In chapter four, we turned to Husserl's discussions of association,
habitualization, and apperception in order to explain the function of far
retention. By doing so, we already entered into a ...discussion of passive
genesis. Here we will return to the notion of apperception (and, implicitly,
appresentation) as our guide to understanding passive genesis, not only
because it is a notion with which we are already familiar, but also because
Husserl himself says essentially that an understanding of the genesis of
consciousness requires an understanding of apperception:
The World-Horizon in Ideas I Geniusas, Saulius
The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology
Book Chapter
In the context of the horizon-problematic, Husserl’s notion of the world-horizon occupies a preeminent place: it is the original figure of the horizon in Ideas I—the work that marks the emergence of ...the horizon-problematic in phenomenology. This chapter traces Husserl’s development of the world-horizon in Ideas I with the aim of establishing a rather paradoxical thesis: Ideas I both uncovers and suppresses the concept of the horizon in its all-determining sense. Such is the case because Ideas I both marks the discovery of the world-horizon as well as leaves the problematic of the world-horizon largely undetermined. I further argue that the problematic of the world-horizon is left unexplored in Ideas I because the world-horizon is a specifically genetic notion, which in its first appearance is still dressed in static garb. One can thus say that even though Husserl’s Ideas I marks the emergence of the horizon-problematic in phenomenology, this early work procures only a preliminary, and not a conclusive, notion of the horizon.
According to my thesis, the genetic notion of the horizon is first and foremost meant to qualify the horizons of transcendental subjectivity. This chapter argues that phenomenology cannot disclose ...the horizons of transcendental subjectivity for as long as it understand the phenomenological reduction in accordance with how it was spelled out in the confines of static phenomenology. I argue that the philosophical significance of the new path to the reduction, which Husserl has introduced in First Philosophy II, lies in the fact that it enables phenomenology to disclose the distinct horizons of transcendental subjectivity. I suggest that from First Philosophy II, one can derive a new notion of the horizon, conceived as the milieu of concealed sense accomplishments, i.e., as the very conceptual space that genetic phenomenology aims to thematize. On such a basis, the question of the origins of the horizon obtains its specifically phenomenological sense: it merges with the question of sense-formation itself.
Cílem článku je postihnout nejdůležitější hermeneutické aspekty Husserlova myšlení, ukázat je v jejich vzájemné souvislosti a upozornit na to, že rozvoj hermeneutiky probíhal z podstatné části v ...návaznosti na Husserla a jako pokračování jeho snah jinými prostředky. Autor se zaměřuje na vyhodnocení hermeneutického smyslu vybraných aspektů Husserlovy fenomenologie, nikoli na podrobnou diskuzi jejího vnitřního vývoje. Článek shrnuje souvislosti Husserlova posunu od statické fenomenologie ke geneticky orientované fenomenologické analýze. Jako předstupeň uvedeného posunu je nejprve představena koncepce motivovanosti vnímání z Idejí k čisté fenomenologii a fenomenologické filosofii II. Následně autor na základě rozboru hlavních spisů pozdního Husserla charakterizuje koncepci genetické fenomenologie a analyzuje její hlavní pojmy: pojem pasivní geneze a zejména pojem horizontu. V závěru článku je nastíněna vazba mezi Husserlovou koncepcí genetické fenomenologie a pozicí hermeneutické fenomenologie, která byla postupně formulována M. Heideggerem, H.-G. Gadamerem a P. Ricoeurem.
The aim of the article is to capture the most important hermeneutical aspects of Husserl’s thinking, to display them in their mutual relatedness, and to draw attention to the fact that the development of hermeneutics drew significantly on the work of Husserl and can be seen as a continuation of his endeavour by other means. The author focuses on an evaluation of the hermeneutical sense of selected aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology, rather than on a detailed discussion of its inner evolution. The article summarises the contexts of Husserl’s move from a static phenomenology to a genetically-orientated phenomenological analysis. As an introductory phase of the move in question, the conception of the motivated perception of the Ideas of a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy II is presented. Subsequently the author, on the basis of the main works of the late Husserl, characterises the conception of the genetical phenomenology and analyses its main concepts: the concept of passive genesis, and especially the concept of horizon. In the conclusion of the article the connection between Husserl’s conception of genetical phenomenology and the position of hermeneutical phenomenology is sketched, as it is gradually formulated by M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer and P. Ricoeur.
Martin Ďurďovič.
