Strict liability imposed on firms involved in an imperfect competition game (here duopoly) is not an obstacle to achieving a socially optimal care level of care. However, when one input becomes ...scarce (here a limited generic asset), the precedent result is compromised. Duopolistic competition leads to supply more goods at a lower price at the equilibrium, but also a lower care level compared to a monopoly placed in similar conditions. When damage are too high, capped strict liability coupled with an ex-ante regulation leads the firms to increase their care level. The weakest one may disappear letting the other one in monopoly situation.
Nowadays, theories, new ideas and generally speaking information have a very important role in cultural, economic and political life of human beings. Most of the books and magazines consist of ...significant and broad information that they may be defective. In fact, they are goods that due to defective of ambiguous information, may be considered as defective and cause damage to their readers or users. In common law system, claims against authors and publishers for the defect of information of written works are examined on the basis of liability for the defect of goods. In our legal system, despite the existing ambiguities specifically in Consumers Protection Rights Act, applying the standards of the liability for defect of goods and acceptance of strict liability arising from the defects of written works can be an appropriate solution in solving the problems and disputes that have been occurred due to injuries caused to readers and other consumers of these works resulting from their defect. In Imamiyah jurisprudence, provoking some jurisprudential rules including ‘To whom there is benefit, there is damage to”, the liability can be imposed on authors and publishers without proving the negligence. The method of the present study is descriptive-analytic and the method of collecting materials is a library-based one.
In 'Trustees of the Barry Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v BXB', the Supreme Court held that there was a single approach to determining all cases of vicarious liability. No 'tailoring' of that ...approach was required either because the defendant was a religious organisation or because the tort in question was sexual abuse. It followed that the Court of Appeal had erred in placing significance on the authority conferred by the defendant on the tortfeasor to guide the behaviour of the claimant when determining vicarious liability. This note explores whether there is any role for conferred authority after 'Barry'. To accommodate distinctions in the existing cases and contain further unwarranted expansion, it is argued that it is necessary to recognise a discrete form of strict liability for the tort of another, distinct from vicarious liability, that responds to the potential for conferred authority to be abused.
Liability for AI is the subject of a lively debate. Whether new liability rules should be introduced or not and how these rules should be designed hinges on the function of liability rules. Mainly, ...they create incentives for risk control, varying with their requirements – especially negligence versus strict liability. In order to do so, they have to take into account who is actually able to exercise control. In scenarios where a clear allocation of risk control is no longer possible, social insurance might step in.
This article discusses public policy considerations concerning liability for artificial intelligence (AI). It first outlines the major risks associated with current developments in information technology (IT) (1.). Second, the implications for liability law are discussed. Liability rules are seen conceptualized as an instrument for risk control (2.). Negligence liability and strict liability serve different purposes making strict liability the rule of choice for novel risks (3.). The key question is, however, who should be held liable (4.). Liability should follow risk control. In future scenarios where individual risk attribution is no longer feasible social insurance might be an alternative (5). Finally, the innovation function of liability rules is stressed, affirming that appropriate liability rules serve as a stimulus for innovation, not as an impediment (6.).
The negligence-versus–strict liability debate is over in tort law, and negligence has clearly won. Yet the fact that our accident-compensation system is fault based continues to attract much ...opposition in popular sentiment and academic circles. Standard economic analysis views strict liability as preferable to negligence because it is easier to administer and leads to better risk reduction: strict liability induces injurers not only to optimally invest in precaution but also to optimally adjust their activity levels. Standard analysis thus views the prevalence of negligence as unjustifiable on efficiency grounds. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom and clarifies an efficiency rationale for negligence by spotlighting the informationproduction function of tort law. Tort litigation affects behavior not just directly through imposing sanctions but also indirectly through producing information on how the disputants behaved. Third parties can then use information from litigation to decide whether to avoid the defendant or not. And the choice of liability rules dictates the magnitude and scope of these informational effects: negligence produces more valuable information on the behavior of market actors than strict liability does.
Litigation under negligence produces granular information on whether the defendant could have reasonably avoided the harm, how she fares relative to others in her profession, and so on. Such information, to the extent it becomes public, allows outside observers to infer whether the past accident is indicative of the defendant's future behavior or not, which in turn affects their willingness to do business with her going forward. A physician found negligent may lose future patients, a seller failing the consumer-expectations test in products liability may lose future consumers, and so on. Litigation under strict liability produces much coarser information—namely, that a harm occurred as a result of the defendant's activity. It rarely provides outside observers with information on the competence or integrity of the defendant vis-à-vis her peers. The efficiency rationale for negligence thus stems from facilitating more robust market discipline. In contrast to what influential accounts in economic analysis suggest, negligence does affect the activity levels of potential injurers, albeit from the demand side: by warning third parties, it reduces market demand for the services of risky actors.
This Article explains how information from litigation translates to reputation, identifies the circumstances under which these reputational effects are more (or less) pronounced, and uses the reputational perspective to reevaluate timely debates such as the desirability of secret settlements or how to set the liability standard for autonomous-vehicle accidents.
Public nuisance has lived many lives. A centuries-old doctrine defined as an unreasonable interference with a right common to the public, it is currently the backbone of thousands of opioid and ...climate-change suits across the United States. It was a major force behind the landmark 1998 tobacco settlements and has figured in litigation over issues as diverse as gun sales, lead contamination, water pollution, Confederate monuments, and COVID-19 safety standards. Although this common law oddity has shaped the face of modern tort law, it is unfamiliar to the public and typically ignored, even in law schools. When discussed, it often provokes anxiety: Is it a tort at all? Whatever it is, will it swallow tort law? The regulatory state? Or separation of powers as we know it? This article utilizes the current opioid litigation to explore the three most common sets of objections to public nuisance: traditionalist, formalist, and institutionalist. Public nuisance can seem unusual, even outlandish. At worst, it is a potentially capacious mechanism that allows executive-branch actors to employ the judicial process to address legislative and regulatory problems. Nevertheless, its perils are easily overstated and its promise often overlooked. Historically, public nuisance has long addressed problems such as harmful products. Doctrinally, it accords better with tort law than is commonly recognized. And institutionally, it functions as a response to nonideal conditions - specifically, where regulatory mechanisms underperform. Drawing on long-standing tort principles of duties generated by risk creation, I propose a conception of public nuisance that highlights its coherence with familiar aspects of tort law and its consistency across past and present. Public nuisance is an object lesson in the common law's balance of stability and evolution, across time and within varying regulatory contexts.
Abstract—
Some of those theorists who believe tort law consists of relational wrongs also believe, under the influence of Kant’s legal philosophy, that tort law is concerned for the agency of the two ...parties to a wrongful interaction. I argue that these theorists should discard their agency framework. It distorts our view of tort doctrine and does not really fit the law’s relational structure. We can reach a better understanding just by pursuing the idea that torts are relational wrongs. I try to diagnose and suggest cures for the intellectual tendencies that lead Kantian theorists away from this approach.
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