Manfred Lautenschlaeger Award for Theological Promise 2024 Karl Barths Theologie wird gemeinhin – und zurecht – als Widerspruch gegen die Säkularisierung der Kirche in der Neuzeit gelesen. Inwiefern ...sie zugleich den Versuch darstellt, theologisch adäquat auf die Säkularisierung der die Kirche umgebenden Gesellschaft zu reagieren, hat die bisherige Forschung erst in Ansätzen ausgeleuchtet. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, wie Barth ganz konkret auf das sich vollziehende Ende der ‚christlichen Welt‘ im europäischen Kontext reagiert hat. Sie fragt: Welche ekklesiologischen und sozialethischen Umstellungen ermöglichten es Barth, die partikulare Existenz der Kirche in einem nichtchristlichen Umfeld theologisch zu affirmieren? Und welche Denkmuster prägten seine „Theologie der Welt", d.h. die von ihm vorgeschlagene theologische Bestimmung nichtchristlicher Menschen, des säkularen Staates und der profanen Kultur insgesamt? Dabei wird die These plausibilisiert, dass Barth angesichts der gesellschaftlichen Säkularisierungsprozesse seiner Zeit eine umfassende christologisch-inklusive Theologie der Welt entwickelte, die von Christi Wirken auch in einer säkularen Gesellschaft ausging – und dass diese Welttheologie in Barths Denken zur Ausbildung charakteristischer Stärken und Schwächen geführt hat. ; Manfred Lautenschlaeger Award for Theological Promise 2024 Karl Barths Theologie wird gemeinhin – und zurecht – als Widerspruch gegen die Säkularisierung der Kirche in der Neuzeit gelesen. Inwiefern sie zugleich den Versuch darstellt, theologisch adäquat auf die Säkularisierung der die Kirche umgebenden Gesellschaft zu reagieren, hat die bisherige Forschung erst in Ansätzen ausgeleuchtet. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, wie Barth ganz konkret auf das sich vollziehende Ende der ‚christlichen Welt‘ im europäischen Kontext reagiert hat. Sie fragt: Welche ekklesiologischen und sozialethischen Umstellungen ermöglichten es Barth, die partikulare Existenz der Kirche in einem nichtchristlichen Umfeld theologisch zu affirmieren? Und welche Denkmuster prägten seine „Theologie der Welt", d.h. die von ihm vorgeschlagene theologische Bestimmung nichtchristlicher Menschen, des säkularen Staates und der profanen Kultur insgesamt? Dabei wird die These plausibilisiert, dass Barth angesichts der gesellschaftlichen Säkularisierungsprozesse seiner Zeit eine umfassende christologisch-inklusive Theologie der Welt entwickelte, die von Christi Wirken auch in einer säkularen Gesellschaft ausging – und dass diese Welttheologie in Barths Denken zur Ausbildung charakteristischer Stärken und Schwächen geführt hat.
Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock market returns by extrapolating past returns. Such beliefs are hard to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate ...stock market. We study a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes, while other investors hold fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features of actual prices and returns; importantly, however, it is also consistent with the survey evidence on investor expectations.
In this commentary, we embed the volume's contributions on public beliefs about science in a broader theoretical discussion of motivated political reasoning. The studies presented in the preceding ...section of the volume consistently find evidence for hyperskepticism toward scientific evidence among ideologues, no matter the domain or context—and this skepticism seems to be stronger among conservatives than liberals. Here, we show that these patterns can be understood as part of a general tendency among individuals to defend their prior attitudes and actively challenge attitudinally incongruent arguments, a tendency that appears to be evident among liberals and conservatives alike. We integrate the empirical results reported in this volume into a broader theoretical discussion of the John Q. Public model of information processing and motivated reasoning, which posits that both affective and cognitive reactions to events are triggered unconsciously. We find that the work in this volume is largely consistent with our theories of affect-driven motivated reasoning and biased attitude formation.
In this paper, we provide a perspective into the main ideas and findings emerging from the growing literature on motivated beliefs and reasoning. This perspective emphasizes that beliefs often ...fulfill important psychological and functional needs of the individual. Economically relevant examples include confidence in ones' abilities, moral self-esteem, hope and anxiety reduction, social identity, political ideology, and religious faith. People thus hold certain beliefs in part because they attach value to them, as a result of some (usually implicit) tradeoff between accuracy and desirability. In a sense, we propose to treat beliefs as regular economic goods and assets--which people consume, invest in, reap returns from, and produce, using the informational inputs they receive or have access to. Such beliefs will be resistant to many forms of evidence, with individuals displaying non-Bayesian behaviors such as not wanting to know, wishful thinking, and reality denial.
