VSE knjižnice (vzajemna bibliografsko-kataložna baza podatkov COBIB.SI)
  • The metaphysics of secondary qualities : defending response-intentionalism
    Miščević, Nenad
    The topic is the ontology of secondary qualities, properties that seem mind independent and categorical but, according to the line defended in this paper, are not; they are rather ... response-dispositional (or response-dependent). The final view to be proposed and defended is the view, dubbed "response-intentionalism": for a surface to be of a colour C is to haveadisposition to cause a response in normal observers, namely, an intentional phenomenal C-experience. Response-intentionaIism follows on considerations of charity, i. e. minimizing and rationalizing the error of the cognizer, and inferring the best explanation: being red in a scientific sense is being such as to cause the response of (intentionally) visaging phenomenal red in normal observers under, normal circumstances.
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del ; neleposlovje za odrasle
    Leto - 2011
    Jezik - angleški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 18277896