Objective:
to comprehensively study the reception of Roman law in Europe in the 11
th
– 17
th
centuries as the key element of the continental legal system formation; to consider the reception process ...through the study of the activities of medieval universities, which had a decisive influence on the borrowing of Roman legal norms and adapting them to European realities, and on the formation of the continental system of law.
Methods:
the article uses the main general scientific research methods: induction, extrapolation, analysis and synthesis, and also uses a comparative method of scientific research that allows tracing changes in the norms of Roman law during its reception.
Results:
it is difficult to overestimate the importance of Roman law reception for the European legal order and legal culture. As a result of a long process of analyzing, borrowing and adapting the Roman legal norms, the continental law system developed with the legal traditions and institutions forming it. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the full-fledged perception and qualitative adaptation of Roman law in the medieval states were possible only due to higher educational institutions. University professors disclosed the meaning of Roman legal norms in research works, taught students to apply these norms in the social conditions of that period, analyzed judicial practice, and contributed to the evolutionary changes of law that had arisen in the Roman Empire. In general, thanks to their activities, the absolute authority of Roman law was confirmed, and the attitude towards jurisprudence changed – law was no longer perceived as a limited set of casuistic laws adopted by the state, but as science and art.
Scientific novelty
: the article for the first time examines the influence of the Roman law reception, which was carried out by European universities, on the continental legal system formation. The evolutionary stages of the Roman law reception are considered: from the scholastic interpretation of the Code of Justinian by glossators to the activities of humanists. The opinion is argued that the transfer of cases to the conclusion (the Aktenversendung Institute), the development of the school of glossators, postglossators and humanists directly shaped the trends, determined the rules and system of the Roman private law institutions borrowing and adaptation.
Practical significance
: the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific and pedagogical activities when considering issues related to the study of the Roman law reception and the trends in the European legal systems development.
In this paper we mostly deals with authority of the courts from two points of view. Firstly, we deals with authority which courts have in itself, because in their decisions principaly decides about ...rights and duties of people in dispute (we don’t go in the quality of their decisions). Secondly, we deals with the quality of their decisions, primarly through their use of argument of authority. It is difficult to talk about argument of authority without saying what is the role of judgements in two great legal systems – European-continental system (civil law) /traditionally authority is court practice/ and Anglo-American system (common law) /traditionally authority is precedent/. In European-continental system, lower courts invokes to the decisions of higher courts because of their quality. In Anglo-American system, precedents bind lower courts and they are are formal sources of law. Can we define argument of authority uniqualy for both systems? We are pleading for definition of argument of authority in which argument of authority means invoking to court practice and invoking to precedents, but it doesn’t mean invoking to laws. We think that invoking to law means realisation of the principle of legality. There is difference between invoking to law and invoking to precedents, although this last has the effect of legality. We are showing that some solutions of Croatian lawmaker means exception from the principle of European-continental law in which decisions of higher courts binds lower courts because of their quality, so there are some types of binding decisions of higher courts which have “de facto” effect of precedents.
In this paper we mostly deals with authority of the courts from two points of view. Firstly, we deals with authority which courts have in itself, because in their decisions principaly decides about ...rights and duties of people in dispute (we don’t go in the quality of their decisions). Secondly, we deals with the quality of their decisions, primarly through their use of argument of authority. It is difficult to talk about argument of authority without saying what is the role of judgements in two great legal systems – European-continental system (civil law) /traditionally authority is court practice/ and Anglo-American system (common law) /traditionally authority is precedent/. In European-continental system, lower courts invokes to the decisions of higher courts because of their quality. In Anglo-American system, precedents bind lower courts and they are are formal sources of law. Can we define argument of authority uniqualy for both systems? We are pleading for definition of argument of authority in which argument of authority means invoking to court practice and invoking to precedents, but it doesn’t mean invoking to laws. We think that invoking to law means realisation of the principle of legality. There is difference between invoking to law and invoking to precedents, although this last has the effect of legality. We are showing that some solutions of Croatian lawmaker means exception from the principle of European-continental law in which decisions of higher courts binds lower courts because of their quality, so there are some types of binding decisions of higher courts which have “de facto” effect of precedents.
Autoritet i sud Harašić, Žaklina
Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu,
06/2015, Letnik:
52, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
U ovom radu prvenstveno se bavimo autoritetom sudova, i to s dvaju aspekata: bavimo se autoritetom što ga sudovi imaju sami po sebi, budući da svojim odlukama meritorno odlučuju o pravima i obvezama ...stranaka u sporu (ne ulazeći u kvalitetu njihovih odluka), te autoritetom koji proizlazi iz vrsnoće njihovih odluka i koji razmatramo kroz njihovo korištenje argumenta autoriteta. Gotovo je nemoguće govoriti o argumentu autoriteta ako ne krenemo od uloge presude u dvama velikim pravnim sistemima – europskokontinentalnom (u kojem tradicionalno autoritet predstavlja sudska praksa) i anglo-američkom (autoritet predstavljaju sudski precedenti). U europskokontinentalnom sistemu niži sudovi pozivaju se na odluke viših sudova zbog njihove vrsnoće, dok su precedenti u anglo-američkom sistemu obvezujući za niže sudove i imaju značenje formalnih izvora prava. Može li se argument autoriteta jedinstveno definirati, tako da njegovo određenje vrijedi za oba sistema? Autor ovog teksta zalaže se za takvu definiciju argumenta autoriteta prema kojoj bi bilo dovoljno reći da isti znači pozivanje na sudsku praksu i precedente, ali ne, kao što neki tvrde, i pozivanje na zakone (i druge propise). Ovo iz razloga što pozivanje na zakon znači ostvarenje načela zakonitosti. Razlika je između pozivanja na zakon i pozivanja na precedent, pa makar ovo posljednje i imalo učinak načela zakonitosti.
