This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and ...impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1974.
In 1931 Husserl writes and publishes the Epilogue to his
, where he aims to explain the core of his work. Aware that this is his a legacy which must be carried forward, he seeks to preserve it from ...what he calls “the mistaken views” found in the new ways of conducting phenomenology. Our text underlines the polemic side of Husserl’s project, which is basically but tacitly against Heidegger, and sustains that this auto-interpretive piece is a fundamental key within Husserl’s corpus, where he defines the direction of his phenomenological project. At the center of the controversy are the answers to the objections of intellectualism and solipsism, and the disavowal of all forms of anthropologism in the conception of subjectivity.
The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia—the very idea—from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the ...diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience.
First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization—in general and regarding “schizophrenia” in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity—a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience.
Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated “self-presence” that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.
In a very literal sense, a biological organism cannot be alive on its own. I employ key premises in second-order cybernetics in current developments in philosophy of science and posthumanist thought ...in an attempt to speak upon the state of precarity and lived reality of social and political life during the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. I posit the parasite and the virus as biological and communicational forms which model the impossibility of solipsism in life (be it viral, parasitic, or human). I believe that disrupting a premise of solipsism operates as a central task in an attempt to see and speak of the skein of interrelationships that inform our shared understanding about current events.
To mobilize this discussion, I am sensitized to seek the resonances of the film Parasite on topics of radical interrelationality, systemicities within capitalist strictures, and muddled boundaries of biological and political life. The role of socio-economic boundaries affectively felt in the film provides a starting point from which I delve into analogous scientific concepts, including work of cyberneticians Gregory Bateson and Heinz von Foerster, among others, and their respective notions of epistemological responsibility and the circularity of human relations and mutual interaction. This discussion will anchor my attempt to present a symbiosis of concepts that posit the existence of viruses as the existence of boundaries in life forms on earth. Such concepts include Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt especially as it pertains to viral life, Michel Serres’ malleable interpretation of the parasite, and the formal analogies made by cyberneticists between viral ‘consciousness’ and Alan Turing’s machine (self-)organization. I frame these concepts with their potential to offer a phenomenologically resonant and scientifically nuanced understanding into systemic class warfare in mind, as depicted in the film and ramifying throughout.
What is cultural about vision--or visual about culture? In this ambitious book, Whitney Davis provides new answers to these difficult and important questions by presenting an original framework for ...understanding visual culture. Grounded in the theoretical traditions of art history, A General Theory of Visual Culture argues that, in a fully consolidated visual culture, artifacts and pictures have been made to be seen in a certain way; what Davis calls "visuality" is the visual perspective from which certain culturally constituted aspects of artifacts and pictures are visible to informed viewers. In this book, Davis provides a systematic analysis of visuality and describes how it comes into being as a historical form of vision. Expansive in scope, A General Theory of Visual Culture draws on art history, aesthetics, the psychology of perception, the philosophy of reference, and vision science, as well as visual-cultural studies in history, sociology, and anthropology. It provides penetrating new definitions of form, style, and iconography, and draws important and sometimes surprising conclusions (for example, that vision does not always attain to visual culture, and that visual culture is not always wholly visible). The book uses examples from a variety of cultural traditions, from prehistory to the twentieth century, to support a theory designed to apply to all human traditions of making artifacts and pictures--that is, to visual culture as a worldwide phenomenon.
In a very literal sense, a biological organism cannot be alive on its own. I employ key premises in second-order cybernetics in current developments in philosophy of science and posthumanist thought ...in an attempt to speak upon the state of precarity and lived reality of social and political life during the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. I posit the parasite and the virus as biological and communicational forms which model the impossibility of solipsism in life (be it viral, parasitic, or human). I believe that disrupting a premise of solipsism operates as a central task in an attempt to see and speak of the skein of interrelationships that inform our shared understanding about current events. To mobilize this discussion, I am sensitized to seek the resonances of the film Parasite on topics of radical interrelationality, systemicities within capitalist strictures, and muddled boundaries of biological and political life. The role of socio-economic boundaries affectively felt in the film provides a starting point from which I delve into analogous scientific concepts, including work of cyberneticians Gregory Bateson and Heinz von Foerster, among others, and their respective notions of epistemological responsibility and the circularity of human relations and mutual interaction. This discussion will anchor my attempt to present a symbiosis of concepts that posit the existence of viruses as the existence of boundaries in life forms on earth. Such concepts include Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt especially as it pertains to viral life, Michel Serres’ malleable interpretation of the parasite, and the formal analogies made by cyberneticists between viral ‘consciousness’ and Alan Turing’s machine (self-)organization. I frame these concepts with their potential to offer a phenomenologically resonant and scientifically nuanced understanding into systemic class warfare in mind, as depicted in the film and ramifying throughout.
According to the French phenomenologist Emmanuel Levinas, ethics – not ontology – is “the first philosophy”. In the following Article, we will reconstruct the Levinasian ethics from the perspective ...of the primacy of alterity, arguing that this focus on the Other may also have consequences for business ethics. The distinction between the Same
and the Other
helps the French thinker to surpass a solipsistic ontology (from Plato to Heidegger) and to get to the definition of the absolute radicality of the Other. The Other of Levi-nas, the “Stranger in his strangeness,” irreducible to Me, receives the face of the “disadvantaged” (poor, widow, orphan, refugee, beggar, etc.), whom I must greet. Ethics can be summed up in the concept of “Being-for-the-Other” (the co-rigid opening of otherness to ipseity) or, in other words, “my goodness” (according to Platonic philosophy, which showed that Good transcends both Essence and Being). The Heideggerian phenomenology of death is transcended by Levinas under the influence of the ethics of otherness from Martin Buber’s
Levinas claimed that the “death of the Other” is the “first death” starting from the biblical commandment “Thou shall not kill.”
PDF
