The present study explored the connection between conceptualizations of addiction and lay people's inferences about moral responsibility. In Study 1, we investigated how natural variations in ...people's views of addiction were related to judgments of responsibility in a nationwide sample of Norwegian adults. In Study 2, respondents recruited from Mechanical Turk were asked to consider different conceptualizations of addiction and report on how these would affect their judgments of moral responsibility. In Study 3, we tested whether manipulating conceptualizations through textual information and through the framing of addiction in terms of states versus behavior could influence participants' judgments of moral responsibility. We found that attributions of moral responsibility were lower when addiction was connected to diseases and disorders, such as dysfunctional processes in the brain, and greater when addiction was associated with agency and addictive behaviors. In conclusion, different conceptualizations of addiction imply different moral judgments, and conceptualizations are malleable.
The existence of free will is a subject that has been discussed for centuries ontologically, ethically and teologically in various areas. There has been much debates about the subject since Antique ...Greek to today. The aim of this study to investigate the relationship between medical ethic and the existence of free will. Free will be discussed sociologically, neuroscientifically and ethically in this study. Firstly, general approaches to the existence of free will will be gathered and explained basically and providing the different views of the topic through history to readers is aimed. Next, some examples of neuroscientific studies having potency to light the way for free will arguments will be examined. Lastly, a universe model where free will doesn't exist will be investigated in terms of ethic principles. In this study, the thought that the existence of ethic depend on the existence of free will was discussed and based on the findings in the literature.
Purpose of Review
This review was undertaken to analyze the main reasons behind the limited development of hospice care in China, and to put forward some suggestions.
Recent Findings
Although the ...Chinese government has increased its support for hospice care in recent years, however, owing to the lack of education around hospice care and the heavy influence of the traditional Chinese Confucian concept of “filial piety,” many individuals resist hospice care. Moreover, due to impaired patient rights, inadequate composition of hospice care teams, unbalanced geographical distribution, and limited service range, the development of hospice care in China is hindered.
Summary
Hospice care education and continued training should be popularized and the government should strengthen the legal structure of the medical system to protect the rights of patients, families, and medical staff to promoting social support for hospice care. Through graded diagnosis and referral systems in medical institutions to integrate medical resources and expand the range of hospice care services.
This paper begins to examine different interpretations of causa sui as the key notion used by Strawson to argue for the impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility. Descartes’ and Spinoza’s ...interpretations are representative in understanding the notion of causa sui. Strawson is, I think, on the side of Descartes. If causa sui can be interpreted differently from the way in which Strawson did, the idea of moral responsibility would change. I shall here examine Spinoza’s notion of causa sui, which is an alternative approach to Strawson’s, for leading to the possibility of moral responsibility. The Chinese concept of the Supreme Polarity (taiji) can be interpreted as a foundation of self-determination when philosophically comparing it with Spinoza’s idea of causa sui, which means an immanent and efficient cause. In the Chinese context, the ontological account of an agent explains how and why persons actively participate in the ordering of the world in the Confucian way of life. Based upon this, I will attempt to examine the idea of moral responsibility with the notion of taking responsibility for oneself or, as I will call it, “self-assignment”, and consider how the role a person plays might contribute to understanding the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. In other words, the ontological claim that the unitary principle of Heaven-and Earth is innately immanent in each person seems to endorse the possibility of ultimate responsibility even though the teleological commitment to making the world better implies the absence of free will. This is one of the alternative ways that we can take moral responsibility without free will. KCI Citation Count: 0
In his account of his Düsseldorf conversations with G.E. Lessing shortly before the latter’s death in 1781, F.H. Jacobi records the Enlightenment poet and philosopher’s allusion to the Kabbalistic ...philosophy of Henry More, whom he cited in support of his shocking Spinozist creed of the hen kai pan. Origen’s first Christian philosophy hinges upon a conviction of universal divine goodness which cannot but share its riches with beings capable of participating in it by virtue of their own free will. From this first Christian truth flow the infamous doctrines of the pre‐existence of souls and, above all, the restitution of all things envisaged as a never‐ending process of autonomous moral soul‐making. Origen’s philosophy of divine goodness and human freedom appealed deeply to the Cambridge Platonists Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, who cited the Church Father in support of their metaphysics of God’s benignity and man’s free will. German rationalist G.W. Leibniz was also a close reader of Cudworth and More. Both his Theodicy and his Monadology—notably the notion of a best possible world created by a good God and inhabited by self‐improving spiritual monads—are indebted to the Church Father’s Christian philosophy. G.E. Lessing, reviewing the controversial discussions about the apokatastasis in his day, staunchly defended Leibniz’s Origenist rationalism in several works devoted to his philosophical eschatology. Above all, he restated Origen’s notion of salvation as divine pedagogy in his celebrated Education of the Human Race. The present essay establishes the deeply Origenist character of the historic systems of these two seminal German rationalists, with their shared concern for God’s creative goodness and man’s free perfectibility.
