Ovaj rad iz perspektiva filozofije biologije i filozofske antropologije tvrdi načelnu nemogućnost hibridnoga potomstva čovjeka i genskih srodnika iz vrsta antropoidnih majmuna. Ta se tvrdnja izvodi iz suvremene znanstvene spoznaje o manjoj genskoj sličnosti čovjeka i majmuna nego se ranije mislilo (uz oslabljenu poziciju genetskoga redukcionizma) i supstancijalne razlike morfologija dviju vrsta. Hibrid tih dviju vrsta nije moguć logički ni ontološki jer bi morao spajati kontradiktorna morfološka obilježja. On the basis of the perspectives of the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of anthropology, this paper claims that, in principle, hybrid offspring between anatomically modern humans and their closest genetic relatives from the anthropoid monkey species is not feasible. However, possible anthropological, moral and ideological implications and arguments linked to the (in)feasibility and attempts at hybridization are not the focus of this paper. The successful hybridization of two different species assumes their genetic and morphological likeness, i.e. a close genealogical relationship. The author believes that there exist genetic and morphological facts that point to the general infeasibility of such hybridization as follows: 1) contemporary scientific knowledge claims a smaller genomic similarity between the two species than was previously thought, and the position of genetic reductionism is weakened; and 2) the morphology of the two species is only apparently similar as they are actual ly substantively different. A hybrid between these two species is neither logically nor ontologically possible, because it would have to combine the contradictory morphological characteristics of man and animal, namely, specialized animal and non–specialized human characteristics. The human species is also, among its other traits, biologically unique.