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  • Environmental feedback drives cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
    Szolnoki, Attila ; Chen, Xiaojie
    Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for ... all competitors. To explore the possible consequence of this feedback we consider a coevolutionary model where the local cooperation level determines the payoff values of the applied prisoner's dilemma game. We observe that the coevolutionary rule provides a significantly higher cooperation level comparing to the traditional setup independently of the topology of the applied interaction graph. Interestingly, this cooperation supporting mechanism offers lonely defectors a high surviving chance for a long period hence the relaxation to the final cooperating state happens logarithmically slow. As a consequence, the extension of the traditional evolutionary game by considering interactions with the environment provides a good opportunity for cooperators, but their reward may arrive with some delay.
    Source: Europhysics letters : EPL. - ISSN 0295-5075 (Vol. 120, no. 5, Dec. 2017, str. 1-6)
    Type of material - article, component part ; adult, serious
    Publish date - 2017
    Language - english
    COBISS.SI-ID - 125633027
    DOI

source: Europhysics letters : EPL. - ISSN 0295-5075 (Vol. 120, no. 5, Dec. 2017, str. 1-6)
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