This article develops a model of practice-driven institutional change—or change that originates in the everyday work of individuals but results in a shift in field-level logic. In demonstrating how ...improvisations at work can generate institutional change, we attend to the earliest moments of change, which extant research has neglected; and we contrast existing accounts that focus on active entrepreneurship and the contested nature of change. We outline the specific mechanisms by which change emerges from everyday work, becomes justified, and diffuses within an organization and field, as well as precipitating and enabling dynamics that trigger and condition these mechanisms.
The question of the scientific nature of jurisprudence is often either rashly answered in the affirmative in view of its institutional anchoring and authority, or else it is understood as an academic ...glass bead game that leads artificial questions to a solution that may be well-founded in legal theory, but is nevertheless largely irrelevant for legal practice and society. In fact, however, what is at stake is nothing less than participation in the rationality of the sciences and their special methods of cognition. The volume therefore embarks on a search for the ontological and epistemological foundations of legal science and sketches a scientific foundation for legal methodology.With contributions byDr. Markus Abraham; Dr. Dr. Philipp-Alexander Hirsch; Dr. Jannis Lennartz; Dr. Kristian Peters; Dr. Bettina Rentsch; Dr. Nina Schrott; Dr. Rike Sinder, M.A.; Amadou Korbinian Sow and Dr. Alexander Stark.
The object of jurisprudence Ryu, Angelo
Jurisprudence (Oxford, England),
04/02/2024, 2024-04-02, Letnik:
15, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Here I distinguish two things jurisprudence might take itself to explain. A theory of law can be either concept-first or practice-first. Concept-first theories investigate the concept we implicitly ...deploy to label some things as law and not others. Practice-first theories investigate directly, and uncover interesting features of, a particular social practice. That practice could be, for instance, the practice of lawyers and officials which prevails in the United States. I identify Hershovitz's Law Is a Moral Practice with a practice-first approach. Then I elaborate on the distinction and show that a practice-first approach is more defensible than many assume. Finally, I argue a practice-first approach rules out predictive theories of law.
O artigo tem como objetivo geral abordar aspectos práticos da contestação no processo civil, mediante análise sistemática do CPC e da técnica processual, a partir do marco teórico de compreensão do ...processo constitucional como metodologia de garantia de Direito Fundamentais. Especificamente, visa a enfatizar a importância da técnica processual para formulação de resistência e requerimentos, bem como para arguir questões preliminares e de mérito na defesa do réu, a fim de que esta seja ampla e eficaz.
This paper examines the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Law and offers some broad reflections on its current state. First, the paper introduces the concept of AI, paying particular ...attention to the distinction between hard and soft AI. Next, it considers how AI can be used to support (or replace!) legal work and legal reasoning. The paper goes on to explore applications of AI in the legal domain and concludes with some critical reflections on the use of AI in the legal context.
IS ORIGINALISM OUR LAW? Baude, William
Columbia law review,
12/2015, Letnik:
115, Številka:
8
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This Essay provides a new framework for criticizing originalism or its alternatives—the framework of positive law. Existing debates are either conceptual or normative: They focus either on the nature ...of interpretation and authority, or on originalism's ability to serve other values, like predictability, democracy, or general welfare. Both sets of debates are stalled. Instead, we ought to ask: Is originalism our law? If not, what isi Answering this question can reorient the debates and allow both sides to move forward. If we apply this positivist framework, there is a surprisingly strong case that our current constitutional law is originalism. First, I argue that originalism can and should be understood inclusively. That is, it permits doctrine like precedent if those doctrines can be justified on originalist grounds. Second, I argue that our current constitutional practices demonstrate a commitment to inclusive originalism. In Supreme Court cases where originalism conflicts with other methods of interpretation, the Court picks originalism. By contrast, none of the Court's putatively anti-originalist cases in fact repudiate originalist reasoning. These judicial practices are reinforced by a broader convention of treating the constitutional text as law and its origin as the framing. So while constitutional practice might seem, on the surface, to be a pluralism of competing theories, its deep structure is in fact a nuancedform of originalism.
This article focuses on women legal practitioners in Zimbabwe. Despite extensive legislation outlawing gender‐based discrimination, Zimbabwean women have not been able to achieve equality in the ...workplace. The article explores the conundrum posed by, on the one hand, an increase in enrollments and graduations of women law students, and on the other hand, fewer women entering legal practice. The article suggests three dynamics lie behind the failure of practice to attract and retain female lawyers. First, overt discrimination faced by female lawyers. Second, the structuring of the profession and work environment, which creates an “uneven playing field.” And third, the attitudes of male practitioners and partners as well as the spouses of women lawyers, which affect the entry and retention of women in the profession as well as their career prospects. Subsequently, women legal practitioners are accorded a lower professional status than men and are underrepresented in important facets of legal practice. The study was premised on social role theory and the concept of the glass ceiling. Forty‐six participants were interviewed in an interpretivist approach study where data was analyzed using thematic analysis with the assistance of ATLAS TI 8.
In this comparative ethnographic case study of the implementation of a reform related to the Affordable Care Act in two community health centers, I find that professionals may not compete to claim ...new tasks (and thereby not implement reform) if these tasks require them to acquire information unrelated to their professional expertise, use work practices that conflict with their professional identity, or do impure or low-value tasks that threaten their professional interests. In such cases, reform may be implemented if lower-status workers fill in the gaps in the division of labor between the professions targeted by the reform, playing a brokerage role by protecting each profession's information, meanings, and tasks in everyday work. When the new tasks represent professionally ill-defined problems, brokers can be more effective if they use buffering practices rather than connecting practices—managing information rather than transferring it, matching meanings rather than translating them, and maintaining interests rather than transforming them—to accomplish reform. By playing a buffering role in the interstices between existing professional jurisdictions, lower-status workers can carve out their own jurisdiction, becoming a brokerage profession between existing professions that need to collaborate with one another for reform to occur.
Technology is changing the way that legal services are delivered and is having an impact on the administration of justice. Law firms are increasingly adopting digital technologies to disrupt ...traditional ways of working. The emergence of new technologies test existing legal parameters, paradigms and concepts bringing about legal, ethical and societal challenges. Planned changes to the legal education and training for solicitors and barristers provide law schools with an opportunity to review their curricula. Despite the rise of digital technologies, empirical data suggests that only a few institutions currently offer legal tech modules. This article explores the pedagogical challenges and opportunities afforded by engaging students in technologically enhanced learning.
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