The presence of regular Yugoslav military forces in central Podrinje and their participation in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina have been evident from the very beginnings. As there were ...no significant forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Bosnian Podrinje, in the beginning of April 1992 the 336th Motorized brigade was dislocated from the area of Tuzla and it established its command post in Šekovići, thus becoming the bearer of battle activities and organization of the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this region, including in its organic composition all Serb armed formations from Zvornik, Kalesija, Šekovići, Vlasenica, Milići, Bratunac and Skelani. In the attacks during which the Serb forces gained control over a broader area of Central Podrinje, and the Bosniak population, which constituted a pronounced majority of the overall population, was suppressed and reduced to three isolated enclaves on the territory of Cerska, Konjević Polje and Srebrenica, the function of leading and commanding these forces, as well as other regular and irregular units which were directed or acted from the territory of Serbia, was conducted by the Operative group “Drina”, a formation under the command of the Belgrade military zone, later the 1st Army of the Yugoslav Army. In the attacks on the remaining enclaves of Podrinje during the summer and autumn of 1992 the aviation of the Yugoslav Army was employed along with lighter jets of agricultural aviation, as well as artillery from the firing positions of the Yugoslav Army on the territory of Serbia. The contents of the Wance-Owen peace plan, according to which the greater part of the Bosnian Podrinje was supposed to be included into one of the provinces with a Bosniak ethnic majority, which would have spelt the end of the Serb national policy in Podrinje, represented an announcement of a large winter offensive of the Serbian forces. With a directive issued on 19 November 1992 the Drina corps of the Army of Republika Srpska was ordered to defend Višegrad, Zvornik and the corridor towards Serbia with its main forces, to deblock the communication on the line Milići – Konjević Polje – Zvornik, and to exhaust the enemy on the broader area of Podrinje, inflict upon him as much loss as possible, and force him to “leave the areas of Birač, Žepa and Goražde together with the Muslim population”. On the basis of this directive act, the planned offensive military activities of the Serb forces in Central Podrinje, initiated during November and finished with the agreement on the demilitarization of Srebrenica in April 1993, according to the documents of the Army of Republika Srpska, had three successive phases codenamed: “PROBOJ” (Breakthrough), “PESNICA” (Fist) and “UDAR” (Assault). Despite the significant engaged forces, the offensive “PROBOJ” did not go according to plan, and in the counterattacks during December the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina liberated a large number of settled places, and until 9 January 1993 gained control over Serb strongholds in the communication region of Bratunac – Kravica, and thus physically connected all parts of the liberated territory. Then a new offensive was launched, codenamed “PESNICA”, which, aside from the stabilization of the Serb defence of Bratunac, did not achieve its stated goals, while on the other side the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived to the part of the state border with Serbia in the region of Skelani. In the final phase of the offensive, that bore the code name of “UDAR”, the Army of Yugoslavia directly joined the fighting in Central Podrinje on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the direction of Bratunac towards Srebrenica the forces from the composition of OG “Drina” and parts of other units from the 1st Army of the Yugoslav Army were active, which established a command outpost in Ljubovija. In central Podrinje parts of the Special units corps of the Yugoslav Army also operated, and during the offensive they were stationed in the region of Skelani. From that side, from the direction of Skelani towards Srebrenica, the forces from the composition of the Užice corps of the 2nd Army of the Yugoslav Army were also active. When the forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were suppressed from the larger part of the territory and together with the masses of Bosniak civilians restricted to the broader town area of Srebrenica, the units of the Yugoslav Army could retreat to the territory of their state. The offensive was concluded with the signing of the agreement about the demilitarization of Srebrenica.
