Few transformations in American politics have been as important as the integration of African Americans into the Democratic Party and the Republican embrace of racial policy conservatism. The story ...of this partisan realignment on race is often told as one in which political elites-such as Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater-set in motion a dramatic and sudden reshuffling of party positioning on racial issues during the 1960s.Racial Realignmentinstead argues that top party leaders were actually among the last to move, and that their choices were dictated by changes that had already occurred beneath them. Drawing upon rich data sources and original historical research, Eric Schickler shows that the two parties' transformation on civil rights took place gradually over decades.
Schickler reveals that Democratic partisanship, economic liberalism, and support for civil rights had crystallized in public opinion, state parties, and Congress by the mid-1940s. This trend was propelled forward by the incorporation of African Americans and the pro-civil-rights Congress of Industrial Organizations into the Democratic coalition. Meanwhile, Republican partisanship became aligned with economic and racial conservatism. Scrambling to maintain existing power bases, national party elites refused to acknowledge these changes for as long as they could, but the civil rights movement finally forced them to choose where their respective parties would stand.
Presenting original ideas about political change,Racial Realignmentsheds new light on twentieth and twenty-first century racial politics.
Don't Blame Ustraces the reorientation of modern liberalism and the Democratic Party away from their roots in labor union halls of northern cities to white-collar professionals in postindustrial ...high-tech suburbs, and casts new light on the importance of suburban liberalism in modern American political culture. Focusing on the suburbs along the high-tech corridor of Route 128 around Boston, Lily Geismer challenges conventional scholarly assessments of Massachusetts exceptionalism, the decline of liberalism, and suburban politics in the wake of the rise of the New Right and the Reagan Revolution in the 1970s and 1980s. Although only a small portion of the population, knowledge professionals in Massachusetts and elsewhere have come to wield tremendous political leverage and power. By probing the possibilities and limitations of these suburban liberals, this rich and nuanced account shows that-far from being an exception to national trends-the suburbs of Massachusetts offer a model for understanding national political realignment and suburban politics in the second half of the twentieth century.
Ideologically committed people are similarly motivated to avoid ideologically crosscutting information. Although some previous research has found that political conservatives may be more prone to ...selective exposure than liberals are, we find similar selective exposure motives on the political left and right across a variety of issues. The majority of people on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate willingly gave up a chance to win money to avoid hearing from the other side (Study 1). When thinking back to the 2012 U.S. Presidential election (Study 2), ahead to upcoming elections in the U.S. and Canada (Study 3), and about a range of other Culture War issues (Study 4), liberals and conservatives reported similar aversion toward learning about the views of their ideological opponents. Their lack of interest was not due to already being informed about the other side or attributable election fatigue. Rather, people on both sides indicated that they anticipated that hearing from the other side would induce cognitive dissonance (e.g., require effort, cause frustration) and undermine a sense of shared reality with the person expressing disparate views (e.g., damage the relationship; Study 5). A high-powered meta-analysis of our data sets (N=2417) did not detect a difference in the intensity of liberals' (d=0.63) and conservatives' (d=0.58) desires to remain in their respective ideological bubbles.
•Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid crosscutting information.•Approximately two thirds of people gave up a chance to win extra money in order to avoid hearing from the other side.•The aversion applied to issues such as same-sex marriage, elections, marijuana, climate change, guns, and abortion.•The aversion is not a product of already being or feeling knowledgeable.•People anticipated that crosscutting information would produce cognitive dissonance and harm relationships.
Egypt after Mubarak Rutherford, Bruce K
2008, 2013., 20130221, 2013, 2008-12-14, 2013-02-21, 20080101, Letnik:
48
eBook, Book
Which way will Egypt go now that Husni Mubarak's authoritarian regime has been swept from power? Will it become an Islamic theocracy similar to Iran? Will it embrace Western-style liberalism and ...democracy?Egypt after Mubarakreveals that Egypt's secularists and Islamists may yet navigate a middle path that results in a uniquely Islamic form of liberalism and, perhaps, democracy. Bruce Rutherford draws on in-depth interviews with Egyptian judges, lawyers, Islamic activists, politicians, and businesspeople. He utilizes major court rulings, political documents of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of Egypt's leading contemporary Islamic thinkers. Rutherford demonstrates that, in post-Mubarak Egypt, progress toward liberalism and democracy is likely to be slow.
Essential reading on a subject of global importance, this edition includes a new introduction by Rutherford that takes stock of the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood's victories in the 2011-2012 elections.
How and why do moral judgments vary across the political spectrum? To test moral foundations theory (
J. Haidt & J. Graham, 2007
;
J. Haidt & C. Joseph, 2004
), the authors developed several ways to ...measure people's use of 5 sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally. This difference was observed in abstract assessments of the moral relevance of foundation-related concerns such as violence or loyalty (Study 1), moral judgments of statements and scenarios (Study 2), "sacredness" reactions to taboo trade-offs (Study 3), and use of foundation-related words in the moral texts of religious sermons (Study 4). These findings help to illuminate the nature and intractability of moral disagreements in the American "culture war."