A critical component of both economic and perceptual decision making under uncertainty is the belief-formation process. However, most research has studied belief formation in economic and perceptual ...decision making in isolation. One reason for this separate treatment may be the assumption that there are distinct psychological mechanisms that underlie belief formation in economic and perceptual decisions. An alternative theory is that there exists a common mechanism that governs belief formation in both domains. Here, we test this alternative theory by combining a novel computational modeling technique with two well-known experimental paradigms. We estimate a drift-diffusion model (DDM) and provide an analytical method to decode prior beliefs from DDM parameters. Subjects in our experiment exhibit strong extrapolative beliefs in both paradigms. In line with the common mechanism hypothesis, we find that a single computational model explains belief formation in both tasks and that individual differences in belief formation are correlated across tasks.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2453
.
This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making
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The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning Epley, Nicholas; Gilovich, Thomas
The Journal of economic perspectives,
07/2016, Letnik:
30, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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Whenever we see voters explain away their preferred candidate's weaknesses, dieters assert that a couple scoops of ice cream won't really hurt their weight loss goals, or parents maintain that their ...children are unusually gifted, we are reminded that people's preferences can affect their beliefs. This idea is captured in the common saying, "People believe what they want to believe." But people don't simply believe what they want to believe. Psychological research makes it clear that "motivated beliefs" are guided by motivated reasoning--reasoning in the service of some self-interest, to be sure, but reasoning nonetheless. People generally reason their way to conclusions they favor, with their preferences influencing the way evidence is gathered, arguments are processed, and memories of past experience are recalled. Each of these processes can be affected in subtle ways by people's motivations, leading to biased beliefs that feel objective. In this symposium introduction, we set the stage for discussion of motivated beliefs in the papers that follow by providing more detail about the underlying psychological processes that guide motivated reasoning.
Factive theory of mind Phillips, Jonathan; Norby, Aaron
Mind & language,
February 2021, 2021-02-00, 20210201, Letnik:
36, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Research on theory of mind has primarily focused on demonstrating and understanding the ability to represent others' non‐factive mental states, for example, others' beliefs in the false‐belief task. ...This requirement confuses the ability to represent a particular kind of non‐factive content (e.g., a false belief) with the more general capacity to represent others' understanding of the world even when it differs from one's own. We provide a way of correcting this. We first offer a simple and theoretically motivated account on which tracking another agent's understanding of the world and keeping that representation separate from one's own are the essential features of a capacity for theory of mind. We then show how these criteria can be operationalized in a new experimental paradigm: the “diverse‐knowledge task.”
DYNAMIC BELIEF ELICITATION Chambers, Christopher P.; Lambert, Nicolas S.
Econometrica,
01/2021, Letnik:
89, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
At an initial time, an individual forms a belief about a future random outcome. As time passes, the individual may obtain, privately or subjectively, further information, until the outcome is ...eventually revealed. How can a protocol be devised that induces the individual, as a strict best response, to reveal at the outset his prior assessment of both the final outcome and the information flows he anticipates and, subsequently, what information he privately receives? The protocol can provide the individual with payoffs that depend only on the outcome realization and his reports. We develop a framework to design such protocols, and apply it to construct simple elicitation mechanisms for common dynamic environments. The framework is general: we show that strategyproof protocols exist for any number of periods and large outcome sets. For these more general settings, we build a family of strategyproof protocols based on a hierarchy of choice menus, and show that any strategyproof protocol can be approximated by a protocol of this family.
A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. ...Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.
Bayesian updating remains the benchmark for dynamic modeling under uncertainty within economics. Recent theory and evidence suggest individuals may process information asymmetrically when it relates ...to personal characteristics or future life outcomes, with good news receiving more weight than bad news. I examine information processing across a broad set of contexts: (1) ego relevant, (2) financially relevant, and (3) non value relevant. In the first two cases, information about outcomes is valenced, containing either good or bad news. In the third case, information is value neutral. In contrast to a number of previous studies I do not find differences in belief updating across valenced and value neutral settings. Updating across all contexts is asymmetric and conservative: the former is influenced by sequences of signals received, a new variation of confirmation bias, while the latter is driven by non-updates. Despite this, posteriors are well approximated by those calculated using Bayes’ rule. Most importantly these patterns are present across all contexts, cautioning against the interpretation of asymmetric updating or other deviations from Bayes’ rule as being motivated by psychological biases.
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