Formalni pojam kontrole u pravu preuzimanja razlikuje se od materijalnopravnog pojma kontrole u pravu povezanih društava s obzirom na opseg sudjelovanja u temeljnom odnosno glasačkom kapitalu ciljnoga odnosno ovisnoga društva. Razlika u određenju pretpostavljene mogućnosti prevladavajućeg utjecaja i kontrole nad društvom ne proizlazi iz različitog stupnja utjecaja u društvu. Jer i vladanje i kontrola ponajprije ovise o mogućnosti postavljanja članova upravljačke strukture, a koja se ostvaruje dosezanjem obične većine na glavnoj skupštini društva. Ako dioničar i ne drži apsolutnu većinu glasačkih prava u društvu, kadar je izvršavati prevladavajući utjecaj u njemu. Stjecanjem dionica s pravom glasa u iznosu većem od 25% dioničar prekoračuje kontrolni prag i dužan je objaviti javnu ponudu za preuzimanje, a adresati ponude su svi preostali tzv. manjinski dioničari ciljnoga društva. Oni slobodno odlučuju o prihvatu ponude i istupanju iz društva ili njezinu odbijanju. Stjecatelju dionica pribrajaju se glasovi i onih dioničara koji s njim zajednički djeluju. Uočena su nedostatci u određenju visine kontrolnog praga kao i uređenju zajedničkog djelovanja pa se de lege ferenda preporučuje izmjena relevantnih odredbi i daju se prijedlozi za nju. U pravu povezanih društava štite se vanjski dioničari ovisnoga društva na način da ih se ovlašćuje na isplatu primjerene naknade odnosno otpremnine, ali samo u slučajevima kada je sklopljen ugovor o vođenju poslova društva i ugovor o prijenosu dobiti. Moć vladajućega društva nad ovisnim iskazuje se sintagmom „prevladavajući utjecaj“. Vladajuće je ono društvo koje može neposredno ili posredno imati prevladavajući utjecaj na ovisno društvo, a presumira se da je društvo koje se nalazi u većinskom sudjelovanju ovisno o društvu koje u njemu ima većinski udio. Nakon razmatranja odnosa moći u društvima dionice kojih su uvrštene na uređenom tržištu i povezanih društava uočava se da se pravozaštitni ciljevi prava preuzimanja i prava povezanih društava ne preklapaju, niti su im isti adresati osim u slučaju društava dionice kojih su uvrštene na uređeno tržište. The formal concept of control in the law on takeover differs from the substantive concept of control in the law on affiliated companies related to the extent of participation in the basic or voting capital of the target or subsidiary company. The difference in determining the assumed possibility of prevailing influence and control over the company does not stem from a different degree of influence in the company. This is because both governance and control primarily depend on the possibility of appointing members of the management structure, which is achieved by reaching a simple majority at the general meeting of the company. If the shareholder does not even hold the absolute majority of voting rights in the company, s/he can exercise his/her predominant influence therein. By acquiring shares with voting rights to an amount greater than 25%, the shareholder exceeds the control threshold and is obliged to announce a public offer for takeover, and the addressees of the offer are all the remaining so-called minority shareholders of the target company. They freely decide whether to accept the offer and leave the company or reject it. The votes of those shareholders who act together with him/her are added to those of the share acquirer. Shortcomings were observed in the determination of the maximum of the control threshold as well as in arranging joint action, so recommendations de lege ferenda regarding amendments to the relevant provisions and proposals are made. In the law of affiliated companies, the external shareholders of the subsidiary company are protected in such a way that they are authorized to pay appropriate compensation or severance pay, but only in cases where a contract on the management of the company’s affairs and a contract on the transfer of profits have been concluded. The power of the ruling company over the dependent is expressed by the phrase “dominant influence”. The ruling company is the one that can directly or indirectly have a predominant influence on the dependent company, and it is presumed that the company that is in majority participation is dependent on the company that has a majority share in it. After considering the power relations in companies whose shares are listed on the regulated market and related companies, it is observed that the legal protection objectives of the right of takeover and the rights of related companies do not overlap, nor are they the same addressees, except in the case of companies whose shares are listed on the regulated market.