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  • Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
    Szolnoki, Attila ; Perc, Matjaž
    We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to ... enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.
    Vir: The European physical journal. B, Condensed matter physics. - ISSN 1434-6028 (Vol. 67, no 3, 2009, str. 337-344)
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del
    Leto - 2009
    Jezik - angleški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 13114390
    DOI

Vnos na polico