How can Americans on the political left and right both claim their views represent those of Jesus? Using nationally-representative data in which Americans rated Jesus on the left-right ideological ...spectrum, we assess what characteristics are associated with Americans’ ratings and consider arguments about causal ordering. Competing expectations are drawn from “images of God” research and research showing political identities influence Americans’ religious characteristics. Focusing on Christians first, the strongest predictors of where Christians place Jesus was their own ideological identity followed closely by views on Christian nationalism. No other religious, racial, or partisan characteristics were associated with where Christians place Jesus. For insights on causal direction, we interact religiosity measures with ideological identity and Christian nationalism, finding identical patterns regardless of religious commitment. We also run models to see if patterns differ for non-Christians and the influence of ideological identity and Christian nationalism are nearly identical. Given that Americans’ ideological placement of Jesus has little to do with their own religious identity or commitment, findings lend more support for the theory that Christians and non-Christians alike project their own ideological identities and views about Christian nationalism onto Jesus rather than such characteristics following from stable images of Jesus.
Consociationalism is often proposed for societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, yet its recommendation remains contentious. Critics argue that it has a low rate of adoption, results in political ...immobilism, and entrenches the divisions it seeks to alleviate. Overlooked in much of the criticism, however, is the distinction between liberal and corporate forms of consociationalism, alternatively premised on the self-determination or predetermination of the ethnic groups involved in power-sharing. The article considers whether the critiques apply equally to both versions. Corporate consociation freezes a particular inter-group configuration in time, leading to drawn-out executive formation and, in some cases, to a cementing of divisions. However, liberal consociation runs into its own difficulties: consociational settlements are generally negotiated at the very point at which group identities are most politically salient and divisive. Under these conditions, groups are unlikely to settle for anything other than a guarantee of their share in power, thus making liberal consociationalism less likely to be adopted in negotiated settlements. The article also considers the factors enhancing the adoption of liberal consociational rules.
The Rise of Neoliberal Feminism Rottenberg, Catherine
Cultural studies (London, England),
20/5/4/, Letnik:
28, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In this paper, I argue that we are currently witnessing the emergence of neoliberal feminism in the USA, which is most clearly articulated in two highly publicized and widely read 'feminist ...manifestos': Sheryl Sandberg's Lean In (a New York Times best-seller) and Anne-Marie Slaughter's 'Why Women Still Can't Have It All' (the most widely read piece in the history of the Atlantic). Concentrating on the shifting discursive registers in Lean In, I propose that the book can give us insight into the ways in which the husk of liberalism is being mobilized to spawn a neoliberal feminism as well as a new feminist subject. This feminist subject accepts full responsibility for her own well-being and self-care, which is increasingly predicated on crafting a felicitous work-family balance based on a cost-benefit calculus. I further pose the question of why neoliberalism has spawned a feminist rather than a female subject. Why, in other words, is there any need for the production of a neoliberal feminism, which draws attention to a specific kind of inequality and engenders a particularly feminist subject? While this new form of feminism can certainly be understood as yet another domain neoliberalism has colonized by producing its own variant, I suggest that it simultaneously serves a particular cultural purpose: it hollows out the potential of mainstream liberal feminism to underscore the constitutive contradictions of liberal democracy, and in this way further entrenches neoliberal rationality and an imperialist logic. Indeed, neoliberal feminism may be the latest discursive modality to (re)produce the USA as the bastion of progressive liberal democracy. Rather than deflecting internal criticism by shining the spotlight of oppressive practices onto other countries while overtly showcasing its enlightened superiority, this discursive formation actually generates its own internal critique of the USA. Yet, it simultaneously inscribes and circumscribes the permissible parameters of that very same critique.
Disputes between those holding differing political views are ubiquitous and deep-seated, and they often follow common, recognizable lines. The supporters of tradition and stability, sometimes ...referred to as conservatives, do battle with the supporters of innovation and reform, sometimes referred to as liberals. Understanding the correlates of those distinct political orientations is probably a prerequisite for managing political disputes, which are a source of social conflict that can lead to frustration and even bloodshed. A rapidly growing body of empirical evidence documents a multitude of ways in which liberals and conservatives differ from each other in purviews of life with little direct connection to politics, from tastes in art to desire for closure and from disgust sensitivity to the tendency to pursue new information, but the central theme of the differences is a matter of debate. In this article, we argue that one organizing element of the many differences between liberals and conservatives is the nature of their physiological and psychological responses to features of the environment that are negative. Compared with liberals, conservatives tend to register greater physiological responses to such stimuli and also to devote more psychological resources to them. Operating from this point of departure, we suggest approaches for refining understanding of the broad relationship between political views and response to the negative. We conclude with a discussion of normative implications, stressing that identifying differences across ideological groups is not tantamount to declaring one ideology superior to another.
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