and that its foundation proposal is not exempt from social risks. Keywords: Human rights; Emotive Foundation; Richard Rorty; Social Ethics.
In this book Steven Levine explores the relation between objectivity and experience from a pragmatic point of view. Like many new pragmatists he aims to rehabilitate objectivity in the wake of ...Richard Rorty's rejection of the concept. But he challenges the idea, put forward by pragmatists like Robert Brandom, that objectivity is best rehabilitated in communicative-theoretic terms - namely, in terms that can be cashed out by capacities that agents gain through linguistic communication. Levine proposes instead that objectivity is best understood in experiential-theoretic terms. He explains how, in order to meet the aims of the new pragmatists, we need to do more than see objectivity as a norm of rationality embedded in our social-linguistic practices; we also need to see it as emergent from our experiential interaction with the world. Innovative and carefully argued, this book redeems and re-actualizes for contemporary philosophy a key insight developed by the classical pragmatists.
Richard Rorty Guignon, Charles; Hiley, David R
07/2003
eBook
Arguably the most influential of all contemporary English-speaking philosophers, Richard Rorty has transformed the way many inside and outside philosophy think about the discipline and the ...traditional ways of practising it. Drawing on a wide range of thinkers from Darwin and James to Quine, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Derrida, Rorty has injected a bold anti-foundationalist vision into philosophical debate, into discussions in literary theory, communication studies, political theory and education, and, as public intellectual, into national debates about the responsibilities of America in the modern world. The essays in this volume offer a balanced exposition and critique of Rorty's views on knowledge, language, truth, science, morality and politics. The editorial introduction presents a valuable overview of Rorty's philosophical vision. Written by a distinguished team of philosophers, this volume will have an unusual appeal outside philosophy to students in the social sciences, literary studies, cultural studies and political theory.
Western culture considers that law, power and State have always been intrinsically connected. Currently, a cultural uneasiness appears to be part of those three dimensions of social life. In order to ...find the origin of such uneasiness, this paper focuses on the roots of postmodern law: the traditional North American pragmatism. Thus, this paper starts with the Emersonian tradition and ends with the radical thesis of Rortian neopragmatism. This diachronic focus allowed to evaluate relevant lexical to reflect on legal philosophy.
RESUMO: O artigo enfoca a relevância de uma dimensão política no psíquico. Em nossa hermenêutica sobre o tema, em um primeiro momento, abordaremos as linhas gerais de uma ruptura com modelos ...filosóficos metafísicos do self, tendo como exemplo as críticas de Rorty e Heidegger à “intencionalidade de consciência” de Jean-Paul Sartre; bem como o contraponto rortiano à leitura epistemológica da psicanálise de Paul Ricoeur. Em uma segunda etapa, discutiremos a concepção rortiana de self por mostrar, ao final, seus possíveis limites com a abordagem antipredicativa de self.
Abstract: The article focuses the relevance of a political dimension in the psychic. In our hermeneutics on the theme, at first, we will approach the broad lines of a break with metaphysical philosophical models of the self, taking Rorty and Heidegger’s criticisms of Jean-Paul Sartre’s “intentionality of conscience” as an example; as well as the Rortian counterpoint to the epistemological reading of psychoanalysis by Paul Ricoeur. In a second step, we will debate the Rortian conception of the self for showing, in the end, its possible limits with the antipredicative approach to the self.
Richard Rorty notoriously maintained that philosophy is not an academic discipline. He thought that the only viable candidate for philosophy to be an academic discipline—where philosophy consists in ...a collection of permanent, pure topics—depends on a Cartesian conceptual framework. Once we overcome this framework, he maintained, there will be nothing left to be the distinct subject matter of philosophy. This article argues that there is a conception of philosophy that can be an academic discipline, even if we take Rorty's challenge seriously. It remains even if we overcome the Cartesian conceptual framework. In the end the article goes beyond Rorty's challenge and considers two further criteria for philosophy to be an academic discipline: that it have a distinct method, and that it be able to be done for the public good. The article argues that philosophy can fulfill these two criteria, and therefore that it can be an academic discipline.