OBJECTIVEThe Will-to-Live Scale (WTLS) is used to measure the will to live in older adults; however, there is no Spanish version. The objective of the study was to translate the WTLS into Spanish, ...assess its internal structure, reliability, and the correlates between WTLS and life satisfaction, resilience, and depression in older Peruvian adults. METHODThe participants were 235 Peruvian older adults (M=72.69, SD=6.68), evaluated between March to May 2019, selected through non-probability sampling. The WTLS, the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), the Brief Resilient Coping Scale (BRCS) and the Patient Health Questionnaire-2 (PHQ-2) were administered. Data analysis included reliability by internal consistency and structural equation models, specifically confirmatory factor analysis (AFC), to test the one-dimensional solution of the WTLS and the convergent validity of the WTLS at the latent level, by specifying a four-factor model (will to live, life satisfaction, resilience and depression). RESULTSCronbach's alpha coefficient and the composite reliability index obtain values of .93 and .94, respectively. The one-dimensional structure of the WTLS was fitted to the data (χ2(5)=10,067, P=.073, CFI=.999, RMSEA=.066, SRMR=.014) and showed positive associations with the SWLS (ρ=.82), and BRCS (ρ=.86), as well as negative associations with the PHQ-2 (ρ=-.66). CONCLUSIONThe WTLS in Spanish presents evidence of validity and reliability to measure the will to live in Peruvian older adults.
The problem that Tallis attempts to address in
(2021) is that science appears to describe the entire world deterministically and that this seems to leave no room for free will. In the face of this ...threat, Tallis defends the existence of free will by arguing that science does not explain our intentional awareness of the world; and it is our intentional awareness that makes both science and free will possible.
Against Tallis, it is here argued that his argument is vulnerable to two criticisms. Firstly, his characterisation of science as apparently deterministic is inaccurate. Secondly, he has not solved the problem he has set himself but rather recast it, so that his conclusion leaves us having to account for free will, not in a deterministic universe, but either as a product of chance or as a miracle.
It is here suggested that when we set aside the illusory threat of scientific determinism, we also set aside the temptation of free will (as its spurious answer). That done, we may better focus upon agent’s
– as discussed by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume – the rational capability of an agent to act upon their wishes, given the constraints under which they find themselves.
In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument ...hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the very belief in determinism cannot count as justified. On this ground Lockie argues that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we are free. In this paper I discuss and reject Lockie’s transcendental argument for freedom. Lockie’s argument relies on the assumption that in judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations – e.g., the obligation to believe that determinism is true, or the obligation to aim to believe the truth about determinism. I argue that this assumption rests on a wrong conception of the interplay between judgments and commitments.
Beliefs about free will and determinism have been shown to associate with and influence behavior. The present study examined the relationship between these beliefs, key social cognitive constructs, ...and gambling behavior. A cross-sectional design was used with assessments taken of participants' (N = 316) past gambling behavior; beliefs in free will and determinism; and attitude, perceived behavioral control, and intention toward gambling. Four weeks after survey completion, participants (N = 218) reported their gambling behavior. A MANOVA examined differences between gambling frequency and constructs. Bivariate correlations and regressions were undertaken to understand the relationships between constructs and gambling behavior. Results showed frequent gamblers had significantly greater positive attitudes and intentions toward gambling compared to infrequent gamblers. Infrequent gamblers also had significantly stronger perceived behavioral control and beliefs in free will than frequent gamblers. Free will significantly predicted attitude and perceived behavioral control, and explained additional variance in intention above attitude and perceived behavioral control. There was no effect for determinism. Finally, gambling behavior was explained by intention and perceived behavioral control, but not beliefs in free will and determinism. The study provides evidence for the association between free will beliefs, key social cognitive constructs, and gambling behavior. Future research should confirm the causal role of these relations.
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