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Batrancea, Larissa; Nichita, Anca; Olsen, Jerome; Kogler, Christoph; Kirchler, Erich; Hoelzl, Erik; Weiss, Avi; Torgler, Benno; Fooken, Jonas; Fuller, Joanne; Schaffner, Markus; Banuri, Sheheryar; Hassanein, Medhat; Alarcón-García, Gloria; Aldemir, Ceyhan; Apostol, Oana; Bank Weinberg, Diana; Batrancea, Ioan; Belianin, Alexis; Bello Gómez, Felipe de Jesús; Briguglio, Marie; Dermol, Valerij; Doyle, Elaine; Gcabo, Rebone; Gong, Binglin; Ennya, Sara; Essel-Anderson, Anthony; Frecknall-Hughes, Jane; Hasanain, Ali; Hizen, Yoichi; Huber, Odilo; Kaplanoglou, Georgia; Kudła, Janusz; Lemoine, Jérémy E.; Leurcharusmee, Supanika; Matthiasson, Thorolfur; Mehta, Sanjeev; Min, Sejin; Naufal, George; Niskanen, Mervi; Nordblom, Katarina; Öztürk, Engin Bağış; Pacheco, Luis; Pántya, József; Rapanos, Vassilis; Roland-Lévy, Christine; Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria; Salamzadeh, Aidin; Savadori, Lucia; Schei, Vidar; Sharma, Manoj; Summers, Barbara; Suriya, Komsan; Tran, Quoc; Villegas-Palacio, Clara; Visser, Martine; Xia, Chun; Yi, Sunghwan; Zukauskas, Sarunas
Journal of economic psychology, 10/2019, Letnik: 74Journal Article
•We tested the slippery slope framework of tax compliance in 44 countries.•Both trust and power increase intended tax compliance and mitigate tax evasion.•Trust increases voluntary compliance and power increases enforced compliance.•Power enhances voluntary compliance only if citizens trust the authorities.•Effects were relatively stable across the 44 countries. The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
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JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP |
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in: SICRIS
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