We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor's capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment by the proportion of the allocator's payoffs that the investor can destroy. We find that punishment fosters trust when the capacity of punishment is high (i.e., when the cost of punishing is relatively low). Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior, crowding out intrinsic motivation to trust. Trustworthiness is higher with punishment than without punishment, except if investors have a high capacity of punishment
Bibliografsko gradivo je bilo uspešno dodano na polico.
Dodajanje bibliografskega gradiva na polico ni uspelo.
Gradivo je že na polici.
Trajna povezava
URL:
Faktor vpliva
Dostop do baze podatkov JCR je dovoljen samo uporabnikom iz Slovenije. Vaš trenutni IP-naslov ni na seznamu dovoljenih za dostop, zato je potrebna avtentikacija z ustreznim računom AAI.
Leto
Faktor vpliva
Izdaja
Kategorija
Razvrstitev
JCR
SNIP
JCR
SNIP
JCR
SNIP
JCR
SNIP
Izberite knjižnično izkaznico:
Baze podatkov,
v katerih je revija indeksirana
Ime baze podatkov
Področje
Leto
Povezave do osebnih bibliografij avtorjev
Povezave do podatkov o raziskovalcih v sistemu SICRIS
