Cilj poslovanja bolnišnic, ki so organizirane kot javni zavodi, ni ustvarjanje dobička, ampak izvajanje dejavnosti, za katero so bile ustanovljene. Z izpeljavo tega načela lahko predpostavimo, da bodo bolnišnice stremele k doseganju minimalnega presežka prihodkov nad odhodki, in sicer ne glede na višino sredstev, ki jih prejmejo. Akutna bolnišnična obravnava se plačuje po sistemu skupin primerljivih primerov (SPP). V sistemu SPP zaradi zgodovinskega toka dogodkov bolnišnice prejemajo različno visoka sredstva za enake opravljene storitve, kar lahko vpliva na uspešnost njihovega poslovanja. Izbrani vzorec zajema 15 bolnišnic, ki so organizirane kot javni zdravstveni zavodi in izvajajo zdravstveno dejavnost le na sekundarni ravni. Obstaja povezava med višino cene uteži, ki jo posamezni izvajalec prejme po sistemu SPP, in presežkom prihodkov nad odhodki posameznega izvajalca (Spearmanov rho = 0,52, p=0,000). Zanimivo pa je dejstvo, da je ob upoštevanju enotne cene uteži in prilagoditvi izkazov nanjo poslovanje bolnišnic bolj neenakomerno kot ob različnih cenah uteži, standardni odklon presežka prihodkov pa se poveča za 59 %. Glede na navedeno je treba razmisliti o dokončnem poenotenju cen uteži v slovenskih bolnišnicah. The aim of hospitals organised as public institutes, is not to make profit, but to perform the activities for which they were established. By the derivation of this principle, we may assume that hospitals will seek to achieve a minimum surplus of income over expenditure, irrespective of the amount of funds they receive. Acute hospital treatment is paid according to the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) system. Under the DRG system, due to the historical flow of events, hospitals receive different levels of resources for the same services performed, which in turn may affect their business performance. The selected sample includes 15 hospitals, which are organised as public health institutions and which perform health care services at the secondary level only. There is a link between the cost of weights an individual provider receives according to the DRG system, and the surplus of revenues over expenses of each provider (Spearman's rho = 0.52, p = 0.000). However, what is interesting is that with uniform cost of weights and statements adjusted accordingly, hospital performance is even more uneven than with different costs of weights, while the standard deviation of the surplus revenue increases by 59%. Given the above, reflection is needed on the final uniformity of cost of weights in Slovenian hospitals.