Čumavići is a medium– to low–temperature hydrothermal Sb–Zn–Pb–Ag polymetallic vein–type ore deposit in the Srebrenica orefield, part of the Podrinje Metallogenic District, Eastern Bosnia and ...Herzegovina. The ore deposit occurs in the form of simple and complex veins along faults and fractures, as well as stockworks and disseminations hosted within Neogene volcanic rocks (pyroclastics and andesite lavas of calc–alkaline affinity). The deposit comprises sulfides (sphalerite, galena, stibnite, pyrite, marcasite, chalcopyrite, arsenopyrite, gudmundite, safflorite, löllingite, gersdorffite and acanthite), sulfosalts (berthierite, geocronite, boulangerite, semseyite, plagionite, jamesonite, bournonite, twinnite, andorite, fizéliyte, Ag–bearing tetrahedrite, stephanite, polybasite, pyrargyrite and argyrodite), native gold and silver, tungstates (hübnerite), oxides, and gangue quartz, chalcedony, Mn–siderite, anglesite, smithsonite, fluorite, gypsum and ludlamite. Three generations of sphalerite are recognized in the Čumavići deposit, evolving from Fe–rich to Fe–poor. The most common are yellowish to colorless Fe–poor varieties. Electron Probe Microanalyses of sphalerite free of micro–inclusions of galena and Pb–Sb-sulfosalts revealed wide compositional variations in minor- and trace–element contents (e.g., Fe, Cd, Mn, Cu, Sn, As, and In). Of particular interest are the lead and antimony content of sphalerite, which vary from 0.10 to 3.08, and 0.02 to 1.62wt.%, respectively. Lead– and Pb–Sb-rich zones are the most common in sphalerite, while individual Sb–bearing zones are rare. These zones have fan–like forms with circular to wave-like, micron–scale bands, filled with galena or Pb–Sb sulfosalts. In the Pb–Sb zones, the Sb/Pb atomic ratio ranges between 0.3 and 1.5, similar to ratios between geocronite and jamesonite, thus suggesting the presence of micro– to nano–scale inclusion of sulfosalts within the sphalerite. The mean composition of all sphalerite samples is (Zn0.78–0.99,Fe<0.01–0.21,Cu0.00–0.02,Pb<0.01–0.01,Cd<0.01–0.01,Sb<0.01–0.01,Mn<0.01–0.01)∑0.97–1.03S0.97–1.08 (Sn and As atomic proportions are <0.01 apfu). In all sphalerite samples, excellent negative correlations have been determined between Fe and Zn, and ∑(Fe+Sb) and Zn. The studied mineralization shares many mineralogical and geological characteristics in common to polymetallic Sn–Ag–Sb deposits in Bolivia and elsewhere.
•(Pb–Sb)-bearing sphalerite•Sb–Zn–Pb–Ag epithermal deposits•Vein-type, stockwork, and disseminated mineralization•Medium-temperature hydrothermal, low-temperature hydrothermal, supergene mineral assemblages•Ag–Pb–Sb, Ag–Sb, Ag(Au)–Cu–Sb and Ag(Au)–Ge sulfosalts
Abstract
After a genocide, leaders compete to fill the postwar power vacuum and establish their preferred story of the past. Memorialisation, including through building memorials, provides a ...cornerstone of political power. The dominant public narrative determines the plotline; it labels victims and perpetrators, interprets history, assigns meaning to suffering, and sets the post-atrocity political agenda. Therefore, ownership of the past, in terms of the public account, is deeply contested. Although many factors affect the emergence of a dominant atrocity narrative, this article highlights the role of international interactions with genocide memorials, particularly how Western visitors, funders, and consultants influence the government's narrative. Western consumption of memorials often reinforces aspects of dark tourism that dehumanise victims and discourage adequate context for the uninformed visitor. Funding and consultation provided by Western states and organisations – while offering distinct benefits – tends to encourage a homogenised atrocity narrative, which reflects the values of the global human rights regime and existing standards of memorial design rather than privileging the local particularities of the atrocity experience. As shown in the cases of Rwanda, Cambodia, and Bosnia, Western involvement in public memory projects often strengthens the power of government narratives, which control the present by controlling the past.