Između ostaloga, ukazuje se kako neka rješenja hrvatskog procesnog zakonodavstva znače izuzetak od načela europskokontinentalnog prava, po kojem načelu presuda viših sudova obvezuje niže sudove zbog njezine vrsnoće, tako da neki oblici vezanosti za odluke viših sudova imaju u hrvatskom pravu “de facto” učinak precedenata.
Článek se zabývá rozdělením soukromého a veřejného práva. Toto dělení, které pochází z římského práva, se stalo běžným prvkem evropského právního myšlení. Pro český právní řád mělo členění práva na ...soukromé a veřejné spíše omezený význam z hlediska pozitivně právní úpravy. Lze říci, že české právo tento rozdíl znalo, avšak nešlo o dělení zásadního významu.Vzhledem k přijetí zákona č. 89/2012 Sb., občanského zákoníku, dochází zřejmě k zvýšení významu tohoto členění, a to proto, že sám zákoník z tohoto rozdělení ve svém prvním paragrafu vychází. Protože v důsledku toho rozlišení soukromého a veřejného práva nabývá
na významu, článek ukazuje, na jakých principech bylo toto rozlišení vybudováno.V prvé kapitole článku se vysvětluje, že se nejedná o členění známé výlučně kontinentálnímu právu, nýbrž že i angloamerický právní systém s tímto členěním v určité míře pracoval. Zdá se, že společným východiskem bylo právě odlišení soukromého a veřejného zájmu, s nímž jako s dělícím kritériem pracovali římští právníci.
V druhé části článku jsou přiblíženy jednotlivé teoretické přístupy k členění práva na soukromé a veřejné. Zároveň se zmiňuje míra relevance každé z teorií, stejně tak i její přínosy a kritika. Třetí část se věnuje současnému
stavu práva v České republice právě vzhledem k tomuto dělení práva. Srovnává se dřívější právní úprava předcházející účinnosti nového občanského zákoníku a stav současný. Článek se snaží nalézt
odpověď na otázku, jaký praktický význam bude nově zavedené členění mít. Článek je k tomuto členění kritický, protože jeho důsledky jsou spíše nejasné, což narušuje právní jistotu a předvídatelnost práva. Příklady z rozhodovací praxe ukazují, že není ideální, dochází-li ke striktnímu odlišení soukromého
a veřejného práva. Zdá se, že je vhodnější přistupovat k právu jako k jednotnému souboru norem, protože snaha o popsané striktní odlišení vyvolává mnoho otázek, na něž se obtížně hledají přesvědčivé odpovědi.
The article deals with the distinction of public and private law. This distinction stems from Roman law anb became a very common part of European legal thinking.According to the laws of the Czech Republic, from legal-positivist point of view, this distinction had rather limited consequences. It may be said that the Czech positive law recognized the difference but was not built on it as an inevitable principle. Due to adoption of the new Civil Code (Act of Parliament no. 89/2012 Coll.), in which the first section distinguishes between private and public law there seems to be a change in this attitude because. Therefore the article strives to show on what basis the distinction between private and public was built. In the first part it is shown that the distinction is not unique in European legal cultures, it plays a role in the Anglo-American legal system. It seems that the Roman law distinction between private and public law, based on private or public interests, was correct because in Anglo-American law considered the question of whose interest was infringed upon important as well.
The second part of the article explains theoretical approaches to the distinction between private and public law. It also shows what level relevance was prescribed to each theory. The article presents each
theory and the criticism raised against it. It shows how this difference was treated in the past because it is apparent that each theory lacks something that makes it subject of critique. The third part describes the current status of the Czech legal system. It compares past legal regulation (i. e. earlier
than the new Civil Code had entered into force) and the current status. It tries to consider what consequences the new explicitly enacted distinction would bring. The topic is critical towards this distinction because it seems that it is not very clear what the practical result of this distinction would be.
Predictability of law and legal certainty is at stake. Examples of judicial decisions show that it is perhaps better not to divide legal system into two areas (public and private). Instead it is better to deal with the law as it is one system of legal rules because attempts to distinguish it result in unconvincing
and questionable consequences.
Viewed in its entirety, there can be no doubt that the South African legal system with its large common law orientated areas deserves its classification as a hybrid system. However, one might ask ...oneself what factors really determine a system's classification. This is not the place to examine this question in depth, but taking the main continental systems as examples, one may be tempted to think that it is mainly the nature (concepts etc.) of their private, and possibly their criminal, law which determines their classification as civil law systems, rather than the comparatively new branches of public or commercial law.
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