The “Operational Plan of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces in the event of the European War” dated 1912, with which the Russian Navy entered the First World War, is reviewed; the concept, operational structure, and tasks to the fleet units are analyzed. Strengths of the document include the principle of concentrating forces in a crucial line of action and complex use of heterogeneous forces; weaknesses are single-optionness, passive-expectant nature of actions, not quite rational operational formation of the fleet, lack of operational perspective, and poor coordination with ground forces and allies. The conclusion is made that the plan became a certain stage in the development of naval art and evidence of the creative approach to the search of forms and methods of “asymmetric” counteraction to a superior adversary. However, from the military and political point of view the document turned out to be untenable, as it was based on the only and, moreover, the least probable international political combination.