The 'responsibility to protect' (RtoP) expresses the moral imperative to respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. So far, the debate on RtoP has focused almost ...exclusively on conflict resolution through institutional change. Various forms of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and military intervention have been discussed as means to address the institutional roots of violent conflict. What has too often been neglected, however, is the need for more immediate forms of civilian protection. This need emerges from the complexity and uncertainty of conflict resolution: successful conflict resolution takes time, and it is unfortunately rare. Therefore, it is necessary to complement efforts at conflict resolution with more immediate forms of protecting civilians. Traditionally, the right to asylum and humanitarian aid have been the two primary means to provide such protection. In the case of most intra-state conflicts, however, these means are insufficient. When a state engages in genocide, pursues campaigns of ethnic cleansing, or commits war crimes against its own population, it likely has no intention to let people seek the safety of asylum in other countries, or to allow for humanitarian aid. In response to such situations, the community of states has a moral obligation to establish safe areas and provide them with the legal mandate and military resources necessary to offer reliable protection.
Increasingly, non-state actors exercise unofficial forms of influence within international affairs. Analyzing the actions and platforms in which they operate offers a broader perspective on their ...influence within diplomatic spheres traditionally occupied by state actors. This paper explores the relationship between victim-oriented advocacy roles taken by the NGO ‘Mothers of Srebrenica’ and the resulting formulation of a ‘culture of remembrance’ as an unofficial part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s cultural and public diplomacy portfolio. We examine the Mothers’ advocacy work in promoting genocide remembrance and fighting genocide denial within the country’s foreign policy agency framework. We scrutinize under which circumstances their advocacy shapes or is formulated in parallel with official state diplomacy. We trace three types of advocacy engagement and discuss the influence in contributing to the country’s cultural and public diplomacy. This analysis contributes to scholarship on the influence of non-state actors in public diplomacy by examining the role of advocacy organizations on local, regional, and global levels and expanding the scholarship about the intersection of non-state actors and cultural and public diplomacy to include states undergoing transition, particularly post-conflict states.
In two decisions of 2019, the Dutch courts have come up with novel interpretations of the 'control-based' standard of attribution in the international law of State responsibility. This is a standard ...of attribution that is laid down in Article 8 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which is, by and large, reflective of customary international law. The traditional understanding of Article 8 ARSIWA is that it applies to relations between States and private persons or entities, in particular armed groups: conduct of a non-State armed group is attributed to a State to the extent that the State exercises control over that group. However, the Dutch courts have extended the scope of application of Article 8 ARSIWA to conduct of organs of international organisations (the UN) as well as foreign States (i.e., States other than the Netherlands). Internationally speaking, this is a novel interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, for which there are no precedents. After introducing the Dutch courts' reasoning in these cases, the contribution zooms out and inquires what the Dutch evolutions imply for the development of the controlbased attribution standard in the international law of State responsibility. The author argues that the relatively peculiar interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, as applying to interactions between States and international organisations and between States inter se, is practically viable in a narrow range of scenarios characterised by relatively strong politico-military relations and hierarchies. Keywords: State responsibility, control, military operations, Srebrenica, Jaloud
The forming process of the modern Bosniac families in Ljeskovik settlement started at the beginning of the 17th century, and lasted till the end of the 19th century. However, the whole process can be ...tracked down from the mid 19th century, covered with data collected during the first census in Bosnia from 1850/51, and according to the informations gethered from land books of the Srebrenica District from 1894 andfrom there onwards. The first census from 1850/51 considered only male population. From the data collected in 1850/51, there are seven families or surnames in Ljeskovik, and those are: Čaušević, Duraković, Hodžić, Jahčić, (Bihačić), Kamramović, Mahmudović, Omerović, and Tabaković. By the end of the 19th century according to land books of the cadastral district of Ljeskovik, there are 43 surnames, or family names recorded: Aganović, Avdić, Beširović, Buljubašić, Demirović, Dervišević, Džanić, Efendić, Halilović, Hasanović (Duraković), Hasanović (Vranjkovina), Hasić, Hodžić, Husić, Kreševljaković, Mahmutović, Malović, Mandžić, Mehanović, Mehmedović, Memić, Mujčinović, Mujić, Mujić (Mahmutović), Mustafić, Mustafi (Katanić), Numanović, Omerović, Osmanović, Salkić, Salihović, Selimović, Selmanagić, Sinanović, Smajić (Omerović), Smajlović (Čaušević), Softić, Suljić, Špiodić, Tabaković, Travničanin, i Zukić. This work covers only families that use to live in Ljeskovik in the second half of the 19th century.
