Wittgenstein opposes Socrates’ insistence that words should have an essentialist definition. Wittgenstein also stands with Euthyphro in his discussion with Socrates over whether God’s commands make ...an action good. While Socrates values the examined life, Wittgenstein wonders how we can stop the demand for more explanation. For this Wittgenstein may find more sympathy from Plato. Plato pays attention to the characters in his dialogues – the particulars of their circumstances, and he offers myths that supplement his arguments. In the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, we can see Wittgenstein wishing to side
against
Socrates but
with
Plato – who found ways of making philosophy poetic.
We defend the guise of the good thesis in a tradition going back to Socrates and Plato, according to which persons act on the basis of what appears to them as good or the least bad or evil act ...available to them. This seems contrary to moral experience, but we defend the thesis against plausible counter-examples in life as well as fiction. We contend that the thesis makes wrong-doing and vice intelligible, but still wrong, dysfunctional and horrific.
In the Land of Metaxú Krasicki, Jan
Analiza i Egzystencja,
2023, Letnik:
62
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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The article poses a question about the role of symbolic cognition in philosophical cognition. The starting point is the analysis of Diotima's famous speech quoted by Socrates in Plato's Symposium. ...The issue is presented in a panoramic approach from ancient to modern times.
W artykule stawia się pytanie o rolę poznania symbolicznego w poznaniu filozoficznym. Punktem wyjścia jest analiza słynnej mowy Diotymy przytoczonej przez Sokratesa w Uczcie Platona. Zagadnienie przedstawia się w panoramicznym ujęciu od czasów antycznych do współczesnych.
In this essay, I explain and clarify Jacob Klein’s significant yet difficult account of how to read a Platonic dialogue. I argue that Klein takes Plato’s dialogues to be discursively incomplete ...dramas that the audience is asked to make whole by its participation. A Platonic dialogue thus comes into being only when readers or auditors examine the arguments and themselves.
Abstract
Crito thinks Socrates should agree to leave the prison and escape from Athens. Socrates is also determined that he and Crito should have a ‘common plan of action’ (koinē boulē: 49d3), but he ...wants Crito to share his preferred plan of remaining and submitting to the court’s sentence. Much of the drama of the Crito is generated by the interplay of these two old friends, both determined that they should come to an agreement, but differing radically in what they think the two of them should agree to do. I show how agreements of various kinds—including agreements about how to agree—play important roles in the dialogue and how Socrates’ commitment to a certain method for determining what to do underpins his own integrity. What’s more, attention to that theme helps to explain one of the most pressing questions for any interpretation of the Crito: Why does Socrates choose, at the end of the dialogue, to present to Crito a speech in the voice of the personified laws of Athens?
We defend the guise of the good thesis in a tradition going back to Socrates and Plato, according to which persons act on the basis of what appears to them as good or the least bad or evil act ...available to them. This seems contrary to moral experience, but we defend the thesis against plausible counter-examples in life as well as fiction. We contend that the thesis makes wrong-doing and vice intelligible, but still wrong, dysfunctional and horrific.
This paper is about dogmata (judgements) in the third book of the Discourses. I examine first their content and distinguish between dogmata with general content and those with person-specific ...content. The Discourses do not have the kind of progression from the latter to the former that we find in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I then turn to the attitude of Epictetus’ interlocutor or addressee and show that some of the dogmata targeted by Epictetus are not yet possessed at the time of instruction. Here too he differs from Plato’s Socrates. Despite Socrates’ significance in other respects for the Discourses, Epictetus’ treatment of dogmata should be understood in the light of Stoic moral psychology rather than Socratic elenchus.
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