LAY SUMMARY
Research has shown time and time again that war has an impact on the mental well-being of Veterans and their families. But what does that impact look like when a mission is characterized ...by severe violations of norms and values (in other words, moral injury)? In this study, family members of Dutch Veterans talked about the impact on their lives of a mission gone bad in the former Yugoslavia, 25 years after it happened. Although most of the families were doing well, all of the families felt left alone in taking care of their Veterans after they returned and in dealing with negative press coverage. For the well-being of all, they expressed the need for more appreciation for and acknowledgement of Veterans and their families.
Introduction: In 1995, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission involving the Dutch battalion, Dutchbat III, in the former country of Yugoslavia ended in the killing of 8,000 Bosniak Muslim boys and men by the Bosnian-Serbian army. The mission and its aftermath may be considered potentially morally injurious events that had a long-term impact on the Bosnian people and Dutch Veterans. A study was conducted 25 years after the mission to examine its impact on home front members (i.e., Veterans’ partners and close family members). Methods: Qualitative data were obtained through interviews with five female partners and two parents of Dutchbat III Veterans, as well as from a focus group with four female partners. Topics included the mission, experience of appreciation and support, health, daily functioning, resilience, meaning-making, and possible solutions. Thematic analysis was conducted using open, axial, and selective coding. Results: Findings were interpreted using a model of morally injurious impacts of war on military family members. Family members reported a generally good quality of life and no need for care for themselves but a unanimous perceived lack of support by the government and need for more recognition and appreciation of the Veterans. Discussion: Home front members of Dutchbat III Veterans seemed to suffer mainly from indirect mission impact that led to continued feelings of betrayal. Recognition and appreciation of military Veterans by the government and media may prevent or mitigate such feelings. Involving home front members in Veteran care and long-term follow-up is important.
Abstract
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, the war-time Bosnian Serb leaders, were first indicted by the UN Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1995. The two hid ...for many years, with their trials starting only in 2009 and 2012, respectively, after they were apprehended in headline-generating operations. Their continued evasion of trial was constantly critiqued. After all, thousands were killed, tortured, detained, raped, expelled, and robbed during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these two men were widely seen as responsible. Pleas were made by survivors and frustration expressed on behalf of the victims, as many said, 'justice delayed is justice denied'. However, as this article shows, the many years the two high-ranking individuals spent hiding were well-used to collect evidence which led to their convictions and life sentences. Contrary to conventional wisdom, delay can actually be beneficial in prosecuting leaders for atrocity crimes.
This Article explores the transitional, post-transitional and strategic narratives about the wars in the former Yugoslavia, more specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The criminal justice narrative ...created by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) dominates the transitional narratives about the Yugoslav wars. It is not uncommon that both sides - the victims and the perpetrators - express dissatisfaction with the justice outcome depending on the verdict. Transitional narratives based on the criminal trials are expected to provide clarity on the distinction between "bad" and "good" guys; between perpetrators and victims; between the criminality of the perpetrating side and the response of the victim's side. With the passage of time, all transitional narratives will be challenged by post-transitional narratives, launched by various societal and political actors for different reasons with specific objectives behind them. For example, the ruling post-conflict elites can decide to create a post-transitional narrative in which they will try to re-interpret or counter the existing transitional narratives with the goal to exonerate the policies of the predecessor regime that led to the violence by reintroducing the "politics of the past" into the "politics of the present" in the perusal of the still to be achieved political objectives of the predecessor regime. Using the example of the ICTY genocide judgments, this Article will explore how its transitional narrative of genocide has been undermined by the post-transitional narratives launched by the Serbian post-conflict elites in the perusal of the unfulfilled strategic goals of the predecessor regimes.
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